The Effects of a Less Repressive Counternarcotics Policy on
Post-conflict Violence
Abstract
This paper examines the connection between post-conflict violence and
crime incentives. The argument is that violence should increase after
the peace signature due to the regulatory role of illegal actors in a
war economy. Colombia made history by signing a peace agreement with
the FARC guerrillas, which was hailed as one of the most inclusive and
progressive ever but also marked a significant shift towards a less
repressive counternarcotics policy. Contrary to expectations, the peace
agreements led to a rise in homicide rates in areas previously
controlled by FARC. By integrating multiple datasets and using
comparative interrupted time series, this paper reveals a significant
change in homicide rates in municipalities with previous FARC presence
after the peace accords. The rise in post-conflict violence in these
municipalities is ascribed to the combination of FARC withdrawal and
unanticipated crime incentives, which does not necessarily imply the
failure of the counternarcotics policy.