Scenario planning

One way to manage risks is to proactively plan for possible scenarios by anticipating events that could place researchers at risk (Daniels & Lavallee, 2014). The involvement of experts who have specific knowledge is invaluable at this stage where researchers should ask ‘what if?’ questions until they are fully satisfied that all identifiable scenarios are covered and answered. The objective here is to first eliminate or avoid risks where possible or if that is not possible, minimise the risks posed to an acceptable level. For example, the researcher avoided carrying out fieldwork in the Keppapilaw village in MTP. Described by the military as a model village, Keppapilaw is a place where people were forcibly settled after confiscating their land to build the joint military headquarters. More or less all day-to-day activities are conducted by the military, implicitly or explicitly, and it was decided that the risk posed to the researcher was too high and it was not worth stirring up a hornets’ nest. Doing fieldwork in the Keppapilaw village would have placed the researcher in harm’s way, brought unwanted attention and would have compromised the whole fieldwork process.
Most parts of the risk management process consist of ‘minimising’ risk factors because it is not possible to eliminate or avoid risks. Incorporating some form of approval by an authority, such as by a government department will greatly reduce risks to researchers by bringing some form of legitimacy to fieldwork. However, identifying an institutional authority that has ‘actual’ power in post-war zones can be difficult. The reason for this is there are many power brokers who operate alongside the public administration apparatus and who have different agendas. There is highly likely to be a presence of political parties, military and paramilitary forces which are active and operate beyond the remit of the law. For example, the researcher had the prior approval from the Divisional Secretary to do fieldwork in MTP. However, he was aggressively confronted by an army Colonel on the first day of fieldwork during a discussion with a senior administrative officer at the Divisional Secretariat. The army Colonel barged into the office and the researcher was blamed for not letting the military know about his presence in the area and was accused of being biased (toward Tamils who are an ethnic minority in Sri Lanka) within the first few minutes of the interaction. The researcher was blamed for not being willing to tell the army’s side of the ‘story’ of the war even though the researcher insisted the fieldwork was about entrepreneurship and poverty and had nothing to do with the ongoing war crime probe by the United Nations. The researcher had overestimated the power of the civilian administration, at the planning stage, and had failed to fully grasp the presence and power of an invisible administration by the military apparatus that ran parallel to the civilian administration. Understanding power relations at fieldwork sites and getting access through the appropriate channels will reduce the overall risks, although the downside is that such attempts may compromise the data collected, by the unwarranted influence of power brokers.
Anticipating possible events is important in proactive scenario planning in order to formulate possible responses. For example, it was anticipated that there would be interventions by the military in some shape or form at some point in time during the fieldwork. It was decided that the information disclosed to military personnel at these encounters should be situation-specific, after taking specifics into account such as the place, time, and the ranks of the personnel and the nature of involvement. The limited disclosure of information in such cases is obviously not with the aim to do covert research, which is forbidden by the ethical guidelines but to ensure researcher safety. It is important to understand that researcher safety is paramount, and as such the adherence to the ethical framework should be situational (Woon, 2013) and these situations must not be labelled or viewed as ‘unethical research’. For example, the researcher left out the information that the fieldwork was linked to a United Kingdom university when military personnel stopped and confronted him at Puthumathalan village. At this point, the researcher was told that the Tamils who live in the area have relatives abroad that send money to them so there was no need for research, and hence no need for the fieldwork or the researcher’s presence in the village. The researcher had to insist that he had approval from Divisional Secretaries of MTP and PTK to carry out fieldwork and convinced them that the scope of research was only about ‘businesses’ and ‘poverty’. Puthumathalan area was part of the ‘no-fire zone’ where the last battles took place and belong to MTP and border the PTK divisional secretariat. It was known that the area was guarded by the military around the clock and such encounters were anticipated. Therefore, as a safety precaution to minimise risks, it was decided to wait until permission was obtained from the bordering PTK Divisional Secretariat to carry out fieldwork.
In another instance, the researcher continued a semi-structured interview when military intelligence personnel from a nearby army camp in Alampil village in MTP started monitoring from a distance. Such situations were anticipated and it was pre-decided not to engage with the military unless they approached first. Although the situation did not escalate further, the semi-structured interview was carried out under immense emotional pressure amid the possibility of physical danger arising. However, it is important to note that the interview was carried out with the full consent of the respondent at this point, where the respondent was well aware of the situation. Such surveillance and intimidation had become normal and the villagers had become accustomed to it.
The general approach when managing high-risk highly-volatile settings (i.e. a situational danger) is to take a passive stand, where researchers are advised to take a step back to calm and assess the situation (Nilan, 2002). However, some circumstances may demand that researchers have to recognise and interpret situations in a very short time and take a more active stand than the preferred, non-aggressive passive stand (Castellano, 2007). Taking a passive stand may not always be possible and researchers may have to stand their ground in order to achieve the preferred outcome. For example, when two lower-ranking military personnel who were armed and in civilian clothing confronted the researcher in ODD, the researcher insisted that he wanted to talk to their commanding officer when the conversation started getting out of hand. The researcher noticed that the two military personnel were carrying duffel bags and understood that they were on their way home on holiday. They too did not want the situation to be dragged on which may prevent them from going on holiday. Demanding to call the commanding officer placed lower-ranking military personnel at a situational disadvantage and they left the area, allowing the researcher to carry out fieldwork. However, it is important to note that the confrontations in post-war zones often take place with armed personnel and the researchers should know the ‘limits’ of the situation when managing risks and de-escalating hassles and confrontations to provide the best outcome.
The drawback of having a defined plan in place and proposed possible courses of action is that these may tend to be perceived as rigid and researchers may decide to follow them to the letter. The situations in post-war zones are dynamic, and thus may well have changed from the time of planning. Therefore, the risk management process should be viewed as ongoing and should retain flexibility. Most of the responsibility at this point falls within the remit of researchers who are in the field and benefit from situational understanding and, as such, have the greater responsibility to assure personal safety and the safety of others involved. Ignoring ground realities or underestimating them will increase the risks. Therefore, being able to adapt to the situation and change plans in place accordingly is important on an ongoing basis. The proposed plan in place should be flexible enough to accommodate the volatile realities of post-war zones. For example, it was planned to conduct fieldwork activities until 8 pm but it was observed that villagers deserted the roads and public places by early evening. People living in the area did not deem it safe to be in public places when darkness fell and the researcher, in this case, adjusted his working pattern to suit ground realities by restricting fieldwork to daylight time as much as possible. Fieldwork conducted during the daytime is considered relatively safe (Kenyon & Hawker, 1999). In another instance, the plan to carry a water ration of 1 litre was not sufficient and the amount had to be increased to 1.5 litres, due to fluctuating temperatures that had risen from 35 to 42 degrees Celsius. Further, having a ‘fixed’ plan, in this case, the quantity of water, may not suit individual requirements if many researchers are involved, thus, the flexibility of the plan in place is vital to accommodate personal needs and changing contexts. In another instance, the researcher came across information on public demonstrations on 18th May in relation to the sixth anniversary of the end of the war, which had the potential to be violent. Although the police took out a court order to prevent any demonstrations in Mullaitivu, the Chief Minister had called for a remembrance event in Mulliwaikkal, the place where the last battle took place. By taking account of real-time information and the context, the researcher managed to conduct fieldwork beforehand in this area avoiding potential risks.