Cognitive Approach - Eyerman and Jamison’s Approach
The increase in civil rights movements, student movements and the
various groups of movements in history necessitated the sociological
study of social movements. This sociological approach adopted the
“scientific tradition to divide and conquer, to break reality down into
its component parts so as to be better able to control it” (Eyerman &
Jamaison, 1991, p.1). According to Eyerman & Jamaison, (1991) the use
of scientific application to understand social movements has become
ineffective, since “science has largely become a process of reduction
and objectification, and truth is seen as coming from distancing the
subjective observer from the objects of investigation” (p.1). Eyerman
and Jamison (1991) further note that the rise of modernity, and the
differentiation of society lead to a form of social dominations in which
power has come to be based on the authority of scientific
expertise…Sociology has reinforced the divisions of modern society by
imposing its own disciplinary division of labour onto social movements.
Social movements are conceptualized as external objects to be understood
in terms of pre-existing frameworks of interpretation. The sociology of
social movement thus provides a kind of knowledge that can be useful for
the preservation of the established political order rather than for its
critical transformation. (p.3)
Eyerman and Jamison (1991) are the earliest known authors to have
consolidated the cognitive approach as an alternative to the
sociological study of social movements. This approach “offers a form of
analysis that seeks to study social movements in their own terms…it
means that we look at social movements through the complex lens of a
social theory of knowledge that is both historically and politically
informed” (p.2). To describe a movement in a cognitive sense is to see
an articulation of particular “cognitive products or types of
knowledge” (p.65). The use of a cognitive lens in relation to social
movements is considered by the authors as “processes in
formation…forms of activity by which individuals create new kinds of
social identities… where action is neither predetermined nor
completely self-willed; its meaning is derived from the context in which
it is carried out and the understanding actors bring to it/or derive
from it” (p.3). This means that social movements are producers of
knowledge.
Eyerman and Jamison (1991) first used to term Cognitive Praxis in
discussing concerns that transforms groups of individuals into social
movements and that give them their particular meaning or consciousness.
In other words, dimensions of cognitive praxis are the relations to
knowledge that distinguish particular social movements, and the
concepts, ideas and intellectual activities that give them their
cognitive identity (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). Additionally, the use of
the term cognitive praxis emphasizes the inventive function of
consciousness and cognition in all individual and collective actions of
humans (ibid). Eyerman and Jamison (1991) hence identified the different
dimensions of cognitive practices of social movement as knowledge
production. Cognitive approach also presents a political historical
context of social movements. With its political context, Eyerman and
Jamison (1991) wanted to “understand social movements in relation to
their particular time and place…a contextual theory of social change”
(p.3). The authors’ analysis therefore looks at social movements both in
historical moments and between political cultures (ibid). The approach
by Eyerman and Jamison (1991) for that reason “focuses upon the process
of articulating a movement identity (cognitive praxis), on the actors
taking part in this process (movement intellectuals), and on the
contexts of articulation (political cultures and institutions)” (p.4).
Two actors in social movements are identified by the authors’; the
leader and the led. Leaders are the individuals who organize, while the
led, are the individual members of the movement. This categorization is
problematic as there are always individuals are who neither part of the
organisers nor general members. In this case, it raises the question on
how such individual voices get represented. Secondly, such division
raises concern on how voices of activist - the led, get captured by
necessary bodies concerned – governments, academics and others. This
split (leaders and the led), also has the potential of creating a
master-subject relationship in a movement. Nonetheless, in as much as
this division poses a challenge, it enables scholars to recognize and
perhaps measure the knowledge and intellectual contribution of the
different actors to the making of a social movement (Eyerman and
Jamison, 1991).
By conceiving social movements as processes through which meaning is
constructed by instruments and strategies, we are exposed to the
possibility of recognizing a range of intellectuals’ practices and
contributions of different actors to the making of social movements.
Eyerman and Jamison (1991) therefore suggests that though activists in
social movements do not participate at an equal level, they are all
regarded as ‘movement intellectuals’ because “through their activism
they contribute to the formation of the movement’s collective identity,
to making the movement what it is” (p.94). Cognitive praxis are shown
as the “unreflected assumptions of analysis rather than the objects of
investigation” (Eyerman and Jamison, 199, p.45).
It is worth noting that while Eyerman and Jamison (1991) box the concept
of social movement into Cognitive praxis, others such as McAdam,
McCarthy and Zald (1996) see Cognitive praxis as one of the factors in
resource mobilization. According to Bostrom (2004), concepts such as
cognitive praxis (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991), frame alignment (Snow et
al 1986), collective identity (Larana et al. 1994) have originated as a
way to better understand resource mobilization approach (which focussed
on resources, rationality and formal organization) to the study of
social movements. Resource mobilization was a response to collective
behaviour approach that emerged in the United States in the 1960’s and
focuses analysis on an organization not the individuals (McCarty &
Zald, 1973) For this reason, it does not centre around the question of
why individuals join social movements, the rationality or irrationality
of their intentions or behaviour as participants, but rather on the
effectiveness with movement, that is movement organizations use of
resources in attempting to achieve their goals (Eyerman and Jamison,
1991, p. 24).
Bostrom (2004) identifies three dimensions of cognitive practice;
knowledge, meaning and rules. Knowledge he notes “encompasses both
general and specific ideas about relationship in reality… and can be
both theoretical and practical, abstract and concrete, systemized and
diffuse, and professional as well as popular” (p.76). Because of its
vague nature, which can easily make it susceptible to manipulation by
all parties, knowledge must be filled with meaning (ideals, values,
interests, and emotions). This will ensure that parties exploits of the
“truth” is limited to some degree (Bostrom, 2004). Meaning making is a
cognitive process because it involves “experience, consciousness and
reflection…needs conceptions and communication for its discovery,
development, and clarification” (p.76). The third dimension: rules, is
“about socially accepted and sanctioned ways to act” (p.77). Three
kinds of rules are identified by Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000). The
first is directives. This form of rule is usually issued by an official
authority and is mandatory on all subjects. Norms, the second, are
usually a form of rule that is internalized and not taken seriously
because of its couched nature. Standards are the last form of rules.
Standards are often explicit with identified source, but are presented
as voluntary. Notwithstanding the seemingly intricacies in the practice,
the purpose of this paper is to use a cognitive lens to study
pre-independent social movements in Ghana.