Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that Hegel can be considered a semi-pantheist because his understanding of God or the Absolute closely aligns with Spinoza’s, who is recognized as the first modern pantheist. However, Hegel’s concept of God - the Absolute differs significantly from Spinoza’s understanding of God as Nature or substance. In order to arrive at this conclusion, I partitioned my paper into three distinct sections. In the first section, an examination is conducted on Spinoza’s pantheism through an analysis of the notion of God as an infinite, necessary, and independent substance, as articulated in Spinoza’s seminal work, Ethics. In the second section, I am seeking Hegel’s exposition on pantheism in relation to the notion of God as presented in his works. In this particular section, I argue that the notion of God as the Absolute exhibits certain attributes that align with the notion of God as nature or substance as described in Spinoza’s account. In the final section, which comprises two sub-sections, an attempt is made to address the inquiry regarding Hegel’s pantheistic position through an analysis of his conceptualization of pantheism. Within the first sub-section, it is contended that Hegel refutes the notion that pantheism is synonymous with atheism. In the subsequent subsection, it is argued that while Hegel espouses the concept of pantheism, he does not exhibit the characteristics of a pantheist. I explore the concept that the Absolute or God is subjective in order to demonstrate that while Hegel’s God or the Absolute and Spinoza’s God exhibit certain similarities, they diverge in their understanding of subjectivity. Subsequently, I deduce that Hegel is a semi-pantheist.