This article examines the double bias that the two most important
senders of economic sanctions, the European Union and the United States,
frequently introduce into their coercive measures. Distinguishing
between sanction incidence and intensity, we conceive of the executive
branch of the two senders as opportunistic actors that balance the
influence of competing interest groups. We argue that economic interest
groups try to prevent the imposition of strong sanctions if important
interests are at stake. However, strong diasporas from the target state
and violations of core liberal values increase the chance of forceful
measures. Our examination of the post-Cold War era lends support to our
demand- and supply-side analysis of the double bias in the coercive
regimes of these two Western powers. Counterfactual simulations
demonstrate that the measures of the EU against Russia and of the U.S.
against China have been repeatedly too weak during the post-Cold War
era.