Introduction
Do you think it is moral to cultivate human embryos just to test them in
the lab? Is it morally permissible to destroy embryos to extract their
stem cells? Is it acceptable to use human embryos for scientific study
and then kill them? Do you think it is right? Is there a window of
opportunity to legally support abortion while an embryo is still
developing? The answers to these questions about embryonic human
personhood will be explored in this paper. The structure of this paper
will consist of four main parts. Based on the scientific facts about the
early embryo, we will explore embryo development over time in the first
section. The second section will go on to define the embryo. To what
extent is the embryo a person? Two sub-sections will be devoted to
analyzing the two possible responses to this question: The immediate
animators’ position is that, at the time of conception (fertilization),
the embryo is already a human being. Conversely, proponents of the
immediate-delayed animation school of thought argue that every stage of
embryonic development does not involve a human being. In the third part,
I address some of the criticisms leveled against delayed animation and
highlight some of the issues associated with this perspective. In the
last section, I offer some challenges to the developmental view
regarding the criteria for personhood. In light of all this evidence, I
have come to the conclusion that the embryonic human being is a human
person throughout its entire life cycle. Consequently, no effort must be
made to harm or destroy this human being in any way.
The early human embryo development
This section focuses on the central inquiry of embryo science, also
known as embryology, which investigates the characteristics, behaviors,
and developmental processes of early embryos in order to discover the
truth regarding the genesis of Homo sapiens – human beings.
The development of an individual human being begins with fertilization
or conception which is a combination of the sperm and the egg (ovum) to
form a zygote into an embryo and fetus is a process that goes through
several stages that occur during the full-length term of thirty-eight
weeks. We can divide this process into five parts: (1) the
Pre-fertilization stage Gametogenesis; (2) The fertilization and
implantation; (3) the Embryonic stage; (4) the Fetal stage.
Gametogenesis
In this stage, the gametes which are the sperm cell and the egg cell
(oocytes) come to be formed and developed, in preparation for
conception. Spermatogenesis occurs when sperm are generated in the
testes and subsequently deposited in the epididymis. Spermatogonia
(primordial germ cells) are transformed into mature sperm through this
process. This development commences during puberty. Spermatogonia
remains latent in the seminiferous tubules of the testes during
gestation and until the time of birth. They increase in quantity
throughout puberty. Spermatogonia develops and transforms after multiple
mitotic divisions (Moore et al., 2016, p. 12).
The transformation of primordial germ cells (oogonia) into mature
oocytes in females is referred to as oogenesis. Oogenesis, as opposed to
spermatogenesis, commences at the moment of delivery. It indicates that,
following delivery, no oogonia develop into primary oocytes. Until
puberty, the primary oocytes (oogonia) remain in ovarian follicles.
Female reproductive cells also undergo the meiotic process. The initial
meiosis is completed by the primary oocytes prior to the day of
ovulation. The secondary germ oocytes initiate the second stage of
meiosis at ovulation; this stage is incapable of completion in the
absence of fertilization (ibid., 17).
Fertilization and implantation
Fertilization is the procession of events that begins when a father’s
sex cell – sperm unites with a mother’s sex cell - oocyte and ends up
with the intermingling of twenty-three maternal and twenty-three
paternal chromosomes to form a new single entity, the human embryo. In
this procession, the sperm and the oocyte cease to exist, and a new
organism. The new organism possesses all the essential genetic material
required to guide its further development into a fully developed human
adult individual (Cantens, 2019, p. 12). The process of fertilization
doesn’t happen all at once; it’s made up of several steps that happen
over time (about 24 hours).
After fertilization, the new cell zygote continues its development by
way of cell division called cleavage before moving to the uterus. In
this process, one cell of the zygote divides into two, then four, eight,
and so on. These cells are called blastomeres. Three days after
fertilization, the embryo contains about sixteen cells, and its name at
this stage is morula which has two layers: an inner group of cells
called inner layer, and outer layer. The distinction between the two
layers more clearer after four days of fertilization. The inner layer is
called the embryoblast, and the outer layer is called the trophoblast.
The whole embryo at this time is called the blastocyst.
On the sixth day after fertilization, the embryo begins the process of
implantation, and this procession finishes ten to twelve days after
fertilization. After implantation, the embryo begins to take nourishment
(oxygen and nutrition) from its material tissues (Tollefsen and George,
2011).
Embryogenesis: gastrulation and neurulation
As mentioned above, after fertilization, the embryo has two layers: the
inner layer and the outer layer. During the second week, the embryo
continues its development in some ways. Inside the inner layer, there is
a division that divides the inner cell layer into two-layer embryonic
discs – hypoblast and epiblast. This disc will help to form all the
tissues and organs of the embryo (Moore et al. 2016, p. 44). In
addition, inside the hypoblast layer, there is one of the most important
things that indicates the site of the mouth and organizes the head
region- the prechordal plate (ibid.).
At the beginning of the third week, the third layer will be formed in
the embryo through the process of gastrulation. The gastrulation’s
procession begins with a migration of cells from the epiblast to the
center and back of the embryonic disc. This is called the primitive
streak. Consequently, the embryo has transformed into a trilayered disk
composed of upper-facing ectodermic cells, lower-facing endodermic
cells, and central mesodermic cells. The positioning of cells within
each layer is pivotal in determining the specific parts of the human
body that a cell will contribute to developing (Ibid., p. 52). Following
gastrulation, the embryo undergoes further development until the
conclusion of the eight weeks, including processes such as neurulation,
gut development, and cardiovascular system development.
In summary, during the embryonic period, the embryo undergoes the
formation of significant internal and exterior structures, thereby
preparing for the subsequent stage of fetal development that will take
place in the coming weeks.
Fetal development stage
Critical developmental processes occur from the ninth week until birth,
primarily involving rapid body growth and the division of tissues,
organs, and systems. During this phase, the external genitalia emerge at
the ninth week and reach their fully developed state by the end of the
twelfth week. The primary ossification center and bones also emerge by
the end of the twelfth week. Fetus’s eye can move and limb movement
occurs at week fourteen and his kidneys begin to function at around week
sixteen. Between seventeen and twenty weeks, a fetus can hear voices
from outside. Lungs and the nervous system develop their functions
between weeks twenty-six through twenty-nine (Moore et al., 2016, p.
94-97; Cantens, 2019, p. 15017). According to Cantens (2019), these
functions are related to the operation of the brain which indicates
human consciousness and the capacity for cognitive sapient awareness (p.
17). Since, the human brain has three major parts: cerebrum, cerebellum,
and brain stem. Each of them controls some functions of humans. The
cerebrum is the part of the brain that gives us the ability to think,
reason, remember, and feel. It is the cerebellum’s job to control motor
skills and actions. Heart and breathing are very important functions
that are controlled by the brainstem (ibid.). These functions cannot
occur before the week of twenty-six of gestation (Jones, 2004, p.
22-31).
From the standpoint of embryo science, I wish to conclude by emphasizing
several essential facts about the human embryo. First, the human embryo
is a human being at a very early stage of development. Second, the
genesis of human beings (specifically, human embryos) occurs during
conception, when sperm and oocyte combine to form a single cell known as
the human organism. Third, the embryo is completely separate from any
cells originating from either the mother or the father. This is evident
as the embryo is developing in a unique and independent trajectory. She
experiences internal growth that is focused on her own survival and
personal development. Fourth, the embryo possesses a genetic composition
that is distinctive to human beings. Finally, the embryo is a completely
mature organism, although it is still in the embryonic stage (Lee and
George, 2008, p. 120).
What are early human embryos?
In accordance with the analysis presented in the preceding section, the
human embryo is a human being. Nevertheless, it might be argued that an
embryo possesses human characteristics yet lacks the status of a human
being. They differentiate between human beings as completed organisms at
any level of human development and human persons who acquire some
characteristics of personhood. ”Personhood is a foundation concept in
ethics, including both pure philosophical ethics and the applied field
of ethics,” state Farah and Heverlein (2007), who also note that
establishing criteria for personhood and defining the concept of person
are crucial tasks in the field of ethics (p. 39). Do human embryos
possess personhood or not? Two contradictory hypotheses (immediate
human person and delayed human person )11Adapted from the theory
of immediate animation, which was put forth by a significant majority
of Catholic thinkers, the phrase ”immediate human person” signifies
that a spiritual soul is present in the fertilized ovum from the
moment of conception. However, the term ”delayed human person”
originates from the theory of delayed animation, which posits that the
infusion of the human soul occurred at some point during the interim
period following conception rather than at the instant of conception.
Anselm, Aquinas, and a multitude of eminent scholastic intellectuals
all endorsed this theory.
In this paper, the term “immediate human person” indicates that the
embryo is a human person at the moment of conception. Human beings are
human persons. The phrase “delayed human person” means human beings
are not human persons at conception, but they are human persons at
some point after fertilization. that pose a philosophical conundrum
regarding the definition of personhood are put forth in response to this
inquiry.
Immediate human person or standard view
The initial perspective, known as the immediate human person (standard
view), posits that the emergence of a human person occurs
instantaneously upon conception. According to John Gallagher (1984),
“looking at all of the likely evidence suggested in the literature
… none of it gives reason to believe that the human person begins
to exist at any other point than fertilization”. In this perspective, a
human person is considered to be a human being. Put simply, personhood
is an innate quality that exists in every human being at every stage of
their development (Miklavic and Flama, 2017, p. 130). A human being does
not become a human person at some point during the development of the
embryo after conception. Consequently, a human person is already present
at the moment of fertilization, but they undergo further development
over time, progressing through various stages including zygote, embryo,
and fetus. Thus, the distinct phases of growth following conception,
namely zygote, embryo, and fetus, merely delineate the various stages of
a human person’s life as infant, baby, toddler, child, teen, and adult,
rather than elucidating the process by which an entity transforms into a
human person. This is because, at the moment of fertilization, the
zygote or early embryo possesses all the genetic material necessary for
its maturation and progression into a significantly larger organism. The
advocate of this perspective posits that the attainment of personhood
occurs at the moment of conception (ibid., 131). Consequently, it can be
inferred that the embryo obtains the characteristics of a human person
throughout all stages of its developmental trajectory, beginning from
the point of fertilization. In the following section, I will examine
another personhood position.
Delayed human person or developmental view
In contrast to the early hypothesis positing that human individuals are
human beings, wherein an embryo is considered a human person upon
conception, some proponents argue that human beings acquire human
personhood at a certain stage subsequent to fertilization. It signifies
that human beings do not possess the characteristics of being human at
the very first moment of conception. It follows that not all human
beings are human persons (Miklavic and Flaman, 2017, p. 131). Defenders
of this viewpoint argue that human embryos and fetuses possess the
characteristics of human beings. Nevertheless, they differentiate
between a human being and a person and assert that embryonic human
beings have not yet attained the status of human persons. Advocates of
this hypothesis contend that human beings in the embryonic phase,
including the zygote, embryo, and fetus, are merely intermediate stages
in the progression of human existence and possess the capacity to
develop into human beings. However, they argue that embryos do not
possess personhood due to their lack of advanced cognitive abilities or
functions. According to Lee and George (2007), proponents of this
perspective assert two fundamental concepts related to the status of
personhood. Firstly, it is necessary to identify certain fundamental
characteristics or criteria that define personhood. Furthermore, the
attribution of personhood occurs as an incidental characteristic during
the early stages of embryonic development (p. 131-133).
Criteria for personhood
Several philosophers have put forward a set of criteria for determining
personhood that encompasses human abilities, physical growth, and
psychological and cognitive abilities (Miklavic and Flaman, 2017, p.
134). It means that there are several criteria such as rationality,
self-consciousness, self-awareness, and only these properties constitute
the fundamental attributes of a being that we could designate as a
person. Boethius is the first one who give an explicit definition of
personhood: ”an individual substance of a rational nature” (Boethius
n.d., chap. 3). In this definition, the cognitive ability – rationality
is a significant component of personhood account. Following Boethius,
Locke and Kant also claim that intelligence is an essential
characteristic of personhood (Locke, 1996; Kant, 1948). Several
contemporary thinkers also propose a series of criteria to decide which
entities are persons and which are not. Tooley (1972) argues that
something is a person “if it possesses the concept of a self as a
continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes
that it is itself such a continuing entity.” Like Tooley, Warren (1975)
argues that to be considered a person, an entity must possess at least
some of the following characteristics: consciousness, reasoning,
self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate an indefinite
variety of types of messages, and the presence of self-concepts
(151-160). Feinberg (1980, p. 189): “persons are those beings who are
conscious, have a concept and awareness of themselves, are capable of
experiencing emotions, can reason and acquire understanding, can plan
ahead, can act on their plans, and can feel pleasure and pain.”
Englehardt (1986, p. 107): “What distinguishes persons is their
capacity to be self-conscious, rational, and concerned with worthiness
of blame or praise.”
Based on the aforementioned attributes of personhood, previous
philosophers and thinkers posit that the human embryo or fetus possesses
the genetic or biological attributes of a human being, yet it does not
possess the characteristics of a person. They contend that a fetus or
human embryo lacks the requisite characteristics necessary for an entity
to be classified as a person. They conclude that unborn human beings,
specifically human embryos, lack the characteristics of personhood and
therefore cannot be considered persons.
Others believe that a fetus or human embryo is a person when its
physical appearance is similar to the fully development human at week
nine of gestation. Others contend that a human being may attain
personhood when the central nervous system and organs are fully
developed or when some critical functions such as breathing and kidney
filtration are established at twenty-six weeks of gestation (Moore et
al., 2016, p. 97). Following these analyses, defenders of the criteria
of personhood point out some problems of the standard view.
Criticism of the standard view
Proponents of the developmental view perspective offer a critique of the
standard view viewpoint, which holds that human beings are defined by
the fact that the zygote or early embryo contains all the genetic
material required for its development and growth into a substantially
larger organism at the moment of fertilization.
First, for proponents of the delayed human person, a similar genetic
code is not unproblematic. According to Singer (1994), being a member of
the species Homo sapiens is not ethically relevant; some nonhuman
animals may have any trait or set of traits that we think give humans a
right to life or make it generally wrong to end a human life. In another
way, Laintinen (2007) claims that to be a member of the species Homo
sapiens for personhood, some nonhuman animals will become people if they
reach a certain level of development. Glenn (2002) argues that “most of
our genome consists of the genes we share with other species - chimps,
fruit flies and that barriers between the species begin to blur and
blend” (p. 9). Consequently, non-humans may qualify as persons based on
the similarity in their genetic codes with humans. However, this
conclusion may result in complications effect. According to this
conclusion, primates with 98 percent genetic similarity to humans may
evolve into human beings, if the genetic code is an essential component
of personhood. Wilson and Brown (2006) argue that if a comparable
genetic code is adequate to warrant personhood, then it is possible to
incorporate other nonhuman primates into this classification if their
genetic composition is comparable to that of humans; alternatively, we
must be willing to acknowledge them as moral counterparts and bestow
upon them personhood as well (pp. 602-610).
Second, proponents of the concept of the standard view encountered an
additional challenge when they acknowledged that human embryos possess
human personhood from the moment of conception, a phenomenon known as
spontaneous abortion. Spontaneous abortion refers to the occurrence of
early embryonic loss due to their failure to successfully implant
following fertilization. According to Karl Rahner (1972), it is
extremely illogical to refer to spontaneous abortion as a ”person” (pp.
225-252) with moral standing. Based on the current prevalence of early
spontaneous abortion stands at approximately 55 percent, Shannon and
Wolter (1990) argue that “such vast embryonic loss intuitively argues
against the creation of a principle of immaterial individuality
[ontological personhood] at … conception” (pp. 618-619).
Following these facts, proponents of the delayed human person contend
that the early human embryo at the stage of preimplantation is not a
human person. In other words, spontaneous abortion is great evidence to
support the developmental view’s argument that early human embryos
before implantation are not yet persons.
Twinning is another problem for the standard view. As mentioned before,
when fertilization is complete, the embryo can split and become two or
more new embryonic which is capable of developing toward two or more
distinct human beings before the implantation. The potential occurrence
of twinning restricts us from identifying the early embryo as a human
person.
To elucidate this issue, Condic (2018) provides the subsequent
illustration: A zygote (A) splits into two different organisms (B and
C). There is a causal connection between A and B and between A and C.
However, it is impossible to say that A is identical to either B or C.
We can therefore conclude that B and C are identical if this holds.
However, this is illogical in nature because of the fact that B and C
are two separate human organisms (p. 36). Proponents of developmental
view defense contend that, as a result, an early embryo is not a human
being, but a mere mass of cells at the time of fertilization.
Up to this point, it seems that the early human embryo is not a human
person at the moment of conception contrary to the assertions made by
defenders of the concept of a standard view. In the next section, an
analysis will be conducted to investigate the validity of these
criticisms are true and examine whether the delayed human person is not
unproblematic.
Some responses to developmental view criticisms
In this section, I will give some responses to the criticism mentioned
above. First, I argue that the assertion that a similar genetic code is
an adequate standard for determining personhood is invalid. Then, I
assert that the argument based on spontaneous rate is flawed
In response to the first criticism, I will show that extending
personhood beyond humans is flawed. There are two problems in the
argument that the opponents of the standard view’s view supposes. In the
first place, the fact that nonhuman primates and humans share 96 percent
of genetic material does not mean that the primates can be considered
persons. Gilad et al. (2012) say that even though human and chimpanzee
genomes are about 96% similar, they have important genetic differences
that affect phenotypes and the frequency of diseases. His study also
shows that up to 40% of the differences in gene expression between
humans and chimpanzees can be attributed to regulatory mechanisms that
control how a gene’s instructions are transcribed into RNA molecules.
Aside from that, epigenetic changes like DNA methylation and histone
modifications are very important in controlling gene expression levels
in primates (Sadler, 2012, p. 3-129).
Denying personhood to those who have a genetic code that is less than 98
percent similar to a (normal) person is another problem for those
proponents of the personhood of nonhumans. What will happen to
individuals with serious chromosomal anomalies (e.g., Turner or Down
syndrome - less than 98 percent similar), if a similar genetic code is
deemed adequate for personhood? Does this mean those individuals do not
qualify as human persons? Therefore, it appears that the assertion that
a similar genetic code is an adequate standard for determining
personhood is invalid (Miklavic and Flaman, 2017, p. 137).
To reply to the second problem with spontaneous abortion, I contend that
the argument based on Shannon and Wolter’s research is fallacious.
Miklavic and Flaman (2017) contend that judging personhood based on an
estimated spontaneous abortion is not unproblematic since having an
approximate rate is not easy. According to the statistics provided by
ArmMed Media, the rate of spontaneous abortion varies greatly from 15
percent to 60 percent22Spontaneous abortion. ArmMed Media.
http://www.health.am/pregnancy/more/spontaneousabortion/.
Accessed on March 8, 2024.. According to Moore (2016), early embryos
undergo spontaneous abortion, at an approximate rate of 45%. In another
passage, he says that spontaneous abortion typically happens during the
initial 12 weeks of pregnancy and has a prevalence ranging from 10% to
20% (p. 34, 49). Even if we have an exact number, it does not mean that
these human embryos are not persons. What was the result of Shannon and
Wolter’s research if the spontaneous abortion rate was less than 10
percent (Miklavic and Flaman, 2017, p. 138)? According to Tollefsen and
George (2011), the argument presented, which relies on these statistics,
can be classified as a natural fallacy. They give an example based on
the historical record of the high rate of infant mortality in the past
(which still happens today). According to the reasoning of Shannon and
Wolter’s argument, these babies could not be full human persons with the
right not to be killed for the good of others. However, undoubtedly, it
is wrong. Therefore, the argument fails (Chapter 5).
Another objection to the standard view is that embryo A is one whole
thing before it splits. When it splits, there are two: B and C. Both B
and C can be traced back to the early embryo where they came from. This
means that the zygote is not yet a human being. According to Patrick Lee
(2005), the fact that A can split into B and C does not lead to the
conclusion that A was not a human being before twinning as a conceptual
matter and an empirical matter (p. 123-14). As a conceptual matter, the
possibility of twinning does not show any evidence against the existence
of an individual before twinning. In case A splits into B and C, there
are three possibilities for the existence of A. First, A is an aggregate
of B and C. Second, A ceases to exist after B and C are formed. Third, A
is identical to B or C. In these possibilities, a division does not mean
that A could not have been a single person before the division (ibid.,
p. 123). As an empirical matter, Lee uses evidence of plants and
flatworms to indicate that before twinning, there is a single,
developing organism. He contends that in most cases of monozygotic
twinning, there is only one embryonic human being until some cells from
the first embryo split apart. This creates a second embryo (ibid., p.
124).
In sum, in this discussion, I gave some responses to some objections
raised by the developmental view. I demonstrate that these objections
cannot stand anymore since their argument are fallacy and invalid. In
the next section, I will raise some objections to the development point
of view.
Challenges to the developmental view
The perspective of the delayed human person posits that human beings do
not possess the status of human persons. Put simply, personhood
necessitates certain attributes, including human capabilities, physical
development, and psychological and cognitive capacities. Based on the
aforementioned criteria, I argue that these criteria are not free from
challenges.
The appearance and development of organs
Opponents of personhood contend that the complete development of organs
at some stages is a criterion for an entity to become a person. Before
that point, we had an organism but not a person. For instance, an embryo
at twenty-six weeks with a brain, heart, lungs, and kidneys is a person,
before that point, there is no person. However, this criterion implies
some obstacles. One primary concern is the arbitrary nature of
determining when organismic development is adequate to warrant
personhood since the human body develops at different rates at different
points in time. Another problem is that the human body cannot reach a
definite point of development since it is always changing until death.
All organs (cells or tissues) in our body continue to be remodeled even
when they are completely formed. if this is the case, one can lose his
personhood status if his organs continue to differentiate (it always
changes in adults).
In another way, Michael Gazzaniga, who is on the President’s Council on
Bioethics, has said that a brain is the only thing that makes a person
human. Before that, we had a human body that did not have the rights and
dignity of a person. Following this theory, an embryo with an
undeveloped brain is not a person. However, Teleffsen and George (2011)
contend that an embryo with a not-yet-developed brain is not like a
person with a dead brain. An embryo does not have a brain but it has the
potential to develop one. it is similar to an infant has ability to
develop sufficiently her thinking in the future. Embryos are potential
adults in the same way that fetuses, babies, kids, and teens are
potential adults. A human embryo is not dead, but still alive. An embryo
is a living person whose life is still ahead of her, but a brain-dead
body is a person whose life is over. A human being in the embryonic
stage of development is a complete, unified and self-integrating human
organism (Chapter 5, Brain Death).
These arguments show that the appearance and development of organs
cannot be a criterion for personhood (Miklvic and Flaman, 2017, p. 136).
The cognitive abilities
Proponents of the developmental view argue that being a person entails
more than just a human being (organism), it requires many sophisticated
cognitive functions: consciousness, reasoning, self-determination,
communication, and self-awareness. In her “ On the Moral and Legal
Status of Abortion” essay Warren claims five traits are central to the
concept of personhood: (1) consciousness, (2) reasoning, (3)
self-motivating activity, (4) communication, and (5) self-awareness (p.
55). Without these traits, a human being should not be considered a
person. Feinberg (1980,189) also argued the criterion for personhood as
follows: “persons are those beings who are conscious, have a concept
and awareness of themselves, are capable of experiencing emotions, can
reason and acquire understanding, can plan ahead, can act on their
plans, and can feel pleasure and pain.” On the same page, Englehardt
(1986, 107) claims that “What distinguishes persons is their capacity
to be self-conscious, rational, and concerned with worthiness of blame
or praise.” These criteria are proper and essential functions of human
adults. The notion of personhood employed by those thinkers, according
to Schwarz (1990), depends on how a person functions rather than on the
definition of a person. He argues that the following human capacities
are present in persons: rationality, thinking, autonomy, consciousness,
and sentience. However, Schwarz maintains that the nature of an object
is quite distinct from its function. The properties or functions of an
object do not invariably correspond with its nature. The problem with
the developmental view is that they consider the functions of human
beings as human persons. In other words, for the proponent of the
delayed human person, the essential criteria for human persons are based
on these functions. In the following subsections, I contend that there
are some problems in their point of view.
Unconscious and comatose persons
Warren posits that the prerequisites for personhood encompass cognitive
abilities that are conscious, rational, self-motivated, communicative,
and self-aware. Nevertheless, there are occasions in which these
functions fail to operate, resulting in the brain being deactivated.
During such instances, an individual lacks consciousness, rationality,
self-motivation, and self-awareness. Does he lack personhood during
these instances?
In his book entitled The Moral Question of Abortion , Stephen
Schwarz argues that it is morally wrong when we kill someone if she is
not acting like a person when she is asleep or under anesthesia.
Imagine a person in a deep dreamless sleep. She is not conscious, she
cannot reason, etc.: she lacks all five of these traits. She is not
functioning as a person. But of course she is a person, she retains
fully her status of being a person, and killing her while asleep is just
as wrong as killing her when she is awake and functioning as a person
(Schwarz, 1990, p. 89).
Based on the content of this passage, it is argued that the act of
killing someone is not permissible due to the absence of personhood, as
people are unable to exhibit consciousness while asleep or in a comatose
condition. The rationale behind this assertion is that despite being
unconscious during sleep, she retains her complete humanity and the
potential for her consciousness to be reinstated at a later time. Hence,
it would be erroneous to assert that the fundamental standards for
personhood are based upon the functional aspects of the human being, as
advocated by proponents of the developmental perspective (Cantens, 2019,
p. 49-50).
Lee and George (2005) raise another criticism of the developmental view
in their book entitled Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics
and Politics. They contend that the cognitive abilities’
self-consciousness is not the essential criteria for personhood as
advocated by McMahan (2002): “Roughly speaking, to be a person, one
must have the capacity for self-consciousness”… “and it is
equally clear that they may lose the capacity for self-consciousness,
and therefore cease to be persons, and yet not only continue to exist
but also remain alive and conscious” (4, 24-25). Based on these
statements, it appears that an individual can attain varying degrees of
personhood and subsequently attain different moral statuses based on
their level of consciousness. People vary in their level of
self-awareness, which subsequently influences their moral standing (Lee
and George, 2005, p. 13-26). They conclude that the personhood of human
beings is the same for everyone, and independent of the level of
self-consciousness. Alternatively, someone could lose his personhood,
which can subsequently be regained upon the restoration of their
self-consciousness. This problem demonstrates the inherent flaw in
defining personhood as any specific criterion or set of criteria
(Miklavic and Flaman, 2017, p. 141).
In summary, this section presents two arguments regarding the
development of appearance and cognitive capacities. It highlights
certain issues within the developmental perspective, specifically the
assertion that personhood can be attained when a human being meets
specific criteria based on their human functions. It can be inferred
that the assertions made by proponents of the developmental view
regarding the criteria for personhood are untenable. Hence, the
assertion made by proponents of the standard perspective regarding the
personhood of the early human embryo at the moment of conception is
valid.