Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that Hegel can be considered a semi-pantheist
because his understanding of God or the Absolute closely aligns with
Spinoza’s, who is recognized as the first modern pantheist. However,
Hegel’s concept of God - the Absolute differs significantly from
Spinoza’s understanding of God as Nature or substance. In order to
arrive at this conclusion, I partitioned my paper into three distinct
sections. In the first section, an examination is conducted on Spinoza’s
pantheism through an analysis of the notion of God as an infinite,
necessary, and independent substance, as articulated in Spinoza’s
seminal work, Ethics. In the second section, I am seeking Hegel’s
exposition on pantheism in relation to the notion of God as presented in
his works. In this particular section, I argue that the notion of God as
the Absolute exhibits certain attributes that align with the notion of
God as nature or substance as described in Spinoza’s account. In the
final section, which comprises two sub-sections, an attempt is made to
address the inquiry regarding Hegel’s pantheistic position through an
analysis of his conceptualization of pantheism. Within the first
sub-section, it is contended that Hegel refutes the notion that
pantheism is synonymous with atheism. In the subsequent subsection, it
is argued that while Hegel espouses the concept of pantheism, he does
not exhibit the characteristics of a pantheist. I explore the concept
that the Absolute or God is subjective in order to demonstrate that
while Hegel’s God or the Absolute and Spinoza’s God exhibit certain
similarities, they diverge in their understanding of subjectivity.
Subsequently, I deduce that Hegel is a semi-pantheist.