Managing the ‘risk
boundary’?
This paper starts from the above position that safety frameworks that
are required by institutions must account for researcher safety. Alpay
and Paulen (2014) argue that the principles of field safety remain the
same, which is to provide a basis to promote risk management practices
and create awareness that brings individual responsibility, irrespective
of whether institutional structures are in place or not. Such an
approach has frequently placed on researchers the main responsibility of
managing risks in research projects. This has demanded that researchers
anticipate scenarios that could harm them physically and emotionally and
proactively manage such situations. However, this paper seeks to examine
the extent to which the responsibility of managing such risks represents
a partnership between researchers, principal investigators/ supervisors
and university ethics boards/committees that reflect institutional
positioning and individual responsibilities. In particular, it
identifies some important ‘boundaries’ or ‘transition points’ in this
responsibility relationship. A common denominator in definitions of risk
is the chance of occurrence of negative events in the face of
uncertainty (Green, 2016). This is linked to decision-making by Daft
(2003), who describes risk as a situation where a decision has clear-cut
goals, but outcomes are subject to chance. What emerges is the
importance of decision-making in managing risks, which involves
combining fact-based and value-based data and information as shown in
Figure 1 (Aven, 2016).
Expert Decision-Maker
Fact-based
Value-based
Figure 1 . A model for linking the various stages in the
risk-informed decision-making (Lans, Blok, & Wesselink, 2014; Maine,
Soh, & Dos Santos, )
Aven’s (2016) framework provides a useful way to approach the process of
risk management in research. First, in the initial stages of research
planning and seeking ethical approval, the ‘expert’ role of providing
evidence generally lies with the researcher who, while they may draw on
the knowledge-base and advice of institutional actors and other third
parties such as research funders and collaboration partners in
constructing their application for ethical approval, are generally
considered to be the de facto ‘experts’ in their own study.
Within the submissions demanded by university ethics committees, there
is generally some form of risk assessment sheet and accompanying
narrative on how identified risks will be managed. This means the
researcher making a ‘broad risk evaluation’ based on the foreseeable
risks specific to their particular project. The ‘decision-maker’ at this
stage is the university ethics committee. However, before a decision can
emerge, the process needs to undergo a further loop of ‘expert’
analysis. Here, the university ethics committee will compare the
evidence provided by the researcher with such other pertinent evidence
that is available to them and draw on the knowledge base within (and
possibly outside) the group, in order to form their own ‘broad risk
evaluation’. If there are concerns at this stage, more evidence may be
requested from the researcher (as the ‘expert’ in their own research)
and the cycle repeated until the university ethics committee is able to
finally transition from its own ‘expert’ role to that of
‘decision-maker’ and approve the study.
The principal investigator/
supervisory team generally at this point remain in a moresupportive and advisory ‘expert’ role, although it is possible
that the principal investigators involving in fieldwork thereby playing
a transitionary role between institutional and individual arrangements.
This may, in advance, involve providing advice and support regarding
appropriate fieldwork precautions. Once in the field, it will also
generally involve requiring the researcher to report back ‘evidence’
from the field on any ethical issues that arise (including the risk of
personal harm), drawing on their own (and possibly others’) ‘knowledge
base’ to subsequently form their own ‘broad risk evaluation’. The
reporting back evidence from the field by the researcher and accordingly
communicating supportive advice where appropriate to the researcher by
the principal investigator/ supervisory team is a dynamic process. As a
result, the institutional positioning and individual responsibility
comprise a proactive two-way relationship (Figure 1) that facilitates
risk-informed decision-making. In extreme situations, such advice could
go as far as a decision that the researcher should withdraw from the
field altogether, although the formal ‘decision’ to withdraw ethical
approval in this scenario would normally lie with the university ethics
committee, who may be asked to step back in as ‘decision-maker’ if the
principal investigator’s/ supervisor’s advice goes unheeded. The ‘safety
culture’ within institutions plays a vital part in this overall
understanding of risks that shape perceptions and risk tolerance. A
high-risk activity for some may be viewed as a relatively low-risk by
another, which brings in a level of subjectivity, making analysis
complicated and limiting generalisation.
However, arguably the most important transition or boundary in the
responsibility relationship is reached at the point of ethical approval,
at which point the ethics committee takes a step back from any immediate
involvement in the study and the researcher assumes the mantle of
‘decision-maker’ in the ethical conduct of the study. This is a
significant delegation of responsibility, and its implications need to
be fully considered. Key questions that arise include:
- Have the good practices that potentially fill gaps has been understood
by everyone involved (i.e. ethics committee, supervisors and field
researchers)?
- Has the researcher been made fully aware of the responsibilities and
is there clarity of ownership?
- Could the researcher identify emerging risks, evaluate them and
implement action?
- Are unacceptable risks that act as red lines explicit and are
contingency plans are in place?
In short, what Aven’s (2016) framework alerts us to is a set of
possibilities where potential gaps or ambiguities might become apparent,
and where good practice might be extended as a result. The disappearance
of the fuzzy boundaries that existed in the pre-fieldwork stage has
clearly shifted the burden to the researcher, who predominantly assumes
the role of undertaking all five elements of the risk-informed
decision-making process. Hence, potential gaps regarding who is doing
what at what point and time to what extent and the level of
communication arise when managing risks as shown in Figure 2.