If Russia were in Africa: Analyzing the double bias of EU and U.S. sanctions

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Abstract

This article examines the double bias that the two most important senders of economic sanctions, the European Union and the United States, frequently introduce into their coercive measures. Distinguishing between sanction incidence and intensity, we conceive of the executive branch of the two senders as opportunistic actors that balance the influence of competing interest groups. We argue that economic interest groups try to prevent the imposition of strong sanctions if important interests are at stake. However, strong diasporas from the target state and violations of core liberal values increase the chance of forceful measures. Our examination of the post-Cold War era lends support to our demand- and supply-side analysis of the double bias in the coercive regimes of these two Western powers. Counterfactual simulations demonstrate that the measures of the EU against Russia and of the U.S. against China have been repeatedly too weak during the post-Cold War era.

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Introduction

When insurgent forces backed by Russia invaded Crimea in the spring of 2014, the primary question was not whether, but rather how the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) would sanction the regime of Vladimir Putin. The gradual way in which the restrictive measures expanded through the inclusion of an increasingly larger number of individuals and firms partly reflected the insufficiency of the first reaction, but also the considerable discretion that the executive branches of these senders have in designing their sanctions.

The academic literature has largely shied away from examining the intensity of economic coercion, perceiving sanction decisions as an either-or option. While Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) took the scope of economic coercion into account in their attempt to measure sanction effectiveness, later studies often focused on the decision to impose sanctions as a simple binary choice. We argue in this article that such a narrow perspective misperceives the extent to which the EU and the U.S. – the two senders that most frequently rely on coercion – bias the design of their sanctions regimes. While the two senders can withstand the pressure to sanction close economic partners or political allies completely, they can also dilute the measures if public demand renders some sort of punishment unavoidable. Yet, as is the case in court decision-making, erroneous judgments do not stop with the refusal to sanction culprits or with the soft-pedaling of their alleged wrongdoings. The senders can also sanction governments and organizations whose behavior does not challenge Western values or interests at all, or opt for severe measures against targets for which a lighter punishment would have been adequate.

This article sheds light on both types of biases, which we dub over- and under-sanctioning, respectively. Whereas the former category includes erroneous and excessive coercive measures, the latter contains cases of sanction impunity and dilution. We examine the incidence and strength of the coercive measures that the EU and the U.S. levied – or renounced – from 1989 to 2015. To understand the sanctions regimes of these most active senders, we rely on a political economy framework that conceives of the executive branches of the EU and the U.S. as agents who depend on a variety of conflicting interests. We draw theoretically on the common agency model that Bernheim and Whinston (1986) introduced and that Grossman and Helpman (1994) adapted for the analysis of trade policymaking. We argue in this vein that political executives balance the interests of competing interest groups, as well as those of the median voter, against each other. Whereas business associations typically seek to prevent, postpone, or at least water down costly sanctions, public interest groups and strong diasporas from potentially targeted states advocate for imposing sanctions against regimes whose behavior challenges fundamental values and interests that are constitutive for both the EU and the U.S. The general public supports these sanctioning efforts as the costs of economic coercion are diffuse in the beginning, and often only accrue in certain regions of the U.S. or member states of the EU. We therefore expect that sanctioning behavior responds to international developments, such as election fraud or aggressive foreign policies, as well as to domestic power constellations.

Our argument about the double sanction bias is close to McLean and Whang's (2014) study on how public opinion and special interest groups shape the onset and design of sanctions. Our theoretical framework, however, suggests that analyses of sanction bias need to take the frequently used legitimizing reasons for economic coercion into account – such as human rights violations or the development of weapons of mass destruction – in order to understand why certain actors are targeted in a specific way while others are not. We argue that the EU and the U.S. bias their sanctions regimes in accordance with the economic or political importance of an offender, expecting that the probability of powerful sanctions grows with the severity of the target's challenge to the liberal order, but declines when the economic or political interests of the sender are more pronounced. A further innovation of this article is the comparison of the conditions under which the EU and the U.S. impose sanctions; most research on coercion so far has focused on one sender or the other. We expect that both political systems are similarly responsive to interest groups, despite the considerable differences in political processes that pave the way toward eventually imposing sanctions. In the U.S., while the White House's dominance of the sanctioning process creates incentives for powerful economic interest groups to lobby against forceful sanctions, presidents cannot ignore the power of diasporas or the influence that blatant violations of liberal ideals have on public opinion. In the EU, the unanimity requirement that gives each member state veto power creates considerable access opportunities for private interests across the Union, but the Brussels bureaucracy also enjoys substantial discretion in designing coercive measures once it has received the go-ahead from member states.

Our analysis of the double bias in the imposition and design of economic sanctions relies on the EUSANCT dataset (Weber and Schneider 2022) that updates and integrates existing datasets for the analysis of sanctions from 1989 to 2015. To take the rare events nature of sanctions into account, we use the penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects (PML-FE) estimator (Cook, Hays, Franzese 2018) for the binary decision for sanctions and ordered logit models to explain the intensity of the imposed measures. The models provide ample support to our key theoretical expectations that the two liberal senders react to human rights violations and other challenges to their liberal values and interests through the imposition of economic sanctions. However, we also show that economic interests increase the risk that certain norms violators are not sanctioned at all, or that the two senders' executive branches frequently soft-pedal on measures that they could not avoid imposing. We also illustrate, based on our models, which countries have been over- and under-sanctioned between 1989 and 2015.

An integrated model of sanction design

History shows that some of the worst aggressors, human rights offenders, coup plotters, and election fraudsters have escaped sanctions from the international community completely or have only received light punishments. During the Cold War, the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union prevented the superpowers from imposing economically crippling sanctions mandated by the United Nations on each other and on their respective allies. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. and

its transatlantic allies have continued to apply sanctions erratically despite the improved geopolitical climate. The inconsistent reactions toward usurpers of presidential power in Egypt and Côte d'Ivoire in the early 2010s illustrate the arbitrariness of economic sanctions. When the Egyptian military, under the leadership of General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, instigated a coup against the regime of Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Western reactions remained muted, with only isolated calls for foreign aid cuts and other similarly moderate measures. However, the international community reacted swiftly with travel bans and an intervention force in the winter of 2010-11 when Laurent Gbagbo, former President of Côte d'Ivoire, refused to accept defeat in the second round of the country's presidential elections.

Most instances of economic coercion since the 1990s have been aimed at the restoration of democracy and human rights (von Soest and Wahmann 2015, Weber and Schneider 2022). However, major misdeeds in this domain have frequently been punished lightly, and some of the worst offenders have escaped economic sanctions completely. Conversely, in some cases the EU and the U.S. have targeted relatively innocent bystanders or relied on excessive economic coercion that does not correspond to the alleged misdeeds of the target. This suggests, theoretically, that a biased sanctions regime can manifest itself in four ideal types: impunity, dilution, wrongfulness, and excess.

Figure 1 offers a categorization of the possible forms of sanction bias, differentiating between three behaviors of the target and the corresponding responses by the sender. The target can accordingly violate the interests and norms of the potential sender massively, moderately, or not at all. The sender can impose harsh or light sanctions, or can renounce to rely on what Baldwin (1985) labelled 'economic statecraft.' Appropriate responses where the sanction policy matches the perceived behavior of the target can be found on the left-right diagonal. The other six cells represent ideal types of over- and under-sanctioning.

Target

Sender	Major violation	Minor violation	No violation
Massive sanction	**Justifiable *punishment***	***Excessive sanction***	***Massively wrongful sanction***
Light sanction	***Diluted sanction***	***Justifiable punishment***	***Wrongful sanction***
No sanction	***Massive impunity***	***Impunity***	***No violation, no sanction***

Figure 1: Forms of over- and under-sanctioning

The cells below the left-right diagonal contain three ideal types of under-sanctioning. The aforementioned treatment of Egypt after the military coup of 2013 is an example of impunity. The light initial sanctions against Russia following the annexation of Crimea are a case of dilution – the EU and the U.S. could not avoid imposing coercive measures, but did not levy an initial punishment that would adequately reflect Russia's violation of the norm of territorial integrity enshrined in the UN Charter. Over-sanctioning, by contrast, includes cases in which a sender imposes sanctions even though the behavior of the target does not warrant punishment. The coercive measures that the U.S. implemented in the early 2000s to prevent sovereign states around the world from joining the International Criminal Court arguably belong in this category. The sanctions against Cuba that the U.S. intensified in the 1990s are, as we will argue, instances of excessive coercion where the means do not match the misdeeds of the target.

The study of sanctions bias can be traced back at least to the pioneering study of Galtung (1967), who highlighted how a mixture of domestic and international factors had undermined the effectiveness of the coercive measure against Rhodesia. Three decades later, a new wave of studies started to qualify this pessimism and showed that economic statecraft can be a useful foreign policy tool in some contexts. Some methodological contributions simultaneously argued that the early empirical sanctions research did not adequately consider that the senders initially have to decide whether to employ economic coercion against a government or an organization. Nooruddin (2002), for instance, demonstrated that sanctioned countries are not a representative sample of all potential targets and that the self-selection of economic coercion needs to be tackled theoretically and empirically. Morgan and Schwebach (1997: 46) similarly pointed out that the relative ineffectiveness of imposed sanctions might be due to the high success rate of threats with economic coercion: "Sanctions may not be applied in those cases in which they would work simply because the threat may be adequate to achieve the desired results."

This literature has inspired a broad research program that explores the issue of sanctions bias by focusing on the motives of a sender to sanction a particular target, or to refrain from doing so. Most of these studies accordingly compress the incidence and design of sanctions into a binary choice and examine the sources of this decision without systematically considering the international community's 'demand' for punishment. In other words, many studies – with some notable exceptions, including Erickson (2020) as well as von Soest and Wahmann (2015) – shy away from examining the reasons or alleged motivations for imposing sanctions, and from considering the ample discretion senders have at the drafting stage of the measures. According to von Soest and Wahmann (2015), coups and controversial elections are among the factors that have frequently triggered economic sanctions. However, they also note that that the economic vulnerability of the target vis-à-vis the sender and low economic importance increase the chance of what they call *democratic sanctions* – measures that "explicitly aim to improve the level of democracy or human rights protection" (von Soest and Wahmann 2015, 18). Erickson (2020) examines how the economic and political interests of the senders dilute their attempts to protect human rights and similar values through the "metanorm" that punishes those who

break or offend liberal norms. Her empirical analysis demonstrates that the imposition of sanctions responds to violations of international norms through political violence and the development of nuclear weapons programs, although "the majority of the violations go without much material punishment" (Erickson 2020: 116).

Erickson (2020), as well as von Soest and Wahmann (2015), list target characteristics and the sender's political and economic considerations as motives to stop short of imposing coercive measures. Von Soest and Wahmann (2015) show that senders are less likely to punish former colonies, and Erickson (2020) – as well as McLean and Whang (2014) – control for the influence of alliance commitments. Examining U.S. sanctions between 1950 and 2005, Peksen and Peterson (2016) demonstrate that economic considerations strongly influence decisions to impose coercive measures. McLean and Whang (2014) find support for their main hypothesis that the anticipated ability of the target to substitute potential trade loss through its links to powerful economic players is a key mediating factor. According to them, this limits the positive effect that a target's high dependence on trade with the U.S. has on the probability of sanction onset. Bapat and Kwon (2015) show that the relationship between economic interdependence and sanctions onset is curvilinear. They find broad support for their hypothesis, derived from a game-theoretic model, that the chance of sanctions onset is smallest with moderate economic ties between the sender and the target.

Extant studies of sanctions onset suggest that political executives juxtapose the costs and benefits of economic coercion when designing a measure. To understand the trade-off, we turn to Bernheim and Whinston's (1986) common agency approach. This particular contribution to principal-agent reasoning models presents situations in which multiple principals (i.e., voters or interest groups) try to sway an agent toward their preferred outcome. Grossman and Helpman (1994: 834) used this analytical framework in their pioneering analysis of trade policymaking. Their model suggests that the policy chosen by the executive reflects the "weighted sum of aggregate social welfare and total contributions." Hence, governments balance the interests of the median voter and of interest groups, and opt for protection only if the contributions of pro-protectionist lobbies are more potent than those of free-trade lobbies. Increased protection furthermore results from the electoral importance of the people working in a protected sector. In this vein, the common agency model suggests that protection shrinks with the elasticity of the import demand and the import penetration for politically organized industries – hypotheses that have found support in various empirical studies including Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).

Economic sanctions follow a similar logic in the sender economy as barriers to trade because they reduce aggregate welfare and redistribute income from consumers and the export sector to import-competing industries. However, governments can also count, at least in the short-term, on some electoral gains if the proposed sanction has enough visibility to boost the popularity of the actor (i.e., the governments of the EU member states jointly and the U.S. president or Congress). The common agency framework suggests that senders like the EU and the U.S. typically have to weigh the electoral gains of

potential sanctions against the support they may lose in economic circles that maintain close business ties with the target.

We assume, in line with an emerging literature, that the diaspora of the target living in the sender countries, public interest groups, and the average voter are typically the strongest advocates of economic coercion. Evaluating survey responses in ten EU member states, Onderco (2017) demonstrates, in accordance with our conjecture, that political factors outweigh economic considerations in the respondents' assessments of the sanctions against Russia. This can translate to a surge in popular support if political leaders impose sanctions in cases where citizens demand some action against a target state. Whang (2011: 799) shows for the United States between 1948 and 1999 that "sanctions are an efficient way of displaying 'do something' leadership to the public in the midst of international conflict." Drury (2001), McLean and Whang (2014), and Attia (2020) provide similar evidence that sanctions can be used for domestic purposes.[1]

These results bolster our assumption that the immediate economic costs do not play a major role in the citizens' evaluation of economic sanctions, but rather that they follow the call by public interest groups for punishing a government that acts against the key interests and values of the two Western powers examined in this context. Democratic leaders are likely to respond to these concerns if their political survival depends upon the support from stakeholders who favor the imposition of economic sanctions following a perceived misdeed by a target. As they can count on strong regional support, diaspora organizations are particularly important lobbyists for or, on some occasions, against economic sanctions. The Cuban American National Foundation (e.g., Haney and Vanderbush 1999) has for instance played a crucial role in building support for the design and continuation of economic measures against the regime of Fidel Castro and his followers. Rubenzer (2011) additionally shows that campaign contributions by ethnic minority groups affect the voting behavior of members of Congress on sanction-related bills.

Kim and Whang (2018) present evidence that the presence of U.S. nongovernmental organizations in a potential target country boosts the chances that U.S. decision-makers threaten or impose sanctions. Platte (2018) demonstrates in a comparative study that the size of a diaspora community residing in a sender country increases the chances of sanctions imposition, while Rubenzer and Redd (2010) present experimental evidence that it is in fact the effective mobilization of ethnic minorities which makes the imposition of sanctions more likely.

[1] Voters in targeted countries similarly perceive mainly the political aspects of sanctions and are accordingly willing to shoulder some economic pain instead of pressing their governments to give in immediately to the senders' demands. Grossman, Manekin, and Margalit (2018) show, in line with Galtung's (1967) classic study on Rhodesia, that Israeli citizens supported the hardline stance of their government in response to the EU's decision to label imports produced in the occupied West Bank. Similar survey experiments conducted by Frye (2019) on public opinion effects of the coercive measures against Russia do not lend support to this 'rally around the flag,' according to which sanctions are often ineffective because of increasing solidarity with the targeted political leadership. Respondents were only more likely to withdraw support from Russian leadership if they endured economic hardship in the past few years.

Transnationally active interest groups can amplify the influence of public opinion on sanctions imposition. Murdie and Peksen (2013: 48) argue that such organizations provide "information to the world community about human rights atrocities" and pressure governments through their 'naming and shaming' campaigns to initiate sanctions. Peksen et al. (2014) emphasize that the media must pay attention to human rights violations, and McLean and Whang demonstrate that the chances of imposing sanctions grows with increasing voter awareness of a particular foreign policy challenge.

These studies suggest, in line with the common agency approach, that decision-makers will compare the domestic political gains they can achieve with sanctions against the economic and international political costs. As we have indicated, the sanction bias can manifest itself not only in the absence of measures against some targets, but also in the design of respective measures. Distinguishing between different types of sanctions, McLean and Whang (2014) find that growing export interests increase the chances of targeted sanctions as opposed to aid or trade sanctions. We similarly expect that a sender's economic and political interests in the target country lower the chances of sanctions and reduce their intensity once imposed.

However, senders cannot completely disregard the actions that they attribute to a target, rightfully or not. As coercive measures are, in many cases, a response to a perceived or real misdeed in some countries, an examination of economic sanctions' imposition and design must take the sender-target relationship – and some key behavioral attributes of the potential target – into account. Interestingly, many studies on sanction onset do not control for these factors in a systematic way. The sole focus on the domestic roots of sanctions might, however, severely bias the findings. As indicated, von Soest and Wahmann (2015), as well as Erickson (2020), are among the exceptions to this trend.

The following three hypotheses summarize our argument that the two senders carefully consider the political gains of a sanction against the mainly economic costs. This reasoning affects the imposition and design of coercive measures and leads to what we call the *double bias* in economic sanctions. Our analytical framework allows us to distinguish between the demand and supply side of economic coercion. The first two hypotheses stress the international (H1) and domestic reasons (H2) for the imposition of sanctions that match the violations of norms advocated by the two senders. While public interest groups are expected to call for sanctions, economic interest groups are expected to lobby against them or, if they cannot stop their imposition, against economically costly measures.

H1: Violations of core liberal values increase the chances of sanctions imposition and powerful coercive measures.

H2: The larger the diaspora community from a potential target is in a sender, the more likely a sender is to impose costly sanctions.

H3: The more important a target is economically or politically to the EU or the U.S., the less probable it is that these senders impose sanctions, or that imposed sanctions are forceful.

The ways in which sanctioning decisions are made by the two senders under examination differ greatly. For the U.S., the primary actor in the sanctions domain is the executive branch, although Congress has increased its influence through various legislative initiatives, including the Magnitsky Act of 2012. As Tama (2020: 410) writes, "the president frequently signs and implements sanctions legislation despite considering it ill-advised and possessing the ability to opt out of applying its provisions." In addition, Hatipoğlu (2014) advances a veto point argument to show that imposed sanctions initiated by Congress last longer than those originating from the White House.

The complexity of U.S. sanctions decision-making with its two key players is shunned by the often Byzantine way in which the EU makes decisions about economic coercion (Giumelli 2011). As the supranational EU employs unanimity for sanctions imposition, the decision-making costs are much larger than in the United States. The absence of a strong permanent executive also renders it much more difficult to threaten targets effectively (Weber and Schneider 2020). However, the EU has strengthened its regime over the period studied in this article. The interests of different EU member states are often highly divergent and it is difficult to agree on a common foreign policy. The interests and coalitions within the EU change not only with regard to the target but also over time. After the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, the EU imposed an embargo on arms sales to China. From 2003 onward, there were constant debates about lifting the embargo, and individual member countries' positions changed over time depending on which government was in charge (e.g., whereas Germany's former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was in favor of lifting the EU's arms embargo on China, his successor, Angela Merkel, opposed its removal).

We thus expect that the supranational actor needs more room for compromise when designing its coercive measures. The possibility of scaling in order to satisfy particular interests is therefore more important for the EU than for a sender such as the United States with fewer veto points.

> *H4:* Strategic economic and political variables that explain both the imposition and the scaling of sanctions are more likely to differ between these two stages in the sanctioning process of the EU than in the decisions of the U.S.

Research design

This article examines the double bias of the liberal sanctions regimes in the post-Cold War era with a particular focus on the political and economic factors that influence the imposition and design of coercive measures. To do so, we employ the dyadic version of the EUSANCT data set (Weber and Schneider 2022). This database has assembled the sanctions and non-sanction cases from 1989 to 2015, focusing on economic coercion by the three most frequent senders, the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States. The source contains information on 15.0231 dyad-years, covering 199

countries.[2] EUSANCT builds on and extends earlier sanctions datasets, most notably the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan et al. 2009; 2014).[3] The dataset identifies the sender of a threatened and imposed sanction and, if multiple senders contributed to the coercive effort, the primary instigator.

As we only consider the EU and the U.S. in this article, the database refers to 10.154 dyad-years. The first dependent variable, sanction incidence, is a binary concept. Of the 1,339 sanction dyad years, 901 are U.S. and 438 are EU dyad years.[4] Besides sanctions incidence, this study aims to explain the strength of the imposed measures in a given dyad year. This ordinal variable is based on the multiplication of two proxies included in the EUSANCT dataset, the imposed sanction's "economic costs" and "target costs," respectively. The six categories of these two constitutive concepts include visa bans over aid sanctions, arms embargos, targeted financial sanctions, trade sanctions, and economic embargoes. We assume that the costs to the sender increase steadily. If several types of sanctions instruments are in place, the coding reflects the most severe measure. The multiplicative intensity variable contains eight categories for both the EU and the U.S. sanction dyad years. The appendix contains alternative specifications of the intensity variables with largely unchanged coefficients.[5]

The first hypothesis examines the conditions under which the two senders react to the behavior of the target. To start with, we expect that the two senders are less likely to target democracies. As both the EU and the U.S. were committed to democratic values during the period of observation, we expect them to target democracies less frequently and, if they impose a sanction, to employ relatively light measures. We use the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Score (Coppedge et al. 2017) to measure the extent to which the targets adhered to democratic ideals. Military coups and severe human rights violations are a core justification for the imposition of coercive measures. To examine these possible relationships, we rely on the Global Instance of Coups (Powell and Thyne 2011) dataset and the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2016), respectively. The five-point PTS scale evaluates the extent to which a government sanctioned killings. We also examine whether the presence of an armed conflict or one-sided violence in a real or possible target country increases the incidence and intensity of sanctions. These indicators are taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Allansson et al., 2017, Pettersson and Eck, 2018. A final frequent reason for imposing sanctions is a country's intention to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. We employ data on pilot-scale enrichment or reprocessing plants in operation (Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015) to measure the extent to which a country pursues such a program.

[2] The case level dataset refers to 325 sanctions threatened or imposed by the three senders. The potential or real target countries are all states that were member states of the United Nations in the period of examination, plus Taiwan. The number of dyad years is smaller than the triple of the 5.077 country-years because certain UN member states ceased to exist during the observation period.

[3] The database also integrates cases of the HSE dataset by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990; 2007) and the GIGA Sanctions Dataset (Portela and von Soest, 2012). For a full description of EUSANCT, see Weber and Schneider (2022).

[4] We also did some calculations using information on sanction threats.

[5] These alternative concepts are based on a reduction in the number of categories in the constitutive terms.

The second hypothesis similarly expects that the two senders are more likely to impose sanctions and opt for a costly design of coercive measures in the presence of public interest groups. As the presence of these diffuse interests is difficult to measure, we approximate it through the size of the diaspora communities in the EU and in the U.S. Data on the diaspora population of a potential or real target is taken from Platte (2019), who relied on the Global Bilateral Migrant Database of the World Bank (Özden et al. 2011).

The theoretical framework implies that the two senders take the economic and political importance of the target into account when deciding on the imposition and design of coercive measures. We approach these possible concerns through the inclusion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, as well as the logged export and import volumes. GDP per capita, measured in constant 2010 US$, is a World Development (2017) indicator, while the export and import figures were taken from Eurostat (2017) and Barbieri and Keshk (2016). The political dependencies between the sender and the target consider whether a country is an ally of the U.S. or of at least one EU member state through a defense pact. We relied on ATOP Data, v4.01 dataset to obtain this dummy variable (Leeds et al. 2002). Moreover, for EU sanctions, we include an additional dummy variable which indicates former colonies of EU member states. Data was obtained through the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017).[6]

To test for the fourth hypothesis regarding the difference between EU and U.S. sanctioning behavior, we conduct separate analyses for the two senders. To account for the rare event nature of sanction incidence, we employ the penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects (PML-FE) estimator introduced by Cook, Hays, and Franzese (2018). This approach corrects for the erroneous estimate of the baseline risk of sanctions onset, which frequently results in inflated estimates for the effects of the covariates.[7] To estimate sanction intensity, we employ ordered logit regressions. All independent variables are lagged since the imposition and maintenance of sanctions are lengthy processes.

Analyzing sanction bias

Although the EU employs sanctions less frequently than the U.S., it has become a prominent sender in its own right. As we have shown elsewhere, the main difference in the outcome of the sanctions process is that the imposed sanctions by the EU are more effective than those of the U.S. However, the U.S. achieves its goals more often than the EU with its sanction threats. This divergence can be explained by the ability of the superpower to commit itself more credibly to its demands. In addition, the supranational organization needs, as indicated, to coordinate among its member states before reaching any agreement on a joint position (Weber and Schneider 2020).

[6] A corresponding dummy variable covering U.S. sanctions was excluded, as it only covers 54 dyad years.
[7] The relatively small size of the EUSANCT dataset does not create the problem of obtaining incorrect inferences that can arise when a rare event outcome and a rare event predictor are used in a large dataset (Beiser-McGrath 2022).

The two actors also differ in their treatment of potential sanction cases. 7,194 dyad years, and hence almost half of the 15,231 dyad years in the entire dataset, could have experienced sanctions if a target's behavior challenged at least one of the liberal norms advanced by the two senders.[8]

Among the 4,639 EU dyad years, only 438 (less than 10%) experienced a sanction by the supranational organization. The equivalent proportion is roughly 22% for the U.S. (901 out of 4,176 dyad years). Although these figures do not include the relatively rare UN sanction, the statistics reveal that many potential targets have escaped economic coercion completely and that the EU grants impunity to human right offenders and other culprits more frequently than its U.S. counterpart. The situation appears similar when we consider the strength of the imposed measures. On a scale ranging from 1 to 36, the average intensity of the EU's imposed sanctions is 13.5 compared with 14.8 for the U.S. As a t-test reveals, this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the median EU sanction has a strength of 9 while the U.S. has a strength of 8, indicating that the variance of the intensity is larger for the latter sender. The differences in sanction intensity are mainly driven by the higher costs of the coercive measures and not by the costs to the target, the second component of the overall intensity measure.

We analyze the determinants of sanction incidence and design bias in a stepwise fashion. Table 1 and Table 2 report the effects of the variables that explain the onset and the intensity of EU sanctions while the results for U.S. sanctions are provided in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.

The coefficients in Table 1 show, at the 1% significance level, that military coups and nuclear enrichment increase the probability of sanctions incidence, whereas higher scores in the democracy index and in a colonial past reduce the probability of sanction imposition. As reported in the complete model in column 5, the occurrence of a military coup or a higher latent nuclear capability increase the odds of being sanctioned by 2.2 and 0.7, respectively. A one-point increase in the five-point scale of the Electoral Democracy Index decreases the odds of being targeted by EU sanctions by 4.7, with all other factors being equal. Similarly, countries which have been European colonies in the past are less likely to be sanctioned by the EU, as the coefficient in column 5 shows the odds decrease by 1.9. In line with this theory, we also find – at the 10% significance level – that higher levels of political terror, larger sizes of diaspora communities in the EU, and lower trade relations in the form of exported goods decrease the probability of being the recipient of economic sanctions by the EU. These results clearly illustrate that the EU is following a political agenda while implementing sanctions, especially punishing autocracies and states that did not belong to the colonial empires of some of the member states. Being part of a defense alliance is positively related to the incidence of economic sanctions, and it should be investigated whether this result is structurally driven by the numerous alliances in which the EU is involved. These results, however, clearly show that the EU is following a political agenda while

[8] The analysis refers here to the variable 'potential_sanction' of the dataset. It refers to human rights violations, political violence, military coups, and nuclear enrichment as the most common reasons for the imposition of sanctions. A more detailed description of this variable can be found in the Online Appendix of Weber and Schneider (2022).

implementing sanctions punishing especially non-democratic countries and being more forgiving towards former colonies.

Table 1: The incidence of economic sanctions by the EU, 1989-2015

VARIABLES	(1) EU Sanction	(2) EU Sanction	(3) EU Sanction	(4) EU Sanction	(5) EU Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-3.646***			-4.040***	-4.670***
	(0.916)			(0.843)	(1.013)
Political Terror Scale	0.314**			0.250**	0.280*
	(0.125)			(0.119)	(0.144)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	0.939			0.608	2.218***
	(0.859)			(1.338)	(0.224)
Military Coup	0.760***			0.861***	0.746***
	(0.111)			(0.111)	(0.155)
One-sided Violence	0.245			0.0963	-0.0842
	(0.218)			(0.234)	(0.252)
Military Conflict	0.207			0.247	0.161
	(0.183)			(0.198)	(0.267)
Former EU Colony		0.000189	-0.168	-1.270***	-1.907***
		(0.00688)	(0.203)	(0.483)	(0.450)
Logged GDP per capita		0.00279	-0.318	0.415*	-0.150
		(0.00421)	(0.267)	(0.245)	(0.260)
Logged EU Export Value		-0.0140	-0.336**	-0.539**	-0.450*
		(0.0103)	(0.142)	(0.213)	(0.230)
Logged EU Import Value		0.00984	0.0648	0.122	0.0688
		(0.00866)	(0.114)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Defense Alliance		0.00769	-0.248	1.054**	0.536*
		(0.0176)	(0.544)	(0.473)	(0.300)
Diaspora Population Stock			0.0576		0.110*
			(0.0575)		(0.0625)
Constant	-5.001***	-1.326***	3.307	0.596	5.293**
	(0.503)	(0.0621)	(2.872)	(3.050)	(2.514)
Observations	3,848	4,548	3,475	3,658	2,781
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on target states in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are obtained using the penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects (PML-FE) estimator through the biased-reduction generalized linear model. Country and year fixed effects are included. All explanatory variables are lagged for one year. Columns 1 to 4 include partial models while column 5 reports the final model.

Table 2 shows that nuclear latency, the democracy index, and military coups significantly explain the intensity of EU sanctions. In line with expectations, the coefficient for nuclear enrichment is highly significant and positive. More precisely, a country that has built uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities increases its odds of being targeted by stronger sanctions by 17, all factors included. Having a higher democracy score decreases the odds of being targeted intensively by 5.5. Interestingly, while the occurrence of a military coup increases the odds of being punished by EU sanctions, it decreases the intensity of sanctions. Finally, regarding the effect of the other political and economic control variables, we do not find evidence for the claim that the EU shies away from sanctioning powerful states. Neither the target's GDP per capita nor the import and export values increase the likelihood of sanction incidence or intensity. Ultimately, in the case of EU sanctions, we

can confirm the first two hypotheses, but we do not find significant evidence for the third theoretical expectation.

Table 2: The intensity of economic sanctions by the EU, 1989-2015

VARIABLES	(1) Intensity EU Sanction	(2) Intensity EU Sanction	(3) Intensity EU Sanction	(4) Intensity EU Sanction	(5) Intensity EU Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-6.205***			-5.008**	-5.500**
	(1.914)			(2.158)	(2.580)
Political Terror Scale	0.468			0.0842	0.0903
	(0.356)			(0.319)	(0.418)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	4.580***			4.876***	17.09***
	(1.222)			(1.197)	(1.429)
Military Coup	-0.700***			-0.696**	-0.678*
	(0.242)			(0.289)	(0.396)
One-sided Violence	0.244			0.725	0.924
	(0.505)			(0.539)	(0.846)
Military Conflict	-0.219			0.223	0.247
	(0.823)			(0.766)	(0.684)
Former EU Colony		-0.252	-0.539	-0.329	-0.788
		(0.513)	(0.635)	(0.717)	(0.798)
Logged GDP per capita		-0.392	-0.466	-0.353	-0.371
		(0.264)	(0.285)	(0.318)	(0.336)
Logged EU Export Value		-0.0619	-0.336	-0.165	-0.431
		(0.378)	(0.433)	(0.378)	(0.424)
Logged EU Import Value		0.264	0.412	0.290	0.355
		(0.234)	(0.272)	(0.259)	(0.286)
Defense Alliance		-2.205***	-2.129***	-1.066	-0.814
		(0.478)	(0.437)	(0.702)	(0.899)
Diaspora Population Stock			0.0430		0.0133
			(0.0993)		(0.134)
Observations	395	385	295	345	258
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on target states in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are obtained using an ordered logit regression. Year fixed effects are included. All explanatory variables are lagged for one year. Columns 1 to 4 include partial models while column 5 reports the final model.

Regarding the likelihood of sanction incidence by the U.S. between 1989 and 2015, we find highly significant effects at the 1% level for the democracy level, nuclear latency, political terror, and export value, while the diaspora community and military coups are significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Similar to EU sanctions, these results show that the U.S. is more likely to sanction less democratic countries and states pursuing nuclear enrichment programs. While the odds of being targeted by U.S. sanctions decrease by 2.6 for each unit increase in the democracy index, the coefficient is even larger in the case of EU sanctions (4.7). On the contrary, a higher nuclear latency more than doubles the odds of being sanctioned by the U.S. compared to the EU (4.7 compared to 2.2), clearly showing the relative importance of democracy and potential nuclear attacks for the two senders. In line with this finding, for the incidence of U.S. sanctions, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) coefficient becomes highly significant and suggests that a one unit increase along the fourteen levels of the PTS increases the odds

of being sanctioned by 0.4. The occurrence of a military coup is positively related to the imposition of U.S. sanctions, although less significantly than in EU cases. A larger size of the diaspora community increases the likelihood of sanction incidence more significantly than in the EU scenario. Finally, countries that import a larger value of U.S. goods are less likely to be targeted by U.S. sanctions.

Table 3: The incidence of economic sanctions by the U.S., 1989-2015

VARIABLES	(1) US Sanction	(2) US Sanction	(3) US Sanction	(4) US Sanction	(5) US Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-2.188***			-2.248***	-2.622**
	(0.765)			(0.745)	(1.333)
Political Terror Scale	0.287***			0.256***	0.406***
	(0.103)			(0.0946)	(0.147)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	0.468			0.579	4.683***
	(0.341)			(0.462)	(1.772)
Military Coup	0.543***			0.587***	0.412*
	(0.110)			(0.105)	(0.232)
One-sided Violence	0.145			0.0872	-0.103
	(0.180)			(0.187)	(0.288)
Military Conflict	-0.0950			-0.0128	0.238
	(0.200)			(0.188)	(0.310)
Logged GDP per capita		0.216	0.860*	0.430	0.278
		(0.437)	(0.515)	(0.402)	(0.461)
Logged U.S. Export Value		-0.342***	-0.727***	-0.295***	-0.673***
		(0.100)	(0.154)	(0.0981)	(0.168)
Logged U.S. Import Value		-0.0921	0.0695	-0.0920	0.0449
		(0.0722)	(0.0953)	(0.0823)	(0.0986)
Defense Alliance		-0.338	-0.425	-0.139	-0.116
		(0.321)	(0.291)	(0.463)	(0.196)
Diaspora Population Stock			0.462**		0.392**
			(0.205)		(0.177)
Constant	-4.543***	-5.311	-12.61***	-6.692**	-7.183*
	(0.407)	(3.563)	(4.276)	(3.217)	(4.322)
Observations	3,848	4,403	2,155	3,615	1,767
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on target states in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are obtained using the penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects (PML-FE) estimator through the biased-reduction generalized linear model. All explanatory variables are lagged for one year. Columns 1 to 4 include partial models while column 5 reports the final model.

The coefficients in Table 4 show that the democratic and political terror levels, as well as the size of the economy and the value of imports, significantly determine the intensity of sanctions at the 5% level. Higher levels of political terror increase the intensity of sanctions whereas, similar to the EU decisions, the U.S. sanctions stronger countries with lower levels of democracy and those not affected by military coups. Interestingly, two economic factors account for stronger U.S. sanctions. On the one

hand, the more powerful the economy (i.e., larger logged GDP per capita) the higher the probability of being intensively sanctioned. On the other, the export value coefficient loses its significance in Table 4 when compared to Table 3, while the import value coefficient is significantly and negatively correlated with the intensity of sanctions. These results show support for all three hypotheses, both in the cases of sanction onset and intensity. The findings moreover suggest that the U.S. calibrates the intensity of sanctions not only on political factors, but also on economic factors.

Table 4: The intensity of economic sanctions by the U.S., 1989-2015

VARIABLES	(1) Intensity US Sanction	(2) Intensity US Sanction	(3) Intensity US Sanction	(4) Intensity US Sanction	(5) Intensity US Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-5.021***			-6.120***	-5.408**
	(1.522)			(1.378)	(2.374)
Political Terror Scale	0.0629			0.411	0.773**
	(0.270)			(0.256)	(0.383)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	2.022***			1.340**	1.138
	(0.639)			(0.586)	(0.934)
Military Coup	-0.691**			-0.607	-1.149*
	(0.293)			(0.406)	(0.691)
One-sided Violence	0.443			0.583	0.683
	(0.451)			(0.490)	(0.623)
Military Conflict	-0.175			0.258	0.574
	(0.489)			(0.647)	(0.800)
Logged GDP per capita		0.234	0.240	1.050***	1.111**
		(0.196)	(0.271)	(0.301)	(0.455)
Logged U.S. Export Value		0.134	-0.213	-0.0153	-0.207
		(0.202)	(0.296)	(0.141)	(0.195)
Logged U.S. Import Value		-0.133	-0.239	-0.168	-0.280**
		(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.112)	(0.117)
Defense Alliance		-1.370***	-1.932***	-0.292	-0.345
		(0.433)	(0.624)	(0.699)	(1.014)
Diaspora Population Stock			0.748***		0.390
			(0.261)		(0.288)
Observations	844	827	489	741	427
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Standard errors clustered on target states in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are obtained using an ordered logit regression. All explanatory variables are lagged for one year. Columns 1 to 4 include partial models while column 5 reports the final model.

We can illustrate the double bias through cases of under- and over-sanctioning. To this end, we count the number of years that a real or potential target country received the wrong treatment from 1989 to 2015. The counterfactual analysis that we conducted relies on the empirical models that only include the "demand side" of economic coercion and thus measures of norm violations that are typically used for the justification of sanctions. For the PML-FE models, the counterfactual analysis relies on the discrepancy between the predicted probability of being targeted and the decision of the sender from sanctioning the target or not. The simulations conducted on the basis of the ordered logit models

similarly assess the difference between the predicted intensity and the real strength of the imposed measures.

According to our calculations, Bulgaria, Russia and the former USSR are countries that the EU should have targeted respectively in 24, 22 and two years during the examination period from 1989 to 2015 (Table 5). The impunity that these countries received despite their human rights problems and other punishable misbehavior can be explained by the economic and political importance of these countries for some member states of the supranational organization. Nevertheless, the EU probably should not have granted membership to Bulgaria in light of its fledgling democracy and its treatment of ethnic minorities. Afghanistan, Cuba and Sudan, by contrast, are countries that the EU punished too lightly during seven, three and 23 years, respectively (Table 6). By contrast, Equatorial Guinea has been falsely sanctioned for a total of 23 years (Table 5). Similarly, North Korea, Myanmar, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Yugoslavia have been targeted too strongly by the EU for a total of 41 years (Table 6), showing a clear bias against countries which are both politically and economically not the main partners of European countries.

Table 5: Errors in sanction incidence by the EU, 1989-2015

Country	**Years**	**Percent**	**Cum.**
Falsely not sanctioned			
Bulgaria	24	50.00	50.00
Russia	22	45.83	95.83
USSR	2	4.17	100.00
Total	48	100.00	
Falsely sanctioned			
Equatorial Guinea	23	100.00	100.00
Total	23	100.00	

Notes: Estimations based on Table 1, model 1.

Table 6: Errors in sanction intensity by the EU, 1989-2015

Country	**Years**	**Percent**	**Cum.**
Under-sanctioned			
Afghanistan	7	21.21	21.21
Cuba	3	9.09	30.30
Sudan (-2011)	22	66.67	96.97
Sudan (2012-)	1	3.03	100.00
Total	33	100.00	
Over-sanctioned			
North Korea	12	29.27	29.27
Myanmar	24	58.55	87.80
Serbia	3	7.32	95.12
Serbia and Montenegro	1	2.44	97.56
Yugoslavia	1	2.44	100.00
Total	41	100.00	

Notes: Estimations based on Table 2, model 1.

We find that the U.S. did falsely not sanction for 24 years Egypt and Lagos and, for five years, Montenegro, while Cuba and Somalia were falsely sanctioned for 24 years respectively (Table 7). Moreover, Cuba also received too strong measures in comparison to similar cases for 22 years. This is similar to the treatment of Myanmar (24), Iran (24) and Iraq (14) (Table 8). While the hesitance of sanctioning Egypt may result from the strategic partnership with the ruling autocrats on the Nile, the political clout of the Cuban diaspora in U.S. politics most likely explains the impossibility to abandon or at least weaken the sanctions against the communist neighbor. The hostility of the Iranian and Iraqi leadership towards the United States and the fear that these autocracies pursue nuclear weapons programs might explain the prolonged over-sanctioning in these cases. Finally, Afghanistan (13), China (24), Eritrea (10) and Liberia (4) are cases where the U.S. employed relatively weak sanctions (Table 8).

Table 7: Errors in sanction incidence by the U.S., 1989-2015

Country	**Years**	**Percent**	**Cum.**
Falsely not sanctioned			
Egypt	24	45.28	45.28
Laos	24	45.28	90.57
Montenegro	5	9.43	100.00
Total	53	100.00	
Falsely sanctioned			
Cuba	24	50.00	50.00
Somalia	24	50.00	100.00
Total	110	100.00	

Notes: Estimations based on Table 3, model 1.

Table 8: Errors in sanction intensity by the U.S., 1989-2015

Country	**Years**	**Percent**	**Cum.**
Under-sanctioned			
Afghanistan	13	25.49	25.49
China	24	47.06	72.55
Eritrea	10	19.61	92.16
Liberia	4	7.84	100.00
Total	97	100.00	
Over-sanctioned			
Cuba	22	26.19	26.19
Iran	24	28.57	54.76
Iraq	14	16.67	71.43
Myanmar	24	28.57	100.00
Total	150	100.00	

Notes: Estimations based on Table 4, model 1.

The statistical analysis and simulations confirm that the EU and U.S. sanctions are frequently biased. We have found nevertheless support for the first theoretical expectation that the incidence and intensity of sanctions is partly a response to international norms violations. This implies technically that statistical models of sanction onsets or incidence that seek to uncover the domestic politics of economic coercion should control for some of these factors to avoid omitted variable bias. The analysis also supports for the U.S. the second hypothesis

according to which the presence of public interest groups – measured through the size of the diaspora from a potential target – increase sanction incidence and intensity. Economic and political interests of the senders are - in partial support of the third hypothesis - a further source of the double bias in the sanction regimes of the EU and the U.S. This confirms the general expectation that decision makers balance public and private interests against each other when deciding about the onset, design, and continuation of economic sanctions. Special relations of the senders to the targets through their colonial histories or alliance commitments also increase the probability that these partners can escape harsh coercive measures. We did, however, not find strong support for our conjecture that the EU weakens its sanctions more than the U.S. While the Western superpower employs more intensive measures at the average and is especially more likely to use harder sanctions against economically powerful states than the supranational organization, the median intensity of EU coercion exceeds the one of the U.S. We suspect that these marginal differences can be partly explained by the relative success that the military superpower possesses with its threats for economic coercion – an instrument that the EU uses far less frequently (Weber and Schneider 2020).

Conclusion

"Little thieves are hanged, but great ones escape" – defenders of economic coercion often face the accusation that the onset and scaling of economic sanctions follows the logic of this popular proverb. The real or alleged misdeeds of weak actors are, in this perspective, much more likely to be punished than the wrongdoings of powerful culprits. In addition, less resourceful targets receive harsher punishments than their more capable counterparts.

In this article, we have examined whether coercive measures of the EU and the U.S. suffer under this double bias. Our study identifies the conditions under which political and economic reasons supersede the influence that the behavior of the target states has on the design of economic sanctions by the U.S. and the EU. We find, on the one hand, considerable support for justifications that politicians and civil servants provide when they announce new sanctions or the intensification of existing ones. Coercive measures by the EU and U.S. thus respond to worsening human rights conditions and growing evidence that a target maintains or pursues a nuclear enrichment program. There is, on the other hand, also considerable support for the double bias conjecture. While economic factors only play a marginal in the EU decision-making process, the U.S. does not shy away from imposing sanctions on economically powerful states. However, the larger the export value of goods to a country, the less likely it will be sanctioned, and the larger the imported goods, the lower the odds of being sanctioned intensively.

The occurrence of a military coup in a potential target state has a surprising effect on both U.S. and EU sanctions: it increases the odds of being sanctioned in the first place but also decreases the intensity of punishment. In comparison to the U.S., decision-making in the EU makes the organization prone to impose sanctions on certain targets, but likely to significantly water down these measures to the point that only symbolic sanctions remain. Ultimately, we find strong support for our first two hypotheses, but only mixed evidence for the other two theoretical expectations. The empirical results nevertheless confirm that decision-makers in the two political systems consider the influence of their polities and of the situation in the target state when they design economic sanctions.

The empirical analysis has also allowed us to identify countries that, in light of their behavior, were either too intensively sanctioned, had escaped harsher coercion, or, in some cases, were not punished at all. Under-sanctioned cases typically include permanent members of the UN Security Council, particularly Russia or China. Less powerful countries would thus have received harsher punishments for similar offences.

The quantitative analysis that we have conducted does not reveal the extent to which the two senders grant exemptions on humanitarian grounds once the sanctions have been imposed. In the future, archival research might also reveal which agents were calling for harsh or watered down coercion in prominent sanction episodes. However, most sanctions and their renewals are not in the public limelight. This article has therefore shown how changing domestic and international contexts have affected the imposition and intensity of "average" sanctions in the post-Cold War era.

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Appendix

Table A: Alternative measure of intensity of economic sanctions by the EU, 1985-2015

VARIABLES	(1) Intensity EU Sanction	(2) Intensity EU Sanction	(3) Intensity EU Sanction	(4) Intensity EU Sanction	(5) Intensity EU Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-7.131***			-5.960***	-6.709***
	(2.198)			(1.998)	(2.441)
Political Terror Scale	0.513			0.0489	0.0222
	(0.356)			(0.299)	(0.367)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	17.58***			17.58***	17.74***
	(0.887)			(1.121)	(1.319)
Military Coup	-0.771***			-0.714***	-0.582*
	(0.232)			(0.270)	(0.318)
One-sided Violence	0.296			0.855*	1.049
	(0.512)			(0.518)	(0.953)
Military Conflict	0.148			0.746	1.122
	(0.764)			(0.795)	(0.742)
Logged GDP per capita		-0.347	-0.540	-0.301	-0.680
		(0.576)	(0.755)	(0.785)	(0.998)
Logged U.S. Export Value		-0.367	-0.432	-0.341	-0.370
		(0.263)	(0.283)	(0.328)	(0.345)
Logged U.S. Import Value		0.0921	-0.169	0.0433	-0.214
		(0.409)	(0.485)	(0.367)	(0.400)
Defense Alliance		0.212	0.352	0.247	0.330
		(0.247)	(0.306)	(0.270)	(0.304)
Diaspora Population Stock		-2.566***	-2.426***	-1.318*	-0.902
		(0.613)	(0.579)	(0.751)	(0.861)
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index			0.0703		0.0440
			(0.109)		(0.159)
Observations	395	385	295	345	258
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B: Alternative measure of intensity of economic sanctions by the EU, 1985-2015

VARIABLES	(1) Intensity EU Sanction	(2) Intensity EU Sanction	(3) Intensity EU Sanction	(4) Intensity EU Sanction	(5) Intensity EU Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-8.250***			-7.417***	-9.112***
	(2.583)			(2.388)	(2.847)
Political Terror Scale	0.536			0.0139	-0.0271
	(0.413)			(0.366)	(0.440)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	18.33***			26.44***	27.40***
	(0.923)			(1.205)	(1.391)
Military Coup	-1.075**			-1.107**	-0.901
	(0.423)			(0.518)	(0.663)
One-sided Violence	0.309			0.976	1.162
	(0.566)			(0.602)	(1.029)
Military Conflict	0.0905			0.729	1.118
	(0.832)			(0.873)	(0.812)
Logged GDP per capita		-0.374	-0.519	-0.408	-0.773
		(0.562)	(0.724)	(0.789)	(0.997)
Logged U.S. Export Value		-0.343	-0.398	-0.328	-0.386
		(0.286)	(0.304)	(0.369)	(0.397)
Logged U.S. Import Value		0.153	-0.119	0.144	-0.133
		(0.453)	(0.531)	(0.434)	(0.466)
Defense Alliance		0.174	0.313	0.175	0.261
		(0.263)	(0.327)	(0.293)	(0.313)
Diaspora Population Stock		-14.85***	-15.38***	-14.97***	-14.58***
		(0.796)	(0.848)	(1.130)	(1.273)
			0.0955		0.0513
			(0.104)		(0.161)
Observations	395	385	295	345	258
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C: Alternative measure of intensity of economic sanctions by the U.S., 1989-2015

VARIABLES	(1) Intensity US Sanction	(2) Intensity US Sanction	(3) Intensity US Sanction	(4) Intensity US Sanction	(5) Intensity US Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-4.798***			-5.861***	-5.261**
	(1.534)			(1.473)	(2.381)
Political Terror Scale	0.0908			0.413	0.777**
	(0.254)			(0.254)	(0.390)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	2.152***			1.575**	1.087
	(0.618)			(0.663)	(0.998)
Military Coup	-0.712**			-0.590	-1.143
	(0.284)			(0.390)	(0.715)
One-sided Violence	0.390			0.594	0.452
	(0.428)			(0.469)	(0.639)
Military Conflict	-0.324			0.140	0.505
	(0.465)			(0.631)	(0.744)
Logged GDP per capita		0.253	0.191	1.003***	0.973**
		(0.197)	(0.269)	(0.315)	(0.448)
Logged U.S. Export Value		0.150	-0.182	0.0349	-0.144
		(0.195)	(0.284)	(0.137)	(0.193)
Logged U.S. Import Value		-0.123	-0.228	-0.166	-0.273**
		(0.145)	(0.151)	(0.109)	(0.114)
Defense Alliance		-1.385***	-1.890***	-0.302	-0.231
		(0.455)	(0.654)	(0.742)	(1.031)
Diaspora Population Stock			0.730***		0.354
			(0.264)		(0.284)
Observations	844	827	489	741	427
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D: Alternative measure of intensity of economic sanctions by the U.S., 1989-2015

VARIABLES	(1) Intensity US Sanction	(2) Intensity US Sanction	(3) Intensity US Sanction	(4) Intensity US Sanction	(5) Intensity US Sanction
V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index	-5.046***			-6.189***	-5.613**
	(1.801)			(1.570)	(2.643)
Political Terror Scale	0.179			0.572**	0.908**
	(0.289)			(0.270)	(0.418)
Pilot-scale Nuclear Latency	2.221***			1.574**	1.167
	(0.682)			(0.681)	(1.112)
Military Coup	-0.809**			-0.768	-1.359
	(0.348)			(0.523)	(1.041)
One-sided Violence	0.386			0.656	0.498
	(0.425)			(0.460)	(0.637)
Military Conflict	-0.347			0.109	0.454
	(0.482)			(0.694)	(0.784)
Logged GDP per capita		0.253	0.170	1.119***	1.014**
		(0.204)	(0.278)	(0.360)	(0.515)
Logged U.S. Export Value		0.163	-0.194	0.0404	-0.151
		(0.203)	(0.296)	(0.145)	(0.203)
Logged U.S. Import Value		-0.125	-0.233	-0.175	-0.289**
		(0.152)	(0.158)	(0.117)	(0.118)
Defense Alliance		-1.632***	-2.097***	-0.607	-0.377
		(0.528)	(0.736)	(0.874)	(1.184)
Diaspora Population Stock			0.771***		0.379
			(0.282)		(0.317)
Observations	844	827	489	741	427
Year Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1