Keywords: German Foreign Policy, Federal vs. Central Foreign
Policy, Decision-making Process
Introduction
The geopolitical change in the world of politics in the global system
has influenced German foreign policy since reunification and demands
that German foreign policy appropriately adjust to the new challenges
(Hellmann 2015; Maull 2014; Hacke 2012). At the international level, the
government seeks to enforce its own foreign policy interests and to
maintain a high degree of influence on the international political
system. Due to the polarity and the distribution of power in
international politics, many different interests, meet each other and
therefore the scope for action of the state is limited. The reduction of
the room for maneuver of a state thus depends not only on its own
interests and its power of influence in the international system but
also on those of its governing interaction actors. While the
international system is anarchically organized, at the
hierarchical-national levels, it is above all the achievement of
political support from the executive, the legislature and society. At
the same time, the foreign policy of the political parties in Germany is
in trouble, their foreign policy programs are controversial and in
accordance with these developments in world politics they have very
different views (Fard 2018). The purpose of this article is to analyze
the German foreign policy structure by referring to the Basic Law for
the Federal Republic of Germany and the basic programs of the parties
involved in the government. In this article, the domestic actors or the
governmental dimension, which have a determining influence on German
foreign policy, will be discussed. In the following, the legitimated
actors in creating foreign policy are investigated, who make foreign
policy decisions and determine the guidelines of German foreign policy.
Content analysis is used as a research method in order to classify the
divergent opinions on the internal power relations that articulate
themselves in the antagonistic discourses, an analytical examination of
the structure of the German community as well as its structures in the
Federal Republic of Germany is carried out, which makes clear which
constitutional possibilities are available to a German federal
government stands to pursue their foreign policy. In particular, the
Basic Law is used as the substantive basis for shaping German foreign
policy as well as official original documents of the German government
and statements.
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and German
Foreign Policy
The state system of the Federal Republic of Germany is organized as “a
federal state” (Article 20 paragraph (1) Basic Law) that is a link
between the federal government and the federal states. The basis of this
federal order arose after the Second World War from a parliamentary
council in cooperation with the occupying powers (Laufer and Münch
1998). The state system of the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance
with Article 20 paragraph (2) of the Basic Law stipulates that “all
state authority is derived from the people”. The Basic Law is the
legitimate basis for the shaping of German foreign policy (Wolfrum 2007:
157) and determines the rules and requirements for which state organs
are responsible for foreign relations and which national actors
formulate foreign policy objectives and decisions in international
relations to meet (ibid.). The Basic Law recognizes the separation of
powers, which is distributed among various state organs - the executive,
legislative and judiciary - (Hellmann et al., 2014: 43f.). In the
parliamentary-democratic system of the Federal Republic of Germany plays
the German parliament, which is elected by the people, a central role.
In contrast to other parliamentary democracies, the Federal Chancellor
is directly elected by the Parliament in accordance with Article 63
paragraph (1) Basic Law (Article 63 paragraph (1) Basic Law). That is
why the Chancellor or his government is dependent on the parliamentary
majority (Ismayr 2007). The opposition faction in parliament is required
to control and criticize the government and its majority and to offer
political alternatives to the government (ibid.). The Bundestag’s
decision-making process is characterized by political parties that
compete within a multi-party system in order to fill political
decision-making positions and contribute to political decision-making.
In this context, the German Parliament plays an important role in German
foreign policy (ibid.: 175).
The formulation and implementation of foreign policy are a matter for
the Federal Government. Their leadership role vis-à-vis the federal
states and the parliament is enshrined in the Basic Law. Thus, in 1984,
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that foreign policy was a central
area of executive power. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court can also
act as a limiter of foreign policy scope for action, as it is the
decisive point maker of the internal framework conditions and the
distribution of competences between the levels. In the past, however, it
has become apparent that the verdicts are usually in favor of the
executives.
Division of
Competences: Conflict between the Executive and the Legislature
Although the Federal President is the highest representative of the
Federal Republic, he has no formal power. The following tasks in the
field of foreign policy belong to the office of the Federal President:
He “represents the Federation for the purposes of international law”,
“concludes treaties with foreign states on behalf of the Federation”
and “accredited and receive envoys” (Article 59 paragraph (1) Basic
Law). The Federal President is informed by the Federal Government about
foreign policy. Since Article 58 of the Basic Law stipulates that all
presidential orders require the countersignature of the Federal
Chancellor or competent Federal Minister, one can assume that his
activities are generally restricted in the field of foreign policy and
have no effect on government decisions (Jochum 2007: 169).
The Federal Chancellor is a central player in German foreign policy. In
doing so, he determines the guidelines of politics and bears the
responsibility for them (Article 65 paragraph (1) Basic Law). The German
Chancellor plays a leading role in German foreign policy. He formulates
the objectives and strategies of German foreign policy. Furthermore, the
Chancellor also forms the Government by determining the number and areas
of responsibility of the ministries and filling their posts. Starting
from the bureaucratic theoretical approach, the Federal Chancellor is
the most important person for German foreign policy, since the influence
of an actor on the national decision-making process depends on his
bureaucratic position. The chancellor principle and its leading role in
foreign policy are limited by the coordination functions of the
departmental principle, the cabinet principle, and the coalition
principle (Korte 2007: 204). In this context, the Federal Foreign
Minister and the Federal Minister of Defense have an important role to
play in the foreign policy decision-making processes due to their
emphasized position, which was laid down in the Basic Law pursuant to
Article. 65 (1) and Article 65a (1) of the Basic Law. According to
Article 65 (1) of the Basic Law, “conducts the affairs of his
department independently and on his own responsibility” (Article 65
paragraph (1) Basic Law).
In this context, the Federal Foreign Minister in the history of the
Federal Republic of Germany has the field of foreign policy at his
disposal for his own profiling. Due to his position with the Foreign
Minister, it was not always easy for the Chancellor to push back his
Foreign Minister, which is why many Chancellors took an inexperienced
foreign minister by their side so that they themselves could set clear
and stronger foreign policy accents (Hellmann et al. : 47). In critical
foreign policy decision-making situations, however, there may also be
open conflicts between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. For
example, one can refer to the so-called “Zehn-Punkte-Plan” of
the Helmut Kohl government in November 1989, the deployment of the
Bundeswehr to Afghanistan in 2001, or the sanctions against Russia in
the Ukraine crisis of 2014. In addition, the chancellor principle in
German foreign policy also depends on the cabinet principle, which, in
addition to the departmental principle, has an effect on the foreign
policy decisions of the Federal Chancellor (Hellmann et al. 2006b: 46;
Korte 2007). As a rule, the Federal Cabinet consists of the Federal
Chancellor and the Federal Ministers. The head of the Chancellery will
be presenting foreign affairs matters for discussion and decision-making
at the Cabinet meeting, which will be concluded by a majority.
Although the Federal Chancellor plays a central role in foreign affairs
and has a strong position, his power position is limited by the Cabinet
and the departmental principle, as these form counterweights against the
power position of the Federal Chancellor. Although the Chancellor has
primacy in German foreign policy, the Federal Foreign Minister takes
over responsibility for the German foreign relations. A glance at the
development of federal government periods shows that the Foreign
Ministry is often taken over by the smaller coalition partners, thus
reducing the room for maneuver of the Federal Chancellor and opposing
positions between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister can lead to
conflicts and deviations over foreign policy issues (Hellmann et al.:
48f.). Although the basis of each coalition is set out in the coalition
agreement and coalition parties are to agree on the foreign policy
principles, such political agreements are abandoned in the course of
legislative periods, as the world policy is constantly changing and as a
result, new challenges for the shaping of German foreign policy, to
which the coalition parties cannot agree. These deviations in the
tension between coalition parties lead to a conflict of objectives and
limit the character of German foreign policy or its scope for action
(ibid.).
Based on the constitutional basis of the Federal Constitutional Court,
that the Federal Government occupies a primary position in the
structuring of foreign relations, and according to BVerfGE 68 (1) the
care of foreign affairs is part of the task of the Federal Government,
the question can be asked which role the German parliament plays in
German foreign policy. The German parliament consists of the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat, which play a subordinate and restricted or indirect
role in foreign policy issues (Hellmann et a:, 2006b: 53). The Basic Law
has laid down various forms for the control of the Federal Government
and Parliament’s rights of participation in shaping German foreign
policy. In addition, it should be noted that the Bundestag can enforce
its participation rights and parliamentary-political control directly
through the ratifications and the decision annual budget law, more
actively involved in foreign policy decisions resulting from the federal
budget, and can block some foreign policy decisions of the federal
government. In this context, the classic dualism between parliament and
the federal government changed into a new dualism between the government
and both the majority and the opposition factions in the Bundestag
(Ismayr 2007). In principle, the legislature has the right to
participate in shaping German foreign policy, which is enshrined in the
Basic Law: In the development and integration of the European Union
(Article 23 paragraph (1) Basic Law), in the transfer of sovereign
rights to international organizations (Article 24 paragraph (1) Basic
Law), and at the conclusion of international treaties (Article 59
paragraph (2) Basic Law). In addition, the Basic Law has limited the
competence of the Federal Government, thereby providing for concrete but
the controversial involvement of the legislature in the implementation
of foreign missions. According to the ruling of the Federal
Constitutional Court of 1994, the Bundestag must approve, in addition to
international treaties, the Bundeswehr’s foreign missions decided by the
Federal Government. Added to this are the determination of the case of
defense (Article 115a Basic Law) and the conclusion of peace treaties
(Article 115-1 paragraph (3) Basic Law).
Distribution of Competences: Conflict between the Federal
Government and the Federal States
The Federal Republic of Germany is a federal state and is organized on
two levels, namely the federal government and the federal states.
Although the influence on the organization of the federal system in the
Federal Republic of Germany is weighted in favor of the federal states
in accordance with Article 30 of the Basic Law (see Hellmann 2006b,
p.43), the distribution of competences in the field of foreign policy is
clearly defined in Article 32 paragraph (1) of the Basic Law:“Relations with foreign states shall be conducted by the
Federation” (Article 32 paragraph (1) Basic Law). On one side the
Basic Law lays down Art.73 Paragraph 1, 2 of the Basic Law states that
the federal government has “exclusive legislation on foreign affairs
and defense” (Article 73 paragraph (1, 2) Basic Law). On the other
hand, the Basic Law grants the federal states a right to be heard that
“before the conclusion of a treaty that affects the particular
circumstances of a state, […] the federal state shall be consulted
in a timely fashion” (Article 32 paragraph (2) Basic Law). In addition,
under this article, the federal states can “have the power to
legislate, they may conclude treaties with foreign states with the
consent of the Federal Government” (Article 32 paragraph (3) Basic
Law).
Due to the increasing intertwining of German foreign policy within the
EU, the foreign policy options of the Länder have widened, according to
the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court according to Article 70
paragraph (1) of the Basic Law. The Basic Law extended the participation
rights of the federal states in EU matters in accordance with Article 23
of the Basic Law, so that the Federal Government is obliged under Art 23
paragraphs (2) of the Basic Law to inform the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat comprehensively and at the earliest possible date in all EU
matters (Article 23 paragraph (2) Basic Law).
The Basic Law strengthens the participation rights of the Länder in
cases in which the interests of the federal states are affected (Article
23 paragraph (5) Basic Law). Another right of cooperation of the federal
states was taken into account in accordance with Article 24 paragraph
(1) of the Basic Law and stipulates that the Federation may be a law
transfer sovereign powers to international organizations (Article 24
paragraph (1) Basic Law).
All the above-mentioned rules and rights in favor of the federal states
refer to a limitation of competence of the Federal Government in the
area of foreign policy activities. The shift in the allocation of
competences between the federal government and the states is
controversial and triggered a heated controversy in German foreign
policy in EU matters between the federal government and state
governments. Although the distribution of competences between the
federal government and the states has been determined by the new
regulation and supplementation, there are no explicit regulations for
shaping German foreign policy within the EU.
In summary, although the Basic Law provides explicit rules on the German
foreign policy of the Federal Government, there was no conclusive and
uniform regulation on the distribution of competences, which has already
led to conflicts between the Federation and the federal states, the
Federal Government and the Bundestag and coalition parties in the
government to have. Such conflicts over external relations in the Basic
Law could arise because of the lack of an explicit delineation of the
distribution of competences between the Bundestag and the Federal
Government and raise problems in German foreign policy (Wolfrum 2007:
158, Hellmann et al. 2006b, and 2014). The Basic Law also emphasized its
transitory character and also provided for the possibility of reform:
“This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom
of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on
the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people
takes effect” (Article 146 Basic Law).
Foreign Policy Pendelum of the German Political Parties
between Values and Interests
Characteristic of the political system of the Federal Republic of
Germany is its party statehood (Oppellan, 2007: 269). The political
parties “participate in the formation of the political will of the
people” (Article 21 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany), bind together the interests of society and represent their
opinions in the political processes (Bartsch, 1998). On the other hand,
the parties represented in the Bundestag influence their political
factions on German foreign policy, thereby conveying foreign policy
decisions to the public (Oppermann and Höse 2011: 67). Although the
foreign policy is shaped by the federal government, but the foundations
of the policy are influenced by parties involved in the government,
they, therefore, represent the principles and values of their parties
(Paterson, 1981). A look at the historical development and shaping of
the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany shows that all
foreign policy strategies and orientations have been determined in
party-political conflicts (Oppelland 2007). In addition, the Chancellor
determines German foreign policy by his authority competence (Article 65
paragraph (1) of the Basic Law), nevertheless, he cannot reject the
basic values of his own party in foreign policy, since he depends on
the support and loyalty of his party and the faction majority (Oppelland
2007). Although the party political conflicts have an effect on the
shaping of foreign policy, the scope of their decisions is limited in
view of the requirements of the international system (Ismayr 2007).
The governing parties are in a bilateral relationship between the
fundamental values of their own party, which should be guided by them,
as well as the opposition parties and the structure of international
geopolitics that must be established (Oppermann and Höse 2011). This
interrelation between governing parties or opposition parties and German
foreign policy leads German foreign policy in a potentially conflictual
situation in which ruling parties, as central actors, either formulate
their foreign policy according to the basic values of their own
parties and do not adapt to the requirements of the international
environment have to accept their loss of influence or have to adjust to
the reality of the international system and give up some basic beliefs
of the party (Oppelland 2007). In this perspective, German foreign
policy not only leads to inner-party and domestic conflicts, but also to
wavering. Against this background, each federal government continues to
work with the foreign policy strategies of its predecessor, without
correcting or revising them, even though, as an opposition party, they
did not agree with the respective foreign policy and sharply criticized
foreign policy decisions (Hellmann et al. 2006). A look at the foreign
policy of the red-green federal government with regard to NATO, the
enlargement of the EU and Bundeswehr operations, the foreign policy of
the Union parties or Social–liberal government coalition in relation to
the Eastern policy - especially the Russia and Central Eastern Europe
policy - show how the federal governments continue to pursue the foreign
policy of its respective predecessor government and adapt to the new
challenges and demands of global politics (Fard 2018). Therefore, the
question can be asked to what extent the government-forming parties
after German reunification has an effect on the design and development
of German foreign policy. After the geopolitical shifts in world
politics and the End of the East-West Conflict, the political parties of
the Federal Republic of Germany have reacted to the new situation and
prepared or adopted their basic programs (Oppelland 2007: 269). The SPD,
The Social Democratic Party of Germany, adopted the “Berlin Program”
in 1989 and decided again in 2007 to implement the “Hamburg Program”
through an adaptation process. The Greens also wrote in Berlin in 2002
after the violent internal party disputes, a new policy program. The
basic program of the CDU, The Christian Democratic Union of Germany, was
renewed in 1994 in Hamburg and expressly formulated again in 2007 in
Hanover. In addition, the basic program FDP, The Free Democratic Party,
1997 in Wiesbaden and 2012 in Karlsruhe was decided again (ibid.). The
adjustment processes within the German parties led to a party-political
consensus to a certain extent with regard to the German foreign policy
orientation, which is expressly reflected in the basic programs of the
parties (Fard 2018). This will be discussed in the following section.
Party Political Consensus and Parties Conflicts over German
Foreign Policy
After the German reunification, the political parties involved in
government all proceed from a value-led foreign policy based on values
such as peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, solidarity and a more
fairness foreign policy action in world politics. Although these values
have been emphasized by all parties in the basic program, they are not
interpreted in the same sense and parties have different priorities in
enforcing their values (Oppelland 2007: 271). At first sight, the
formulated values in the policies of all parties look similar, but
they show their fundamental differences in concretizing these values
in reality (ibid.). Citing the assumption of more responsibility of
German foreign policy in world politics, the new fundamental program of
all parties legitimized the use of force and military operations of the
Bundeswehr under international and constitutional conditions if human
rights violations occur and lead to fatal consequences for those
concerned. Although the SPD and the Greens are theoretically committed
to their basic programs for conflict prevention and resolution, they
have admitted to Bundeswehr missions in Kosovo conflict and Afghanistan.
One point in which all parties agree is the European Union or the
enlargement of the EU. It is true that there was a far-reaching
consensus among the parties, with all political parties in the
party-political arguments about German European politics, and the
decisive foreign policy decisions about the EU were approved
overwhelmingly by all parties represented in the Bundestag. However, the
parties fought hard in cases such as the introduction of the euro, the
European Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the
enlargement of the EU and the euro crisis. These disputes led German
foreign policy to intra-party conflicts both from the right-wing of the
CDU / CSU and from the left-wing of the Greens and the SPD (ibid.).
Although all parties are in favor of the European Union, there is no
consensus between parties on both a basic principle of European policy
and the objectives and directions of German foreign policy for the
design and development of the European Union.
It has been noted in the Basic programs of all parties that they plead
for multilateral German foreign policy, express peace and freedom within
the framework of the United Nations, and advocate a world community and
friendship with neighbors and other states in international relations.
They also commit themselves that German foreign policy should improve
the situation in both underdeveloped and emerging countries through
development cooperation. They are working for a reform of the world
economic order. Although the CDU / CSU and the FDP want to achieve this
goal in the existing world order, the SPD and the Greens are aiming for
a radical approach to a more fair and equitable world order. On the one
hand, the SPD and the Greens under the red-green government pursued a
foreign policy that was directed against the US and sought
counter-formation against the US through their European policy and
rapprochement with Russia and China. On the other hand, the Union
parties plead for the support of the American leadership and cooperative
cooperation within NATO and are positioned against a European
counter-power policy and oppose any form of alienation of the
transatlantic relations.
Looking for a Federal or Central Foreign Policy Making
Process
Although the primacy of the Federal Government in foreign policy was
pointed out in the Basic Law, and moreover, the Federal Constitutional
Court emphasized the primacy of the Federal Government in shaping
foreign policy relations, the hierarchy does not stipulate that the
Federal Chancellor should have complete and final control over German
foreign policy has. The German interests are not static in the
international system, because of the geopolitical conditions and world
political shifts are not static as a factor. Therefore, they were
completely ignored by the judiciary and the legislature.
The Parliament and the Federal Constitutional Court would be more
willing to pay the value of centralization in foreign affairs if the
international environment was multipolar, and there were a multitude of
threats to Germany’s influence and goals. In this case, the federal
government should be able to project its power more effectively and
assert its interests (Abebe and Huq 2013: 724ff.). Among the advocates
of decentralized federalism in shaping geopolitical codes in German
foreign policy are those observers who are in favor of decentralization
of regulation in German foreign policy (Laufer and Münch 1998). They
argue that countries can better meet the diverse preferences of the
national population for foreign affairs than a single national policy.
They see decentralized federalism as a catalyst for governmental
reactions to diverging interests and preferences of the federal states
and assume that a national policy should inevitably be characterized by
heterogeneous preferences and interests of the countries, and a
decentralized federalism eliminates a single-handedly federal government
in the foreign affairs, Thus, countries interests are seen as more
important in identifying efficient national policies, as they have an
incentive to compete for votes among the population (Hinsch 2002). In
addition, it emphasizes that countries are more motivated than the
Federal Government to tie together with the opinion of the population
and their interests in the field of foreign policy and to contribute to
the political process. Finally, it is argued that decentralization is
necessary to protect individual freedoms and thus better control the
federal government in its decisions.
Compared to decentralized federalism in the development of geopolitical
codes of German foreign policy, there are advocates who oppose such an
emphasis on decentralization and the resulting consequences for German
foreign policy (Püttner 2000). They assume that the interest of the
national government in foreign policy control with changing geopolitical
conditions varies over time. While both the federal states and the
federal government, as well as the executive and legislative branches
are interested in regulating foreign policy conflicts over federalism,
the polarity of international geopolitics generally determines German
foreign policy. Therefore, in international relations, the interest of
the Federal Government in the foreground, if the federal government is
in a unipolar global environment, therefore, of the countries and the
legislature in particular, the Federal Constitutional Court should be
the most respected. In this context, due to the lack of centralization
of the German state apparatus, the Federal Government is clearly limited
in shaping an overall strategy in German foreign policy. From this
perspective, it is argued that the Federal Constitutional Court did not
take the international system as a starting point for the granting of
co-decision and co-decision rights of the Länder and the German
Parliament in EU affairs, as well as for the parliamentary reservation
on foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr in its analysis of the
constitutional basis, In addition, proponents of centralized federalism
in relation to German foreign policy point to the problem of collective
action in a decentralized organizational structure. They emphasize that
both military security and economic perspective, competition policy
could best be achieved through a nationally centralized foreign policy
and not sub-national interventions (Weichelein 2012).
Proponents of centralized federalism are currently criticizing the
absence of a concerted German voice in international politics as a major
weakness of German federalism ( Sargentich 1993). Although the Basic Law
and the Federal Constitutional Court accordingly, limit the competence
of the federal states to sign international agreements and treaties
(they can only conclude contracts with foreign states with the agreement
of the Federal Government) or to participate in military operations of
the Bundeswehr, the centralization of the Foreign policy argues that the
speed of foreign policy decisions was limited by the participation and
co-decision rights of the Länder and the German Parliament in the
deployment of the Bundeswehr and the conclusion of international
treaties. That is why they support the centralization of diplomatic,
military and German foreign policy by a single institutional actor. They
further argue that preserving and enhancing the competitiveness of the
German economy in international politics and the federal government’s
leadership and assertiveness for geographic, demographic and
technological reasons require nationally centralized geopolitical coding
in German foreign policy in order to increase social welfare could,
because in a decentralized system many obligations of the federal
government at country level lead to competing interests in the areas of
conflict of free trade, tariffs, taxes, and trade-related subsidies and
limit the scope for action and effectiveness of the federal government.
However, German foreign policy lacks a framework for taking account of
international political factors in its decisions. This deficiency leads
to a kind of foreign policy of ad hoc decisions (Sandschneider 2005:
62). In this context, it is noted that the legislative and judicial
branches lack the competence to analyze and integrate the international
political environment. As a result of their co-decision rights in
foreign affairs, these participation rights are unhelpful or even
counterproductive because they have no capacity to identify and account
for foreign affairs in terms of international geopolitics.
To summarize, the crucial point here is the structure of the
international system. Since Germany is in a uni-multipolar system, the
situation in which German foreign policy operates in order to achieve
its goals has become more difficult and more complex. In this order, the
interests of other major powers to limit the ability of the federal
government and compete with Germany in the pursuit of its goals. That is
why every country has its own foreign policy goals. On the other hand,
everyone lacks the opportunity to act unilaterally. The complexity of
international politics in a unipolar world poses a serious challenge to
German interests. In this context, it becomes clear that multipolarity
directly influences any assessment of the foreign affairs of the federal
system. Indeed, in developing its geopolitical codes in the
international system, Germany must choose between a centralized and a
decentralized foreign policy. In this situation, it can be stated that a
centralized foreign policy could have many advantages for the Federal
Republic of Germany if the Federal Government could also bundle the
interests of the countries in the foreign policy environment and
determine them a suitable policy.
Conclusion
Although the Basic Law issued explicit rules on German foreign policy,
this did not result in any conclusive and uniform rules on the
distribution of competences, which had already led to conflicts between
the federal government and the federal states, the federal government
and the Bundestag, as well as the coalition parties in the government.
Such conflicts over external relations in the Basic Law could arise
because of the lack of an explicit delineation of the distribution of
powers between the Bundestag and the Federal Government and raise
problems in German foreign policy. Another point of conflict arises in
the context of the Europeanization and Transatlanticisation of German
foreign policy in the age of globalization, which intensifies the
tension between the Federal Government and the Bundestag, because the
German Bundestag wants to exert more influence on the foreign policy
decisions of the Federal Government through this increasing
interconnectedness. In the federal system of the Federal Republic,
foreign policy competence is divided in the context of the
constitutional separation of powers in favor of the Federal Government.
The participation rights of the German parliament in European politics,
as well as in Bundeswehr operations, which are extensive in contrast to
the other western democracies, are regarded by geopolitics as a
disadvantage for German foreign policy. Hellmann assesses the
distribution of powers between the Federal Government and the German
Bundestag by stating that the conflicting field of German foreign policy
is in the need for reform in view of the effectiveness and effectiveness
of the decision-making processes in the age of globalization.
A look at the development of German foreign policy after reunification
shows that the federal structures of the Federal Republic, which are not
intended by the constitution, have changed due to the changing global
political conditions. In order to meet foreign policy requirements, the
German state system is constantly adapting to the new global political
challenges. Although the Basic Law emphasizes that the maintenance of
German foreign policy is the task of the Federal Government, it assigned
the greater part of the legislative powers to the Länder. For this
reason, since reunification, the German federal system has needed a
unified Unitarian regulation for the shaping of German foreign policy.
The German constitution and the resulting German federalism are
characterized by two aspects. The figure of German federalism originated
after the Second World War when the occupying powers prevented a strong
German central state in favor of the German federal states. This German
model of federalism is about the decentralization of the federal
structures of the Federal Republic, which in the course of time
developed in the direction of centralism, because of the federal
decision-making structures and the complex distribution of powers
between the Federal Government and the Bundestag and Bundesrat as well
as the various levels of federal and state governments due to the
competing legislative responsibilities, have not cooperated more
effectively, have led to alienation between the federal government and
the states and the state and the population as well as fluctuating
attitude of the federal government.
The German constitution and German federalism still exist in the form
that determined the Western Allies and no longer corresponds to the new
framework conditions of the Federal Republic of Germany after
reunification. With regard to German foreign policy, not only a reform
of the Basic Law but also a reform of federalism is necessary if Germany
formulates its foreign policy role strategically and consistently and
does not want to fall behind in the international competition. This is
intended to reduce the participation rights of the federal states and
the legislature in the foreign policy environment and to clearly and
clearly classify their distribution of competences. The crucial point
here is the structure of the international system. Since Germany is in a
uni-multipolar system, the situation in which German foreign policy
operates in order to achieve its goals has become more difficult and
more complex. In this order, the interests of other major powers limit
the ability of the federal government and compete with Germany in the
pursuit of its goals. That is why every country has its own foreign
policy goals. On the other hand, everyone lacks the opportunity to act
unilaterally. The complexity of international politics in a unipolar
world poses a serious challenge to German interests. In this context, it
becomes clear that multipolarity directly influences any assessment of
the foreign affairs of the federal system. In fact, Germany must decide
between a centralized and decentralized foreign policy. In this
situation, one can state that a centralized foreign policy could have
many advantages for the Federal Republic of Germany if the federal
government could also bundle the interests of the countries in the
foreign policy environment and determine in a suitable policy.
The German political parties do not formulate their foreign policy in
world political consciousness. The German parties do not pursue any
power politics in their foreign policy formulations, which is explicit
in the foreground in the foreign policy discourse of other major powers.
Likewise, national interests are still in the shadow of the German past.
For both reasons, this political understanding of the German parties
does not correspond to events and politics at the international level.
That is why their basic programs for German foreign policy, such as the
German Basic Law, have been determined on normative and value-oriented
foundations. The German party-political conflict is about the
orientation of German foreign policy and the role of Germany or Europe
in world politics. Rather, it is about the controversial foreign policy
positions of German foreign policy and its decision-making directions.
Although the parties hardly diverge in their basic programs with the
orientation of German foreign policy and come to an agreement in the
coalition negotiations, this problem still exists in the German parties
and led to the crisis in German foreign policy and as a result to
dissatisfaction with the political parties in the parliamentary system.
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