Managing the ‘risk boundary’?

This paper starts from the above position that safety frameworks that are required by institutions must account for researcher safety. Alpay and Paulen (2014) argue that the principles of field safety remain the same, which is to provide a basis to promote risk management practices and create awareness that brings individual responsibility, irrespective of whether institutional structures are in place or not. Such an approach has frequently placed on researchers the main responsibility of managing risks in research projects. This has demanded that researchers anticipate scenarios that could harm them physically and emotionally and proactively manage such situations. However, this paper seeks to examine the extent to which the responsibility of managing such risks represents a partnership between researchers, principal investigators/ supervisors and university ethics boards/committees that reflect institutional positioning and individual responsibilities. In particular, it identifies some important ‘boundaries’ or ‘transition points’ in this responsibility relationship. A common denominator in definitions of risk is the chance of occurrence of negative events in the face of uncertainty (Green, 2016). This is linked to decision-making by Daft (2003), who describes risk as a situation where a decision has clear-cut goals, but outcomes are subject to chance. What emerges is the importance of decision-making in managing risks, which involves combining fact-based and value-based data and information as shown in Figure 1 (Aven, 2016).
Expert Decision-Maker
Fact-based
Value-based
Figure 1 . A model for linking the various stages in the risk-informed decision-making (Lans, Blok, & Wesselink, 2014; Maine, Soh, & Dos Santos, )
Aven’s (2016) framework provides a useful way to approach the process of risk management in research. First, in the initial stages of research planning and seeking ethical approval, the ‘expert’ role of providing evidence generally lies with the researcher who, while they may draw on the knowledge-base and advice of institutional actors and other third parties such as research funders and collaboration partners in constructing their application for ethical approval, are generally considered to be the de facto ‘experts’ in their own study. Within the submissions demanded by university ethics committees, there is generally some form of risk assessment sheet and accompanying narrative on how identified risks will be managed. This means the researcher making a ‘broad risk evaluation’ based on the foreseeable risks specific to their particular project. The ‘decision-maker’ at this stage is the university ethics committee. However, before a decision can emerge, the process needs to undergo a further loop of ‘expert’ analysis. Here, the university ethics committee will compare the evidence provided by the researcher with such other pertinent evidence that is available to them and draw on the knowledge base within (and possibly outside) the group, in order to form their own ‘broad risk evaluation’. If there are concerns at this stage, more evidence may be requested from the researcher (as the ‘expert’ in their own research) and the cycle repeated until the university ethics committee is able to finally transition from its own ‘expert’ role to that of ‘decision-maker’ and approve the study.
The principal investigator/ supervisory team generally at this point remain in a moresupportive and advisory ‘expert’ role, although it is possible that the principal investigators involving in fieldwork thereby playing a transitionary role between institutional and individual arrangements. This may, in advance, involve providing advice and support regarding appropriate fieldwork precautions. Once in the field, it will also generally involve requiring the researcher to report back ‘evidence’ from the field on any ethical issues that arise (including the risk of personal harm), drawing on their own (and possibly others’) ‘knowledge base’ to subsequently form their own ‘broad risk evaluation’. The reporting back evidence from the field by the researcher and accordingly communicating supportive advice where appropriate to the researcher by the principal investigator/ supervisory team is a dynamic process. As a result, the institutional positioning and individual responsibility comprise a proactive two-way relationship (Figure 1) that facilitates risk-informed decision-making. In extreme situations, such advice could go as far as a decision that the researcher should withdraw from the field altogether, although the formal ‘decision’ to withdraw ethical approval in this scenario would normally lie with the university ethics committee, who may be asked to step back in as ‘decision-maker’ if the principal investigator’s/ supervisor’s advice goes unheeded. The ‘safety culture’ within institutions plays a vital part in this overall understanding of risks that shape perceptions and risk tolerance. A high-risk activity for some may be viewed as a relatively low-risk by another, which brings in a level of subjectivity, making analysis complicated and limiting generalisation.
However, arguably the most important transition or boundary in the responsibility relationship is reached at the point of ethical approval, at which point the ethics committee takes a step back from any immediate involvement in the study and the researcher assumes the mantle of ‘decision-maker’ in the ethical conduct of the study. This is a significant delegation of responsibility, and its implications need to be fully considered. Key questions that arise include:
In short, what Aven’s (2016) framework alerts us to is a set of possibilities where potential gaps or ambiguities might become apparent, and where good practice might be extended as a result. The disappearance of the fuzzy boundaries that existed in the pre-fieldwork stage has clearly shifted the burden to the researcher, who predominantly assumes the role of undertaking all five elements of the risk-informed decision-making process. Hence, potential gaps regarding who is doing what at what point and time to what extent and the level of communication arise when managing risks as shown in Figure 2.