Abstract
What is knowledge? What makes knowledge possible? What if we are wrong
about everything we think we know? Can we be sure that the things we
believe are true? Philosophers have spent years trying to answer these
questions. One answer is that Plato’s preoccupation is the traditional
epistemology with the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions
for knowledge. The assumption is that traditional epistemologists see
knowledge as justified true belief (J.T.B). In other words, once these
conditions or criteria (i.e., truth, belief, and justification) are met,
knowledge is gained or attained. However, these conditions have a severe
problem, which Edmund Gettier pointed out and challenged in his
three-page articles about the traditional analysis of knowledge in 1963.
These problems led some epistemologists to look for an alternative view
that could solve these issues. One of the solutions that many
philosophers propose is contextualism as an alternative view to solve
the problems in Gettier’s cases. In this paper, I will attempt to
investigate whether contextualism can offer a satisfactory explanation
of Gettier’s scenarios. This argument will focus on David Lewis’s
contextualism. To avoid Gettier problem, Lewis chooses a nuanced
infallibilism. The author provides these guidelines to achieve this
goal. In conclusion, I assert that Lewis’s contextualism can partially
solve the Gettier dilemma by pointing out some flaws in his account.