Peter G. Riddell
SOAS University of London
Email: pr21@soas.ac.uk
Abstract
This paper focuses on the political and nationalist activities of
Sarekat Islam in North Sulawesi in the period 1920-1950. During this
time the Sarekat Islam movement adopted three models of action:
exploiting political opportunities, setting appropriate goals, and
mobilizing resources. This freed the Indonesian community from the Dutch
political system, gave rise to a newly educated elite, and fostered a
discourse of progress and the spirit of popular nationalism. In certain
regions, especially in Bolaang Mongondow, North Sulawesi, the Sarekat
Islam movement encountered great success and there was largely an
absence of internal conflict both among the member organizations /
parties and between the broader community and Sarekat Islam. The paper
argues that Sarekat Islam both laid the groundwork for increased
political awareness and liberation and created political opportunities
for the newly educated elite and the people of Bolaang Mongondow, North
Sulawesi.
Key words: Sarekat Islam; Politics; Nationalism; Bolaang
Mongondow; North Sulawesi
Introduction
Since the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian archipelago at the beginning
of the 17th century, Indian, Arab, Chinese and native peoples had
experienced discrimination on various levels. Racial policies gradually
had an impact on social stratification (Blunden, 1997). The population
was classified into several racial groups, with the indigenous
population positioned at the lowest rung of society.
The Netherlands East Indies government control extended to political,
economic, and socio-cultural sectors. In political affairs, the Dutch
intervened across the board in determining policies relating to the
native population. Likewise in the economic sector, the Netherlands
developed a policy of giving certain trade advantages to the Chinese
(Van Wijk, 2019). Chinese traders served as a bridge between the
Netherlands East Indies government and the indigenous people in
commercial matters. The Chinese controlled certain sectors of the
Netherlands East Indies economy, such as in monopolizing batik
materials.
The confidence of the Chinese due to their commercial success increased
after the Chinese revolution of 1911 (Franklin, 2020). Economic
pressures were felt by indigenous people in Indonesia and beyond.
Indigenous leaders shored up their power base through cooperation with
outsiders. For example, the elites in Brunei competed more aggressively
for improved access to the limited economic resources available. It is
little wonder that political crises and rivalries among the ruling
classes had become a recurring feature since the first half of the 19th
century (Mansurnoor, 1996).
In addition to discrimination in political and economic issues, the
Dutch also intervened in the educational affairs of indigenous peoples.
The Dutch adopted ethical policies encompassing irrigation, education
and emigration (transmigration). Moon (2005) sees the ethical policy as
linked with technology and economic expansion. Irrigation was carried
out to increase crop yields, while in the field of education,
agricultural schools were strengthened to educate skilled workers in
agriculture. Similarly, in the field of emigration, improved
agricultural practices were promoted in various directions with the help
of equipment from the government.
The Dutch justified the ethical policies as a sign of a moral commitment
to the welfare of all indigenous peoples. These policies represented a
critical response to the previous forced planting system imposed from
1830-1870, which caused great poverty through much of the Netherlands
East Indies. This forced planting system was criticized by certain
advocates for the indigenous community, including L. Vitalis (Inspector
of Agriculture), Dr. W. Bosch (Head of the Health Office), and W.R.
Baron van Hoevell, a priest assigned to the Netherlands East Indies who
later became a Member of Parliament. The three were outspoken in
defending indigenous community rights and calling for the Dutch colonial
government to pay more attention to the welfare of indigenous peoples
(Daliman, 2012: 56).
In 1885, a number of foreign companies commenced operations in the
Netherlands East Indies in support of the Dutch colonial government,
further undermining indigenous welfare in various ways, such as via the
low wages for workers. The colonial government’s policy was criticized
from various quarters, such as the portrayal in the novel Max
Havelaar (1860) by Multatuli (Douwes Dekker). The book attributed the
poverty and suffering of the peasant community to the policies of the
colonial government. In addition, C. Th. van Deventer’s work, Een
Eereschuld (Budi’s Debt), published in De Gids in 1899,
represented the prosperity of the Dutch state as derived from the
spirit, hard work and services of the indigenous people. Van Deventer
argued that the Netherlands should pay its debts to the indigenous
community through ethical policies with a threefold focus on irrigation,
emigration and education.
Van Deventer’s arguments influenced the Dutch colonial government, as
reflected in the contents of Queen Wilhelmina’s speech entitledEthische Richting (Ethical Direction) or Nieuw Keurs (New
Direction) in 1901 (Touwen, 2000). The speech affirmed several elements:
first, the need to investigate and address the deterioration of
indigenous welfare; second, renewed efforts in the field of agriculture
and industry; third, addressing poverty by giving interest-free
loans amounting to f . 30 million with a repayment period of 5/6
years, as well as grants of f . 40 million. The Dutch colonial
government had effectively accepted the proposals of Van Deventer,
Kielstra, and D. Fock, to improve the conditions of indigenous peoples
(Daliman, 2012: 64-65). However, in their implementation the ethical
policies drifted from the original primary goal of improving the welfare
of indigenous peoples. Scholten (1996:270) argues that ethical policies
in fact had the effect of expanding Dutch rule throughout the
Netherlands East Indies by way of European-style self-government under
Dutch authority.
Shihab (1998:43-44) argues that the implementation of the ethical
policies was perceived by some Muslims as a sign of a Netherlands East
Indies government strategy towards Christianizing Indonesia’s Muslim
community. This stimulated the emergence of organizations, both
cooperative and non-cooperative, carrying an Islamic label and dedicated
to Islamic advocacy (Abdullah, 2001: 26). One such organization was
Sarekat Islam (SI).
Van Niel (1970:90-92) cites Tirtoadisoerjo’s discussion of the
establishment of SI in 1912. The reason for its establishment, with the
original name of Sarekat Dagang Islam, was not merely economic in terms
of batik trade rivalry with the Chinese (Suradi, 1997: 35-36). Rather it
represented an effort to counter all forms of racism and oppression,
including rejection of Christianizing policies, as well as the
overbearing behaviour and policies of the native civil servants and
Europeans.
SI was the first mass people’s organization as well as the first mass
political party in Indonesia, according to many historians. Furthermore,
from the perspective of Islamic politics, SI was the first Islamic
political party in Indonesia. The organization moved quickly to
establish branches in various regions in Indonesia, including Bolaang
Mongondow, North Sulawesi.
Sarekat Islam enters North
Sulawesi
SI entered Bolaang Mongondow in 1920. This area was termedOnderafdeeling (subdivision) Bolaang Mongondow with the status of
an administrative area of Manado Residency, which at that time comprised
five Kerajaans, namely the Kerajaan of Bolaang Mongondow (the largest
Kerajaan), Kaidipang Kerajaan, Bintauna Kerajaan, Bolaang Itang Kerajaan
and Bolaang Uki Kerajaan (van Rhijn, 1941: 267; Manggo, 2003: 1). The
Dutch placed a Controller and Assistant Controller from 1901 to
implement a principle of deconcentration of administrative authority.
The emerging SI movement considered strengthening the economy as vital
to raising national awareness. During the Dutch colonial period,
economic realities shaped the relationship between social classes.
Conflicts of interest had a negative effect on the living conditions of
the masses; outdated methods of production could not compete with
colonial capitalism, with its strong organization and modern technology.
Resulting disadvantage for the indigenous population contributed to the
emergence of a sense of community solidarity. This solidarity in turn
resulted in increasing agitation against the colonial authorities, with
some movements becoming radical and revolutionary.
Such conditions marked the entry of SI to Bolaang Mongondow, with the
region lagging well behind other areas in North Sulawesi in terms of
economy and education. The SI growth in Bolaang Mongondow resulted from
the intervention of SI Central in pursuit of its organizational goals.
Several representatives of SI Central were key in this regard, including
Miden Towidjojo, Abdul Muis, Suryopranoto, Harsono Cokroaminoto and
H.O.S. Cokroaminoto. The first leaders of SI in Bolaang Mongondow were
Unta Mokodongan and Adampe Dolot.
An attempt had been made by Miden Towidjojo to establish SI in the
Minahasa-Manado area in 1912 but it had not taken root because the
majority of the population was non-Muslim and the Dutch Resident was
located in this region. SI only flourished when it opened branches in
Bolaang Mongondow, Toli-toli and the Halmahera area of North Maluku.
SI penetrated North Sulawesi in mid-1919 through the efforts of Abdul
Muis as Deputy Chairman of SI Central. Abdul Muis not only campaigned
intensively in this region but also in Toli-Toli, Central Sulawesi in
the same year. With the visit of Abdul Muis, and at the initiative of
two SI figures named Dahlan and Makmur Lubis, a branch was established
in the region (Depdikbud, 1978/1979: 145).
In 1923, SI Central held a regional congress in Manado, tagged by H.O.S.
Cokroaminoto as a National Provincial Congress of the Celebes. The event
was chaired by Cokroaminoto, A. M Sangaji, and Hajjah Oemar Said
Cokroaminoto (Chairman of Central Sarekat Islam Women). The congress
participants comprised all layers of society from various regions in
North Sulawesi, including Minahasa. As for representatives of the SI
branch in Bolaang Mongondow, Pudul Imban, Mustafa Mokobombang, T.
Dilapanga, Unta Mokodongan and Dapo Londa attended. The congress
resulted in the identification of two main priorities for SI Bolaang
Mongondow, namely advancing the economy and developing the education of
the people of Bolaang Mongondow (Manggo, 2003: 6).
Adampe Dolot, leader of the BM SI and himself a native of Bolaang
Mongondo (Kosel, 2010), joined Poedoel Imban in seeking permission from
the ruler of Bolaang Mongondow, Datu Cornelis Manoppo, to acquire a plot
of plantation land in the upper plains of the Ongkag Mongondow River.
The request was granted and a plantation was initiated by eight male and
five female SI leaders. After the forest was successfully cleared,
various types of annual crops such as robusta coffee and coconut were
planted. By the end of 1925, the area that had been cleared to serve as
agricultural land for the SI Bolaang Mongondow was around 170 hectares
(Mokobombang, 1983: 71). From its produce, SI succeeded in establishing
the Khazanatullah Cooperative which was founded with the aim of
improving the economy, advancing and financing the needs of the
organization/party.
The Middle Class as the Motor of the Sarekat Islam Political
Movement: A.P.
Mokoginta
The SI political movement was closely connected with the middle class,
both those at SI Central and the local branches. The SI Bolaang
Mongondow movement, for example, included representatives from the
Muslim middle class such as Abraham Patra Mokoginta, born in Bolaang on
May 15, 1885) His vision focused on the welfare of society, including
the equality of social classes (Depdikbud, 1978/1979: 123).
After graduating from Hoofdenschool (King’s School) in Tondano in 1903,
he was appointed as Head of Kotabunan District until 1907. After studies
at the Bogor agricultural school (1907-1909), Mokoginta served for two
years as Head of Agricultural Affairs of the Bolaang Mongondow Kerajaan
with the rank of Minister of Culture whose task was to organize the
establishment of extensive rice fields in Tungoi/Mopait Village covering
an area of 500 hectares, Kopandakan Village covering an area of 200
hectares, Buyat Village covering an area of 100 hectares and Mongkad
Village with an area of 40 hectares. He then brought in various kinds of
rice and corn seeds from Lombok, elephant durian seeds, Bogor
pineapples, grapefruit (pompelmoese) and other products. He also brought
in teak wood seeds to be planted in the Loni Moyambak area, as well as
superior cattle and sandalwood horses from Makassar, together with
Australian grass seeds as food for these animals (Sugeha in Dunnebier,
1984: 115).
Mokoginta’s next role was as Jogugu (Mangkubumi/First Minister) of the
Bolaang Mongondow Kerajaan, replacing A.P. Sugeha and serving from
1911-1928. This role carried responsibility for managing the government,
including fostering the mental and moral welfare of the community,
especially targetting opium condensers and monitoring villages whose
village heads were uncooperative and recalcitrant. Jogugu Mokoginta, as
the executor of the Raja’s authority, succeeded in bringing about 80
villages in the Bolaang Mongondow Kerajaan under the Raja’s authority,
establishing more modern public housing, establishing government offices
and residences for officials.
Apart from agriculture, Mokoginta was also heavily involved in health
and education. His policies had a major impact on the development of
education and culture in Bolaang Mongondow, marked by the construction
of school buildings, both public and Dutch schools. He helped to
reinforce the Muslim identity of Bolaang Mongondow by abolishing
Christian religious education in public schools which had been
introduced and led by W. Dunnebier, a Dutch Missionary Society (NZG)
missionary. Mokoginta’s action was not without challenges and involved a
heated debate between Mokoginta and Dutch officials from the Department
of Education and Religious Affairs of Batavia who visited the Kotamobagu
area. In a meeting which was also attended by A.J.C. van der Laar Kraft
(Principal of HIS Kotamobagu in 1920), Mokoginta spoke for the 95%
Muslim community of Bolaang Mongondow, speaking in Dutch and justifying
the elimination of the NZG influence in public schools (Sugeha in
Dunnebier, 1984: 117).
In 1926, at a time of widespread PKI insurrection, Mokoginta was
undertaking studies at Bestuurschool Jakarta. He was appointed as a
prosecutor in the Department of Justice with the task of investigating
many individual cases related to the PKI rebellion, especially in the
areas of Rawa Bangke, Rawa Mangun and Rawa Manggis. He learned a great
deal about the political scene in Batavia and witnessed the emergence of
various organizations, such as Jong Java and Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB).
Meanwhile, Mokoginta’s son, Abram (Aleng), was studying medicine at
Geneeskundige Hoogeschool (GHS) Jakarta, and was also an activist. After
Mokoginta returned to Bolaang Mongondow, he cooperated secretly with SI
cadres such as Adampe Dolot and Unta Mokodongan, especially in political
activism.
During the leadership of Raja Datu Cornelis Manoppo (r. 1901-1927),
assisted by Jogugu Mokoginta, SI continued to gain support in Bolaang
Mongondow, although Dutch colonial control continued to hold sway. Datu
Cornelis Manoppo was favourably disposed towards SI, as evidenced when
the Raja granted plantation land near the north coast (Di’at Village,
Lolak District) of Bolaang Mongondow for the cultivation of coconut
seeds as a SI plantation (Sigarlaki, et al., 1977: 164-165). SI greatly
benefited from clearing agricultural land and establishing Khazanatullah
cooperatives throughout the Bolaang Mongondow regency. Likewise in the
field of education, Raja Datu Cornelis Manoppo gave permission in 1926
to SI, under the leadership of Adampe Dolot, to open private Islamic
schools, with the assistance of Mokoginta.
A.P. Mokoginta’s gifts and capabilities almost led to him assuming the
throne of the Bolaang Mongondow kingdom. When Raja Datu Cornelis Manoppo
died on 12 February 1927, Mr. Creutszberg (Vice Chairman of the Indies
Council), representing Governor General De Graeff who was travelling to
Aceh, requested that Mokoginta return to Bolaang Mongondow to occupy the
royal throne. However, this move was blocked by the Dutch authorities in
the area, as well as by several traditional leaders from Bolaang
Mongondow who supported the accusation that Mokoginta was a progressive
and rebellious leftist who was associated with the PKI. As a result, the
late Raja’s son, Laurens Cornelis Manoppo, assumed the throne.
Mokoginta also had a difficult relationship with Dutch missionaries.
Dunnebier (1915: 97-106), an erstwhile opponent of Mokoginta, argued
that while he was an intelligent and strong figure, Mokoginta was not
cooperative with the missionaries and Dutch colonial officials in
Bolaang Mongondow. In 1915 Dunnebier had published a report on the
progress of mission work in “Notices of the Dutch Missionary Society”,
which indirectly criticized the rulers and indigenous officials of
Bolaang Mongondow for intimidating those who wanted to convert to
Christianity and treating as “infidels” those who refused to become
Muslim. Dunnebier (1916:287-289) claimed that he received a direct
rebuke from Mokoginta who urged him to abandon the views which he had
expressed in this report.
Kosel (2005) sees Mokoginta’s role as an example of the ambiguity in the
relationship between the Bolaang Mongondow people and the Christian
mission, which represents part of a much more complex series of power
struggles between Bolaang Mongondow. and the Netherlands. Some Dutch
Controllers worked closely with Mokoginta as he was more efficient than
Raja Datu Cornelis Manoppo, which gradually weakened the king’s position
and contributed to an escalating power struggle between Manoppo and
Mokoginta’s respective supporters. Kosel did not see this conflict as a
Christian-Muslim struggle, rather arguing that it was more local in
nature, although it was masked in religious terminology. The
aforementioned relationship of Christianity with European and Minahasa
outsiders made Islam a gathering point for an emerging ethnic identity
and for voicing dissatisfaction with the policies of the Dutch
government (Kosel, 2005). Regardless of these debates, Islam largely
underpinned the identity of the Bolaang Mongondow community. Mokoginta
exploited that fact in pursuing his political strategy, especially to
gain community support in the face of pressures from the Dutch and from
Christian missionaries in Bolaang Mongondow.
Sarekat Islam Campaigns and Accusations of
Unrest
The edition of De Sumatra Post of 9 December 1926 andNieuwe Amsterdamsche Courant-Algemeen Handelsblad edition of 3
January 1927 reported unrest in Bolaang Mongondow at a coffee company
around six kilometers from Kotamobagu. The coffee company workers had
been campaigning for increased wages and had quit their jobs. Some media
reports linked this unrest with the intervention of SI, mentioning Unta
Mokodongan by name and particularly targeting Adampe Dolot, suggesting
he was the instigator of the troubles and associating SI with crime. At
the same time, Dolot and SI were labelled as communists in the media.
In 1928, Adampe Dolot and the leaders of the SI were accused of planning
a bombing incident. The newspaper Het Nieuws edition of 3
February 1928 reported that the Raja of Bolaang Mongondow had been
informed that conversations were overheard between Adampe Dolot and the
leaders of the SI Bolaang Mongondow who were planning to use dynamite. A
search of Dolot’s house revealed nothing but dynamite was found under
the house of anohter unnamed person. However, according to the author of
the article, since the Dutch wanted Adampe Dolot to be arrested from the
start, they devised a strategy to trap him. The leaders of the SI were
arrested and detained in Manado.
In 1940, Adampe Dolot was again accused of provoking unrest and
opposition to Dutch authority in Bolaang Mongondow. The Het
Vaderland newspaper edition of May 28, 1940, reported that the SI
Bolaang Mongondow Party was considered the most powerful group among the
political parties in the entire Netherlands East Indies.
In 1932 Harsono Cokroaminoto (1912-1992), second son of H.O.S
Cokroaminoto, was assigned by SI Central leadership to campaign on
behalf of the party in North Sulawesi while also serving as a school
teacher of English at one of the Kweekschools, drawing on skills
acquired from earlier studies in India. Harsono remained for two years,
staying with Adampe Dolot and also developing good working relations
with O.N Pakaya and Y.F.K. Dampolii. Harsono reported that he learned a
great deal from the three figures of SI Bolaang Mongondow, which
equipped him to better understand the strategies of the SI struggle.
Harsono observed that although the Bolaang Mongondow area was directly
adjacent to Minahasa, the latter was a centre for Christianity, while in
Bolaang Mongondow Islam was the majority religion. Bolaang Mongondow
therefore was the most suitable springboard for SI political progress in
North Sulawesi. Harsono’s service in North Sulawesi representing the SI
Central was challenging physically; in 1932-1934 the journey from one
area to another could take months because all travel was on foot or on
horseback, often through dense vegetation.(Cokroaminoto, 1983: 48).
1930s: Nationalist campaigning through cooperation and the
Soetardjo Petition
Political debates at the national level also influence groundroots
politics, and vice versa. The struggle for Indonesian independence
involved political parties, various other organizations and leaders as
well as the masses. With the 1929 arrest of several nationalist figures
such as Soekarno, exiled from Java by the Dutch and accused of radical
activities (Palmier, 1957), staunch supporters of the nationalist
movement founded a number of new parties. Sutan Syahrir (1909-1966) and
Mohammad Hatta (1902-1980) founded the Indonesian National Education
(PNI-Baru), while Sartono (1900-1968) founded the Indonesia Party
(Partindo). PNI-Baru focused more on strengthening political and social
education, while Partindo focused on strengthening mass action (Lev,
1967; Tas & McVey, 1969; Hatta, 1985). The two parties, founded to
struggle for Indonesia’s political independence through tactics of
non-cooperation, received close scrutiny form the Dutch, especially when
Governor General de Jonge cracked down on the nationalist movement,
leading to the arrest and exile in 1934 of the PNI-Baru nationalist
leaders and Partindo (van der Kroef, 1972).
The Dutch colonial pressure on the nationalists also prompted the
formation of a National Faction within the Volksraad (People’s Council)
(Adiputri, 2014). This was initiated by M.H. Thamrin (1894-1941) who was
also a member of the People’s Council and Chairman of the Betawi
People’s Association. The National Faction was officially established on
January 27, 1930 in Jakarta, with ten representatives from all regions
in Indonesia, covering Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, with M.H.
Thamrin as the chairman. The formation of the National Faction, apart
from concentrating its efforts on the Volksraad, also expedited progress
towards independence through changes to the state administration system,
reducing political, economic and intellectual differences, as well as
through other methods that fell within the law (Poesponegoro, 1984:
218).
The establishment of the National Faction resulted from the heavy-handed
policies of Governor General B.C. de Jonge who sought to suppress the
Indonesian nationalist movement. The arrest of non-cooperating
nationalists led some Indonesian nationalists to adopt more cooperative
strategies with the Dutch. Apart from the National Faction, various
parties and organizations moved in this direction, such as Budi Utomo,
Sarekat Islam (renamed in 1929 as Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, PSII),
the Indonesian People’s Movement (Gerindo), the Greater Indonesia Party
(Parindra) and the Union of the People of Indonesia (PBI).
A significant initiative as part of the effort to achieve nationalist
aims through cooperation was the Soetardjo Petition of 1936 promoted by
Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo (Pluvier, 1965; Abeyasekere, 1973).
Soetardjo and several other figures such as G.S.S.J. Ratulangi, Alatas,
I.J. Kasimo, Kwo Kat Tiong and Datuk Tumenggung drew up a proposal for
future cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands that was
presented to the Volksraad (van Helsdingen, 1944; Benda, 1966; Ingleson,
1980). The proposal submitted by Soetardjo on July 15, 1936 envisaged an
imperial conference under the umbrella of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
to discuss future relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands,
including the political status of the Dutch colonial government. At its
core was the status of autonomy in order to determine the fate of
Indonesia as a sovereign state, with independence in the following 10
years, based on the limitations of article 1 of the 1922 Dutch
Constitution (Kartodirdjo, 1990: 182).
The petition attracted a mixed reception from the various parties due to
their different agendas and political programs. Those from the
Indonesian side who rejected the petition were Goesti M. Noor, Soekardjo
Wirjopranoto, Wiwoho and Suroso. Goesti M. Noor explained that his
opposition was not due to the content of the petition, but rather
because the petition was submitted by raising both hands, asking and
pleading, to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It was also rejected by the
National Faction who were sceptical about its benefits.
Most of the Dutch parties also rejected the petition. The Vederlandse
Club (VC) claimed that the petition was premature and did not match the
economic and social conditions of Indonesia, which could not survive as
an independent nation. Non-Muslim parties such as the Christian
Political Party (CSP) and the Indies Catholic Party (IKP) argued that
there were more urgent problems to deal with and that unity under Pax
Neederlandica should be maintained due to unstable political conditions.
By contrast, the Indo-European Union (IEV) viewed the petition
favourably, seeing a match between the idea of the Royal Council and
the idea of the Greater Netherlands which included its various regions
(Kartodirdjo, 1990: 183).
In an attempt to breathe new life into the petition, the Volksraad held
a vote on September 29, 1936, aiming to submit the votes to theStaten Generaal (Dutch Parliament) and the Dutch Government. The
vote attracted 26 in favour and 20 against the petition with 15
abstentions, figures unlikely to be accepted by the Dutch Parliament and
the Dutch Government for several reasons. First, the petition seemed
premature given the level of political awareness in Indonesia. Second,
the position of minorities was uncertain in the proposed new political
structure. Third, it was unclear who would hold power. Fourth, the
demand for autonomy seemed inappropriate given the unstable economic,
social and political conditions at that time (Kartodirdjo, 1990: 183).
Nevertheless, there was still enthusiastic support to push for the
Soetardjo Petition to be approved by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. On
October 5, 1937, the Centraal Comite Petitie Soetardjo was
created, with sub-committees established in various regions. Central
committee members were Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo, Otto Iskandar Dinata,
Hendromartono, Agus Salim, Atik Suardi, Ignatius Joseph Kasimo, Sartono,
Sinsu, Datuk Tumenggung, Kwo Kwat Tiong and Alatas. The Central
Committee held a conference in Batavia on November 21, 1937 which was
attended by representatives of political associations, including
Tumbulaka (Minahasa Association) and M.H Thamrin, Gani, Amir
Syariffudin, Juanda, Bajasut (Indonesian Arab Union-PAI). Subsequently,
on November 28, 1937, a large meeting was held in Jakarta, in which M.
Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo explained that he, as the office-bearer of
Domestic Governance (ambtenaar binnenlandsch Bestuur , BB) who
submitted the petition, saw BB as a bridge between the people and the
government (Sutjianingsih, 1983: 36). During the meeting, many parties
supported the Soetardjo Petition, except PSII and PNI-Baru which
rejected it outright. Their arguments in rejecting the Petition were
that the contents of the Petition killed the spirit of the Indonesian
people’s struggle. In contrast was the political stance of Parindra and
Gerindo, both of which did not agree with the intent of the contents of
the petition, but accepted that holding an Imperial Conference
(Imperiale Conferentie ) would have benefit in bringing
representatives from the Netherlands and Indonesia together to discuss
Indonesia’s future.
Although the Soetardjo Petition was proposed by its supporters in a
legal manner, and the proposed Indonesian government would still be
within the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, this still
did not attract the support of most members of the Dutch Parliament. The
petition was rejected on November 16, 1938 on behalf of the Queen of the
Netherlands on the grounds that the Indonesian people were not
sufficiently prepared to take responsibility for their own affairs
(Sutjianingsih, 1983: 37). Those who supported the petition in the Dutch
Parliament were only Rustam Effendi (communist faction) and Van Galderen
(socialist faction).
The Dutch rejection of the Soetardjo petition disappointed the
nationalists. Meanwhile, the precarious international situation in
Europe as a result of the rise of Nazism threatened many countries,
including the Netherlands, and encouraged the nationalists to rally
together. On 11 May 1939 the Central Committee for the Soetardjo
Petition was disbanded, with the National Faction formed by M.H. Thamrin
within the Volksraad carrying forward the campaign for Indonesian
nationalism (Muljana, 1986: 63) and in anticipation of greater
assertiveness towards the Dutch.
Advancing the Nationalist cause: GAPI and the
1940s
On May 21, 1939, at the initiative of Parindra, a meeting was held to
form a Preparatory Committee as a step towards the formation of a
National Concentration Agency. The official meeting was held in Jakarta,
and was attended by representatives of Parindra, namely M.H. Thamrin and
Soekarjo Wiryopranoto; the PSII sent Abikoesno Tjokrosujoso, Moh. Sjafei
and Sjahbuddin Latif; Paguyuban Pasundan was represented by Atik
Soeardi, Otto Iskandar Dinata, S. Soeradiredja and Ukar Bratakoesoema;
Gerindo sent Amir Sjarifuddin, A.K. Gani, Wilopo and Sanusi Pane; Partai
Islam Indonesia (est. 1938) presented Wiwoho and K.H. Mas Mansur; and
the Minahasa Union was represented by Sam Ratulangi and Senduk.
At the meeting, M.H. Thamrin declared that the increasingly uncertain
international conditions required the immediate establishment of the
National Concentration Agency, a unified body that would fight for the
interests of the Indonesian people. In addition, members of various
political organizations in this body could continue to carry out the
programs of their respective organizations. The National Concentration
Body, known as the Indonesian Political Association (Gabungan Politik
Indonesia, GAPI), was thus born, with the goal of encouraging all
Indonesian national political parties to cooperate and organize an
Indonesian People’s Congress. In addition to its goals, GAPI was based
on the right of self-determination, as well as the unity of the
Indonesian nation on the basis of democracy in politics, economy and
society, and unity in action (Kartodirdjo, 1990: 186; Muljana, 1986:
65). The formation of GAPI was thus designed to unite political parties
committed to Indonesian independence in one organized forum.
On 19-20 December 1939, GAPI held a congress and determined that all
members should avoid acting individually. On 23-25 December 1939, GAPI
assembled an Indonesian People’s Congress (KRI) consisting of both
political and non-political organizations. This gathering resulted in
several decisions including calling for an Indonesian parliament,
identifying the red and white flag and the song “Indonesia Raya” as
the flag and anthem of Indonesian unity, as well as increasing the use
of the Indonesian language. GAPI’s serious intent was evident in 1940
when it urged the Netherlands to immediately form an Indonesian
parliament to supersede the Volksraad by involving all Indonesian
society. At the central level, the first GAPI leadership team was M.H.
Thamrin (Parindra), Raden Mas Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso (PSII) and Amir
Sjarifuddin (Pringgodigdo, 1967: 140), while membership was drawn from
several other national parties.
At the end of 1939, GAPI expanded to North Sulawesi through the
campaigning efforts of Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso (1897–1968). In Bolaang
Mongondow, R. Muaja (Parindra) met with Adampe Dolot of PSII to plan the
formation of the Bolaang Mongondow Branch of GAPI (Depdikbud, 1978/1979:
153), of which Dolot became chairman. In December 1939, GAPI Bolaang
Mongondow held a general meeting of all members of political parties and
social organizations across the BM regency. The meeting was held in the
Islamic Education and Teaching Center (BPPI) of PSII located in Molinow
Village and was attended by around 5000 participants. Speakers were
Adampe Dolot, Y.F.K. Damopolii, Kinompol Imban and Andung S. Sugeha.
During the meeting, a red and white badge was distributed to each
participant (Raupu, 2019).
Following the meeting, Controller A. van Weeren (served 1938-1940)
ordered the arrest of the leaders of PSII Bolaang Mongondow on charges
of having engaged in subversive political activities, including: (1)
aiming to overthrow the autonomous government system; (2) usurping the
position of a king; (3) distributing the Red and White Badge; (4)
disturbing the peace with the frequent singing of the anthem “Indonesia
Raya” in every school; and (5) inciting the masses to oppose the legal
Dutch government (Paransa, 1983: 20). The Dutch police led by Commander
Ficher arrested the leaders of PSII Bolaang Mongondow: Masiando,
Popekou, Matero, Adampe Dolot, Damangayo, Rote, Daanan and Humu
Tunggali.
The party leaders were brought to trial before the Zelfbestuur
Commissie (Self-Government Commission), consisting of Mr. Quick (chair)
and M. Mokodompit and H. D. Manoppo (members). The defendants were
sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Masiando (from
Solimandungan), Popekou and Matero (from Motoboi Besar) were sentenced
to two years imprisonment in Nusa Kembangan. Adampe Dolot was sentenced
to four years imprisonment (from 1939 in Kotamobagu, then transferred to
Manado and in 1942 he was transferred to Sukamiskin, Bandung).
Damangayo, Rote, and Daanan, were sentenced to two years in prison in
Glodok, Jakarta. Finally, Humu Tunggali was sentenced to two years in
prison in Pamekasan, Madura (Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 1940; Mokobombang,
1983: 39-40; Iman, 1984). Damangayo, Matero and Humu Tunggali returned
to the Bolaang Mongondow area after their prison terms, while the others
died in detention.
With the arrest and detention of its leadership, PSII Bolaang Mongondow
activities continued under the guidance of Husin Raupu, Yohan Faisal
Kasad Damopolii, Zakaria Imban, Lour Mokobombang and H. Saleh Mustafa
(Depdikbud, 1978/1979: 153-154). With the death of Adampe Dolot in
prison, he was replaced as leader by Y.F.K. Damopolii. In 1940-1941,
Damopolii and his wife, Nurtina Gonibala Manggo, who was also an
activist for the PSII Bolaang Mongondow, worked hard to promote the
organisational agenda, including making visits to various regions to
raise awareness of the proposal for an Indonesian Parliament. On
December 16, 1940, he held a general meeting in Kwandang and Suwawa,
followed by visits on December 18 to Gorontalo, January 15, 1941 to
Sanger Talaud, January 20 to Buol Toli-toli, and February 8 to Palu
Donggala. However, the situation in Palu Donggala was particularly
challenging because Damopolii was unable to hold general meetings and
was also prevented from meeting with PSII leaders because of close
scrutiny by the Dutch, who considered that his activities posed a
serious threat. When he returned to Bolaang Mongondow, Damopolii and his
wife were arrested by the Dutch and taken to Luwuk Banggai. On April 11,
1941, the Resident of Manado sent a vessel to transport them to Manado
where they were imprisoned, questioned for three days and accused by the
Dutch of leading an organisation that was subverting the legitimate
government. On May 25, 1941, Nurtina Gonibala Manggo was released by the
Dutch, while Damopolii was only released on June 30, 1941 (Manggo, 2003:
13-14).
Thus, PSII Bolaang Mongondow Party as a constituent member of GAPI was
at the forefront of activity in the independence struggle. From
1939-1941 GAPI’s primary efforts were devoted to (1) initiating a
manifesto for the formation of Parliament; (2) organizing the Indonesian
People’s Congress; and (3) issuing a resolution on constitutional
changes.
Japanese Defeat, Sarekat Islam Bolaang Mongondow and the Red
and White
Flag
After Japan surrendered to the allies, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta
proclaimed Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. News of the
Proclamation only reached Bolaang Mongondow by word of mouth after some
days due to the lack of communication facilities. Hearing the news that
was still confusing, regional leaders held a meeting in Woloan Tondano,
North Sulawesi, on August 22, 1945, attended by employees of the former
Japanese government, including E.H.W. Palengkahu and B.W. Lapian of the
civil service. H.J.C. Manoppo, the Raja of Bolaang Mongondow, and Y.F.K.
Damopolii also attended the meeting which lasted for two days and did
not encounter any significant obstacles. The instruments of local
government were established, covering all of North/Central Sulawesi,
including Bolaang Mongondow, Minahasa, Sangir Talaud, Gorontalo, Palu,
Poso and Donggala as well as Buol Toli-toli. Within the government
agencies there were several civil service personnel who did not support
the text of the Proclamation, so on September 2, 1945, regional
political figures held a further meeting (Manggo, 2003: 17).
On October 3, Damopolii received the visit from Gorontalo of Baharudin
Y. Kadullah, former leader of PSII Molibagu, and Arun Tangahu. Around
this time, Siata Paputungan, one of the teachers assigned to Molibagu,
had returned to his hometown in Molinow Village with the newspaper
“Suara Nasional Gorontalo” which contained the complete text of the
Independence Proclamation, to be handed over to PSII Bolaang Mongondow
(Manggo, 2003: 18). Siata Paputungan had carried the text of the
proclamation hidden under his horse’s saddle to avoid being questioned
by the Nederlandsch Indische Civiele Administratie (NICA) police.
Newspaper clippings containing the text of the proclamation were handed
over to Kinompol Imban as the Youth Chair (Raupu, 2019).
The arrival of newspapers with the text of the Proclamation added
confidence that Indonesia’s independence had indeed been proclaimed. The
news prompted community leaders and youth to fly the Red and White Flag
in Bolaang Mongondow. Damopolii, who at that time served as
Fukugunco/Head of District (Assistant Wedana), met with Abdul Rahman
Mokobombang, commander of Seinendan Bolaang Mongondow, to discuss the
matter. They concluded that the legal basis for the Proclamation was
strong because it was based on national unity, such as the Youth Service
Oath, the National Flag of Sang Merah Putih and the National Anthem of
Indonesia Raya.
On October 5, 1945, a committee was formed with responsibility to
assemble forces to defend the Proclamation of August 17, 1945. The
committee consisted of members of Sarekat Islam Angkatan Pandu (SIAP), a
group which provided training to graduates from the Sarekat Islam
schools, and Pemuda Muslimin Indonesia (PMI) which had been disbanded on
June 26, 1942, as well as assistants to Japanese soldiers (Heiho Jumpo)
and Barisan Pemuda (Barisan Pemuda). The task of the organizing
committee was to collect and register the names of the members, which at
that time stood at about 500 people. They were then given a week’s
training in matters of discipline and unity as well as the ideology of
the struggle, despite certain differences among them. They were taught
the motto ”one for all and all for one, selfless and reserved, if one
friend is captured, then it is not allowed to mention the other, stay
hidden, have the motto independence or death” (Manggo, 2003: 19-20).
Sarekat Islam and the Banteng Paramilitary
Unit
In mid-October, 1945 in the wake of the Independence Proclamation, the
Banteng Paramilitary Unit was officially formed by Y.F.K. Damopolii and
took the title “Kelaskaran Banteng Republik Indonesia Bolaang
Mongondow”. Although there was no formal organic relationship with the
PSII Bolaang Mongondow, all PSII members joined the unit as a
continuation of the ongoing independence struggle in the region.
The Banteng Paramilitary Unit was divided into two parts, according to
male and female troops, with the leadership of the unit taken from
former members of the SIAP. On October 19, 1945, Y.F.K. Damopolii, as
the male commander, and Nurtina Gonibala Manggo, as the leader of the
female troops, informed Raja H.J.C. Manoppo that the unit had been
formed in Molinow Village. The Raja remained silent, merely smiling and
nodding his head. On October 23, 1945, Damopolii, Manggo and Abdul
Rahman Mokobombang were discussing plans to obtain weapons from the
Japanese army when a Dutch Police Inspector named Yakob van Beugen
delivered an arrest warrant to Damopolii. As he was being taken away by
the police, he said to Nurtina Gonibala Manggo in the Bolaang Mongondow
regional language “pomolat, akuoi moiko, moiko akuoi” (“go on, I am
you and you are me”). As he walked towards the police car, Damopolii
shouted the oath of the Banteng Unit of ”Freedom or Death”, drawing the
response from witnesses of ”Once independent, always free”.
The following day, Nurtina Gonibala Manggo and other leaders took
several important decisions: (1) to appoint a new leadership team of
Laan Massi, Abdul Rahman Mokobombang and Nurtina Gonibala Manggo to
replace Damopolii; (2) to form several regions of action: the Rayon
Dayan under the command of A.H. Raupu, Panang Rayon under the command of
S.M. Saridin, Rayon Kobidu under the command of Adi Mamonto, Rayon Siau
under the command of M.S. Detu, Rayon Tanoyan under the command of Harun
Mamonto and Rayon Lolayan under the command of S.A. Mokobombang, as well
as the Small Motoboi Rayon under the command of S.M. Daun; (3) to master
the use of Japanese weapons in the Mopusi forest, Bolaang Mongondow; (4)
to hold military exercises in Tanoyan and Mopusi under trainers Laan
Massi and Abdul Rahman Mokobombang; and (5) to maintain good relations
with neighboring areas, such as Molibagu, Pinolosian, Minahasa and
Gorontalo (Manggo, 2003: 21-22).
On November 1, 1945, the regional leaders and commanders as mentioned
above held a meeting and took important steps: (1) all regional
commanders gathered their fully equipped troops in the forest areas of
Tanoyan and Mopusi to participate in military training. Before starting
the training, the Red and White Flag was flown; (2) Abdul Rahman
Mokobombang, A.H. Raupu and S.A. Mokobombang went to Molibagu to meet
Baharuddin Kadullah; (3) M.J.W. Gonibala was sent to Pinolosian Village;
(4) Agus Suroto and Suhani were sent to Gorontalo; (5) Nurtina Gonibala
Manggo was sent to Minahasa (Tomohon, Tondano and Manado) because of her
significant reputation in that region (Paransa, 1983: 6-7; Manggo, 2003:
23-24). On November 19, 1945, Manggo, accompanied by several members of
the Banteng Unit, sought weapons from the Japanese soldiers hiding in
the Mopusi forest where the weapons were stored. A certain Mr. Hirayama
provided Manggo with several chests of hand grenades, stenguns, and
revolvers, as well as two red and white cloth rolls.
Conclusion
The stage was thus set for the following war of independence, with SI a
vital component in the struggle. Sarekat Islam was not the sole
determining factor of independence in Bolaang Mongondow. However, the
organisation played key roles in stimulating a thirst for independence
through participation, facilitation and active involvement in the
independence struggle. Sarekat Islam stood under the Red and White Flag
in Bolaang Mongondow, even to the point where the place where the last
Raja of Bolaang Mongondow resigned was the BPPI Molinow Building
belonging to Sarekat Islam. The Sarekat Islam political movement in
Bolaang Mongondow was one important element in the long struggle to
establish the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.