Scenario planning
One way to manage risks is to proactively plan for possible scenarios by
anticipating events that could place researchers at risk (Daniels &
Lavallee, 2014). The involvement of experts who have specific knowledge
is invaluable at this stage where researchers should ask ‘what if?’
questions until they are fully satisfied that all identifiable scenarios
are covered and answered. The objective here is to first eliminate or
avoid risks where possible or if that is not possible, minimise the
risks posed to an acceptable level. For example, the researcher avoided
carrying out fieldwork in the Keppapilaw village in MTP. Described by
the military as a model village, Keppapilaw is a place where people were
forcibly settled after confiscating their land to build the joint
military headquarters. More or less all day-to-day activities are
conducted by the military, implicitly or explicitly, and it was decided
that the risk posed to the researcher was too high and it was not worth
stirring up a hornets’ nest. Doing fieldwork in the Keppapilaw village
would have placed the researcher in harm’s way, brought unwanted
attention and would have compromised the whole fieldwork process.
Most parts of the risk management process consist of ‘minimising’ risk
factors because it is not possible to eliminate or avoid risks.
Incorporating some form of approval by an authority, such as by a
government department will greatly reduce risks to researchers by
bringing some form of legitimacy to fieldwork. However, identifying an
institutional authority that has ‘actual’ power in post-war zones can be
difficult. The reason for this is there are many power brokers who
operate alongside the public administration apparatus and who have
different agendas. There is highly likely to be a presence of political
parties, military and paramilitary forces which are active and operate
beyond the remit of the law. For example, the researcher had the prior
approval from the Divisional Secretary to do fieldwork in MTP. However,
he was aggressively confronted by an army Colonel on the first day of
fieldwork during a discussion with a senior administrative officer at
the Divisional Secretariat. The army Colonel barged into the office and
the researcher was blamed for not letting the military know about his
presence in the area and was accused of being biased (toward Tamils who
are an ethnic minority in Sri Lanka) within the first few minutes of the
interaction. The researcher was blamed for not being willing to tell the
army’s side of the ‘story’ of the war even though the researcher
insisted the fieldwork was about entrepreneurship and poverty and had
nothing to do with the ongoing war crime probe by the United Nations.
The researcher had overestimated the power of the civilian
administration, at the planning stage, and had failed to fully grasp the
presence and power of an invisible administration by the military
apparatus that ran parallel to the civilian administration.
Understanding power relations at fieldwork sites and getting access
through the appropriate channels will reduce the overall risks, although
the downside is that such attempts may compromise the data collected, by
the unwarranted influence of power brokers.
Anticipating possible events is important in proactive scenario planning
in order to formulate possible responses. For example, it was
anticipated that there would be interventions by the military in some
shape or form at some point in time during the fieldwork. It was decided
that the information disclosed to military personnel at these encounters
should be situation-specific, after taking specifics into account such
as the place, time, and the ranks of the personnel and the nature of
involvement. The limited disclosure of information in such cases is
obviously not with the aim to do covert research, which is forbidden by
the ethical guidelines but to ensure researcher safety. It is important
to understand that researcher safety is paramount, and as such the
adherence to the ethical framework should be situational (Woon, 2013)
and these situations must not be labelled or viewed as ‘unethical
research’. For example, the researcher left out the information that the
fieldwork was linked to a United Kingdom university when military
personnel stopped and confronted him at Puthumathalan village. At this
point, the researcher was told that the Tamils who live in the area have
relatives abroad that send money to them so there was no need for
research, and hence no need for the fieldwork or the researcher’s
presence in the village. The researcher had to insist that he had
approval from Divisional Secretaries of MTP and PTK to carry out
fieldwork and convinced them that the scope of research was only about
‘businesses’ and ‘poverty’. Puthumathalan area was part of the ‘no-fire
zone’ where the last battles took place and belong to MTP and border the
PTK divisional secretariat. It was known that the area was guarded by
the military around the clock and such encounters were anticipated.
Therefore, as a safety precaution to minimise risks, it was decided to
wait until permission was obtained from the bordering PTK Divisional
Secretariat to carry out fieldwork.
In another instance, the researcher continued a semi-structured
interview when military intelligence personnel from a nearby army camp
in Alampil village in MTP started monitoring from a distance. Such
situations were anticipated and it was pre-decided not to engage with
the military unless they approached first. Although the situation did
not escalate further, the semi-structured interview was carried out
under immense emotional pressure amid the possibility of physical danger
arising. However, it is important to note that the interview was carried
out with the full consent of the respondent at this point, where the
respondent was well aware of the situation. Such surveillance and
intimidation had become normal and the villagers had become accustomed
to it.
The general approach when managing high-risk highly-volatile settings
(i.e. a situational danger) is to take a passive stand, where
researchers are advised to take a step back to calm and assess the
situation (Nilan, 2002). However, some circumstances may demand that
researchers have to recognise and interpret situations in a very short
time and take a more active stand than the preferred, non-aggressive
passive stand (Castellano, 2007). Taking a passive stand may not always
be possible and researchers may have to stand their ground in order to
achieve the preferred outcome. For example, when two lower-ranking
military personnel who were armed and in civilian clothing confronted
the researcher in ODD, the researcher insisted that he wanted to talk to
their commanding officer when the conversation started getting out of
hand. The researcher noticed that the two military personnel were
carrying duffel bags and understood that they were on their way home on
holiday. They too did not want the situation to be dragged on which may
prevent them from going on holiday. Demanding to call the commanding
officer placed lower-ranking military personnel at a situational
disadvantage and they left the area, allowing the researcher to carry
out fieldwork. However, it is important to note that the confrontations
in post-war zones often take place with armed personnel and the
researchers should know the ‘limits’ of the situation when managing
risks and de-escalating hassles and confrontations to provide the best
outcome.
The drawback of having a defined plan in place and proposed possible
courses of action is that these may tend to be perceived as rigid and
researchers may decide to follow them to the letter. The situations in
post-war zones are dynamic, and thus may well have changed from the time
of planning. Therefore, the risk management process should be viewed as
ongoing and should retain flexibility. Most of the responsibility at
this point falls within the remit of researchers who are in the field
and benefit from situational understanding and, as such, have the
greater responsibility to assure personal safety and the safety of
others involved. Ignoring ground realities or underestimating them will
increase the risks. Therefore, being able to adapt to the situation and
change plans in place accordingly is important on an ongoing basis. The
proposed plan in place should be flexible enough to accommodate the
volatile realities of post-war zones. For example, it was planned to
conduct fieldwork activities until 8 pm but it was observed that
villagers deserted the roads and public places by early evening. People
living in the area did not deem it safe to be in public places when
darkness fell and the researcher, in this case, adjusted his working
pattern to suit ground realities by restricting fieldwork to daylight
time as much as possible. Fieldwork conducted during the daytime is
considered relatively safe (Kenyon & Hawker, 1999). In another
instance, the plan to carry a water ration of 1 litre was not sufficient
and the amount had to be increased to 1.5 litres, due to fluctuating
temperatures that had risen from 35 to 42 degrees Celsius. Further,
having a ‘fixed’ plan, in this case, the quantity of water, may not suit
individual requirements if many researchers are involved, thus, the
flexibility of the plan in place is vital to accommodate personal needs
and changing contexts. In another instance, the researcher came across
information on public demonstrations on 18th May in
relation to the sixth anniversary of the end of the war, which had the
potential to be violent. Although the police took out a court order to
prevent any demonstrations in Mullaitivu, the Chief Minister had called
for a remembrance event in Mulliwaikkal, the place where the last battle
took place. By taking account of real-time information and the context,
the researcher managed to conduct fieldwork beforehand in this area
avoiding potential risks.