# Consequences of the Global War on Terror in the Horn of Africa Region

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March 27, 2024

## Abstract

This article seeks to examine the consequences of the global war on terror (GWT) in the Horn of Africa. The focus is on the various implications to individual countries and the region as a whole. It therefore, critically interrogates what the consequences are and how they manifested. The interplay between internal and external factors compounding the consequences are critically analysed. Militarisation in the service of geo-strategic and geopolitical interests through creation of division of states into friendly and non-friendly and construction of unholy alliances hinders cooperation and regional integration. The politics of creation of pariah states, related to the GWT, engenders fragility, internal instability, and failed states. This in turn exposes societies to all sorts of pathologies, distorting the process of state and nation formation. The paper interrogates these intertwined variables. The paper contends that the GWT aggravated the precarious state of peace and stability in the Horn region causing far-reaching structural, political, social, economic, security, inter-state relation, integration and diplomatic damages still reverberating even after the GWT has been jettisoned. The study of the consequences of the GWT still remains scanty. The paper hopes to contribute to the dearth of knowledge on the consequence of GWT.

**Key words** : global war on terror, Horn region, militarisation, proxy wars

## Introduction

After decades of Cold War interventions that transformed the Horn of Africa region (HOAR) into a theatre of war for superpower rivalry (Yordanov, 2016), it got respite in 1990 in tandem with the demise of the Soviet Bloc that heralded the end of the Cold War. The end of Cold War and collapse of state socialism spurred triumphalist hasty statements such as end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), prophesy of clashes of civilisations (Huntington, 1996). This respite, however, did not last long. A new era of external intervention, in the form of global war on terror (GWT), commenced. The GWT coupled with the war against piracy has attracted various international forces to the HOAR. The last form in a litany of external interventions pertain to what goes commonly under the designation of scramble for resources. Today, although terrorism and piracy has subsided, several dozens of naval forces from West, East, North and South of the glob are still active in the region. Following the Gaza war sparked by the Hamas action on October 7, 2023, and subsequent Houthi retaliatory attacks on ships destined to or connected with Israel passing through Bal El Mandab, disrupting trade have heightened further the insecurity of the region. What is the underlying rational behind the huge military presence in the HOAR? What are the implications of GWT driven interventions? Is there any mitigation to the interventions? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. More specifically, it argues that the GWT has caused irreparable damages in the region in terms of structure, socio-economic development, inter-state relation, democratisation, regional integration, nation and state formation.

Temporality wise the GWT succeeded the Cold War. Nevertheless, there is similarity between the two. If not in form in content, the Cold War and GWT are identical. Both engage in the creation of friends and

non-friends and militarisation of the HOAR. They also entrench proxy wars. The international interventions do cause conflicts, instability and mistrust within states as well as among states of the region perpetrating the cycle of conflicts. There is growing suspicion that the international involvement in the region has less to do with terror and piracy but rather is driven by scramble for resources and strategic positioning (Keenan, 2008, Volman and Jeremy, 2010, Aning at al, 2008). One of the contentions behind this suspicion is that in spite of the huge presence of international military forces, with all the accompanying modern sophisticated technology of warfare, it has not been possible to resolve one of the *raison d'etre* for its presence, defeating the rag-tag militias of Al Shebab completely.

This led to some to argue that the prevalence of terrorist acts and piracy is somehow tolerated because they legitimise the continuous presence of these international actors (Keenan, 2008). The proponents of such argument opine that the less commitment and dedication by international actors to rout out the malice ravaging Somalia is an illustration of the tolerance. Many therefore contend that the superpower rivalry for geo-strategic influence during the Cold War era is now replaced by West-East rivalry for the scramble for natural resources (Abrahamsen, 2013, Schmidt, 2013). The recent discovery of huge biofuel and other mineral resources in the region coupled with the new phenomenon of land grabbing thus lends further currency to the apprehension that it creates a kind of Eldorado where states, transnational corporations and extractive companies are vying for those precious untapped resources. The war in Gaza and the Houthi's retaliatory measure in the Bal El Mandab chock point is a new addition to the misery of the region.

This article seeks to examine the multiple implications of GWT driven, geo-strategic calculations of interventions and geopolitics in the HOAR. Therefore, it critically interrogates what the consequences are, how they are manifested and the mechanisms involved. It has two primary objectives. First, it will interrogate the trajectory of the GWT in the HOAR. Secondly, it seeks to examine the multiple implications caused by the GWT to the HOAR. The article contends the GWT caused irreparable political, social, economic, security, integration and diplomatic damages derailing developmental process in the region.

The article consists of seven sections. Section two analyses militarisation and conflicts in the region concomitants of GWT. Section three discusses the politics of producing pariah states. Section four analyses proxy wars. Section five analyses international peace mediation and GWT. Section six examines regional integration, development and legitimacy under the GWT regime. The final section provides concluding remarks.

## Militarisation and Conflicts

Militarisation and conflicts are two concepts that are intimately connected, albeit not in a unilinearity correlation mode. The interconnection is not a simple manifestation of military as a source of conflict, military could also serve as mechanism of conflict mitigation and deterrence. A circumstance where militarisation would serve as a function of conflict deterrence is when a considerable symmetry in military prows prevails. A second condition is when militarisation at the centre succeeds in pacification of society through taming centripetal forces (Callaghy, 1984, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Young, 1994). In the case of the latter, it relates to the Weberian notion of state monopoly of the legitimate means of violence (Weber, 1984). Societal pacification presupposes a developmental imperative in which societal groups are not in a position to challenge the state through the possession of the means of violation. There emerges a pacified and peaceful society. Conversely, the state submits itself to the societal control, as ultimate power lies on society. The state represents the interests of and is owned by all societal groups, emancipation of the state. Emancipation of state presupposes its standing above all societal groups. Succinctly, state emancipation entails: (i) autonomy of the state, (ii) the state stands above societal groups, (iii) establishment of state harmony over society (Bereketeab, 2011). The pacification of society and emancipation of state represents peace and peacefulness. This also indicate to another development, "The development of a modern state depends above all on the gradual emancipation of established political structure from society" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 4-5). This pacification of society and emancipation of state would eventually produce a condition that render militarisation and violent conflicts within society unnecessary.

It is common knowledge that, militarisation, because of its very nature of provision and making available of the very tools of mortality is anti-peace and peacefulness. Therefore, it is associated with conflicts, destruction and wars. Militarisation in the sense of widespread availability of the means of destruction harbours propensities that easily evolve into conflicts. This is further accentuated when militarisation takes place as an outcome of geo-strategically driven external intervention. Militarisation serves as means for economic, political, cultural and ideological domination. At the end, its primary contribution could be understood as opposition of state emancipation and societal pacification.

Noting the institutionalisation mechanism, Volman and Keenan (Keenan, 2008) write, 'Militarization of Africa is being co-ordinated by AFRICOM'. Indeed, the region has experienced a great deal of such kinds of militarisation over several decades with concomitant dire consequences the most obvious one being the Cold War (Yordanov, 2016). The US need of African oil necessitated that "the Bush administration decided to use military structure to secure access to and control over African oil and opted to use the GWOT as a justification, rather than acknowledging that US military intervention in Africa was about resource control" (Keenan, 2008: 635). The GWT as a strategy and justification for the exploitation of resources rests on militarisation of the region. This militarisation is not limited only to international big powers but also to regional states who willingly jump on the bandwagon of the campaign of GWT to repress their own people. It is not rare that regimes deploy the politics of GWT to repress opposition. For instance, the EPRDF government in Ethiopia introduced draconian laws in 2009 that included anti-terror law, Proclamation No. 652/2009, "that prevented opposition political parties, the media and Civil Society organizations working on democratisation from accessing donor funding" (Mulugeta, 2024: 85).

The GWT driven militarisation has at least two dimensions notably arming of client states and presence of foreign armed forces. In terms of the former client states are provided with armaments that are utilised against internal opposition as well as in the inter-state conflicts (Woodward, 2006, Cliffe, 2004, Schmidt, 2013, Keenan, 2008, Yordanov, 2016). This militarisation through supporting tyrant governments therefore is serving as obstacle to democratisation, respect of human rights, peace, security and development in HOAR. Indeed, the ready availability of the means of warfare is a cause to the rampant wars ravaging the region. Even pastoralists who often engage in cattle rustling, equipped with AK-47, instead of traditional bows and arrows, could inflict immense devastation. The region is hosting several dozens of military organisations.

The US tendency to arrogate to itself the right to interfere and enforce its strategic interests and values (Keller, 2006, Geis and Wunderlich, 2014) often coated in the slogan of protecting global interest and security and their friends is a factor of militarisation in the region. The following are some of the current external military forces actively operating or operated in the region.

- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),
- Africa Command (AFRICOM),
- Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-Terrorism (PREACT),
- Drones base at Port Lemonnier (Djibouti) and Arba Minch (Ethiopia, until January of 2016),
- France, Germany, Japan, Dutch, Mission Atalanta (EU), USA, China (have military bases in Djibouti),
- Private Military Companies (PMCs) that are not accountable to neither home governments nor host governments (Keenan, 2008: 642, Aning et al, 2008). Therefore, lack transparency and accountability to host countries (Aning et al, 2008),

In the hinterland, the tiny state of Djibouti hosts most of the military forces. Indeed, the constellation of Western military force has led some to call it "Horn of Africa NATO" (Sun and Zoubir, 2016: 115). This militarisation of Djibouti may serve well the Ismail Omar Guelleh government, but it seems that it is inducing increasing internal divisions and dissatisfaction as expressed in incidents such as the bombing in July 2014 of a restaurant that is frequently visited by Westerners, and the August 25, same year, attempt on the life of the President. It has also contributed to complications of relation between Djibouti and Eritrea.

**The Politics of Producing Pariah States**

Two notions with the same meaning are invariably employed to label certain actors. These are 'pariah'

and 'rogue'. The meaning invoked by the notions is that "states or non-state actors as being outside the normative structure of international society" (Geis and Wunderlich, 2014: 459). This definition of course begs explanation of its presumption of existence of consensually agreed upon "international norms" and "international society". In addition, "Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (1998) define Pariah States as international States/actors which by virtue of their political systems, ideological postures, leadership or general behaviour suffer from diplomatic isolation and widespread global moral opprobrium" (Lawal, 2012: 227). International community, international values and norms are most abused terminologies. In reality they are used to mean Westerns norms and Western societies. In practice therefore it means arbitrary imposition of those norms and values.

The notion of pariah states as academic subject is not well developed in social sciences. It is rather, purposely employed by big powers, particularly the USA, to designate states considered none compliant with its global war on terror policies (Litwak, 2000). As Rotberg, 2007: 7) notes, "They [pariahs] disregarded Washington's predominant military might and followed autarkic rather than collegial, consensual, or respectful policy trajectories". This makes it subject to the politics of arbitrary construction. The politics of construction of pariahs is usually characterised by an ideology that fosters the need of a concerted and systematic demonization and dehumanisation campaigns (Geis and Wunderlich, 2014: 463). Once the label sticks not only it becomes legitimate to take any measure against the target state but also becomes hard to remove the designation for a long time to come. This political ideology is quietly infiltrating academia where academic discourse is highly influenced by it (Geis and Wunderlich 2014: 459-460). Western mainstream media driven by disseminating Western values have further promoted the politics of construction of pariahood. In its ideological underpinning the politics of pariahood is an attempt of cultivating Western value, particularly US value (Keller, 2006) thereby denigrating and depreciating the values and norms of targeted societies (a reminiscence of the civilising mission: civilising the savages, barbarians, the dark continent). The concept is uncritically deployed in academic works and by researchers too. Books like 'Worst of the Worst', edited by Robert I. Rotbert (2007), uncritically echo what White House officials utter. Lawal (2012: 227) notes, 'big power alliance structure determines Pariahood, but that they also compensate or punish States according to their whims and caprice'. What this indicates is that the categorisation of pariah is rather driven by big power geo-strategic interests and considerations devoid of any rigorous scientific interrogation. The US by its sheer power of influence singlehandedly inserted the doctrine of pariah state at the centre of academia and policymaking. It has also become fashionable that scholars, donors, policymakers, Western media, human rights organisations and activists uncritically mimic the designation.

Recently, the concept of pariah states has been popularised under the GWT regime. The label of rogue state was rigorously pursued by the American administration, particularly by G.W. Bush, following the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 (Geis and Wunderlich, 2014, Preble, 2005). The main components of the Bush Doctrine are pre-emption, democratisation and dominance. Pre-emption alludes to the logic of attacking before being attacked. While democratisation become euphemism to regime change, dominance refers to ensuring US global hegemony (Dresner, 2009). The imperative urge of confronting global terrorism as defined by the US administration has therefore brought the concept to centre of policymaking, international relation, diplomacy and to certain degree academia. The outcome of pervasive utility of the concept in the HOAR is dividing the states into pariah (non-friendly) and friendly and has brought serious multidimensional policy implications.

One of the consequences of the GWT driven intervention in the region is the division of the states into friendly and none-friendly ones. The division seems to be based on arbitrary and subjective criteria. Big powers divide at whim states into those who are willing to serve the GWT and those who are not. The designation has become controversial. If they fail to fall in line with the US interpretation of GWT, are categorised as enemies, "either you are with us or with the enemy".

As will be detailed blow while the non-friendly countries are Sudan, UIC-Somalia and Eritrea; the friendly countries are Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. A critical question is what is the implication of this division to peace, security, stability and regional integration? The most obvious upshot

of the designation of the friendly state for incumbents is they can get away with whatever violation whereas non-friendly states are sanctioned harshly. Big powers seem to gloss over or even defend actions of their close allies. A case in point is the Assistant Secretary of State, Jandayi Frazer, in the US Congressional Hearing, defending the Ethiopian government's action against the ethnic Somali Ethiopians that was labelled by many humanitarian organisations as crime against humanity (HRW, 2008). This kind of blatant defence of friendly states by White House officials undermines US advocacy of universal human rights value.

Moreover, friendly states are rewarded economically, politically, militarily and diplomatically. Ethiopia, for instance, received about US$ 3.5 billion annually, followed by Kenya with 2.6 billions and Uganda 1.7 billions from the West. The three countries also received weapons, particularly from the US as rewards for their involvement in Somalia, for instance (Burgess, 2013). Non-friendly states on the other hand are placed under economic, political, military and diplomatic sanctions. Rebellions to depose the governments are frequently supported and at times even incited to destabilise them. The Sudan is a good example of how the US armed opponents of the government (Nmoma, 2006: 55-6). These societies are extremely fragile, suffer of variety of pathologies. The external interventions therefore further aggravate the already precarious situation. States are pushed to failed status with all the accompanying consequences. The division into friendly and non-friendly states also adversely affects regional integration. A survival instinct will bring those who are designated "pariahs" together. This will therefore compartmentalise the states into opposing groups affecting the long-term sustainable and functional regional integration. Below, we will examine the case of three cases designated as pariah.

*Sudan*

The ascendency of the National Islamic Front (NIF) to state power through military coup in 1989 and its subsequent assertion of readiness to export its version of political Islam to the region in large pronounced a genesis of a process of isolation of the Islamic government. As part of isolating and encircling the Islamic government, the Clinton administration played crucial role in the creation of Frontline States (FS) against Sudan comprising Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Nmoma 2006: 55-6). The FS in collaboration with the Clinton Administration undertook concerted activities that included supporting internal opposition such as the southern rebels and the National Democratic Alliance. On the international arena also diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions intended to undermine and weaken the legitimacy of the Islamic government were systematically conducted. Despite the concerted assaults however the Islamic government survived. The FS collapsed when the Eritrea-Ethiopia second war (1998-2000) broke out (Kibreab, 2009. The two main actors of the FS not only engaged in destructive inter-state war but also hurried to win the support of the Islamic government in Sudan (de Waal 2015: 48).

A number of incidents that were allegedly attributed to the National Islamic Front government sparked US actions against Sudan. One of such incidents was the bombing of the US Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 where Sudan was allegedly implicated, putting it in the limelight of the GWT (Keller, 2006). Consequently, the US bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum that was producing malaria medicine on the suspicion that it was producing chemical weapons. The incidents in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi coupled with the provision of sanctuary to Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, placed Sudan in the list of states harbouring terrorism (Fluehr-Lobban, 2012). The US therefore pursued a hostile policy against Sudan that included economic sanctions, political isolation and supporting opposition groups that led to the split of the country (Nmoma, 2006). Sudan was placed in the list of states that espouse terrorism.

Putting it in the list of states sponsoring terrorism that lasted for decades and was only lifted after the fall of the Omar el-Bashir government in 2019 crippled the economy of the Sudan. Sudan was barred from accessing international economic institution, disconnected from Visa and Swish systems, external investment and diplomatic relations were curtailed. Even travelling to Sudan would place one under suspicion and maybe subjected to rigorous scrutinization for interring the United States of America. This complete shutting subjected the country to unimaginable problems including split. The running war involving the national army and the Rapid Support Force is a consequence of the shutting. It led to fragile state and weak society. In the fragile states index for 2023, Sudan ranks 7th (FSI, 2023)

The GWT and the concomitant military threat hanging on the NCP led Khartoum to concede to self-determination and secession of South Sudan. The secession instead of bringing peace, stability and development to both countries however brought more wars and carnage. Blue Nile, South Kordufan and Darfur became the next war zones in Sudan, South Sudan was plunged in bloody civil war in December 2013 (Theron, 2022). Belatedly, the NCP government took a number of measures intended to improve its relations with the White House, following 11 September 2001. It closed alleged terrorist network cells, provided intelligence information to US agencies, cooperated with CIA and FBI, foiled attacks against US targets (Nmoma, 2006), the rewards for Sudan were however disappointing. The bar of demands from the USA kept rising. Sudan continued to face sanctions and remained in the list of states sponsoring terrorism. The US raised new demands that included the Darfur problem, in order to lift the sanctions. Lately also the Trump Administration added diplomatic relation with Israel to the list of conditions (BBC, 2020). The indictment of President Omar Al Bashir by the ICC for alleged crimes committed in Darfur further complicated Sudan's relation with the West. The upshot of all this is continued multifaceted crisis in Sudan.

The economic consequences of the GWT driven sanctions and isolation were immense to the Sudanese society. The devastation brought on society and consequent chronic state crisis is overwhelming. Under massive popular uprising the Omar al Bashir government was deposed in April 2019. The military that took over power however opposed surrendering power to a transitional civilian government. The confrontation between the armed forces and civilian population culminated in the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Defence Forces and Rapid Support Forces on April 15, 2023. Sudan is therefore, still marching along the pathway it has been marching for the last seventy years. The compounded consequences of sanctions, isolation (effects of GWT) and inability of the political elite to advance state and nation formation have severely weakened the state and shattered the unity of society. The outcome is clearly demonstrated in tackling the challenges of transition from a military rule to civil governance following the fall of the NCP regime in 2019 (Bereketeab, 2022).

*Union of Islamic Court in Somalia*

Following fifteen years of state collapse, a domesticated endeavour of state resuscitation began to take shape in 2006 with promising outcome led by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Within six months the UIC got ride Mogadishu of the warlords, removed roadblocks, opened the airport and port of Mogadishu, established security (Samatar, 2013, Muller. 2013, de Waal 2015: 122). A semblance of state structures was put in place. Unfortunately, the Islamic profile of the UIC attracted negative attention from neighbouring countries and the US who were allied with the warlords. The demise of the "Somali Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, which was funded by the Central Intelligence Agency" (Samatar, 2013: 170) under the onslaught of the UIC sparked Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006. The success of UIC was seen from the prism of GWT. Apparently, the rapid expansion of UIC alarmed the allies of the warlords. The warlords presented themselves as a force combating terrorism and Islamic radicalism embodies in the UIC. This self-presentation of the warlords as agents combating terrorism allied them with the USA on its fight against global terrorism which it (USA)thought Somalia had become a save heaven for terrorists following the terrorist bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (Hansen, 2013: 24). Consequently, the UIC were designated as pariah that induced the Ethiopians with the tacit support of the US to invaded Somalia in December 2006 (Menkhaus, 2013: 98, Abdullahi 2015:.390-1). Somalia under the UIC was suspected of being a save heaven for international Islamic terrorist groups.

The UIC were defeated and dispersed that further plunged Somalia into more chaos and carnage. The UIC was split into different factions (Mengisteab, 2013). The Ethiopian occupation of Somalia had opposite outcome than its pronounced objective, it generated an extremist radical group, Al Shebab, who fought the Ethiopians until they were forced to leave the country in 2009. Al Shebab introduced harsh Islamic Sharia law in all area they controlled. They were designated terrorists allied to international terrorism by the US administration which pushed them to declare allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012 (Hansen, 2013: 118). The counter-terrorism policies adopted by regional governments (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) and interventions in Somalia propelled radicalisation and religious tensions particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Demonstrations in Ethiopia by the Moslem communities; radicalisation of Moslem communities in Mombasa and Nairobi and repressive counter-terrorism measures by police and security forces indicate how the GWT sparks social disruption in those countries.

Moreover, the vanquishing and labelling of the UIC engendered another unfortunate consequence to the resuscitating of the Somali state. There were clear indications that the UIC were trying to resuscitate the state through its endeavour of restoring state functions and services. It was reported that "When the UIC evicted warlords from their bases, they also removed all the checkpoints in the areas warlords controlled. They opened Mogadishu's international airport and sea port – an accomplishment that had proved elusive for several transitional governments" (Elmi, 2010: 83). The rise of the state is a pre-requisite for combating terrorism, radicalism, extremism, peace and stability. As long as the state remains fragile and dysfunctional all these evils will persist.

*Eritrea*

Eritrea emerged as independent state *de facto* (1991) and *de jure* (1993), following a successful conclusion of thirty years of bloody war of independence. Eritreans held the West responsible for all their sufferings, which have veritable implication for future diplomatic relations. The country's diplomatic relations commenced with its de jure independence. Except for few years its relationship with the West was fraught with devastating problems. Eritrea had a good relationship with the West, particularly with the US, until the second war (1998-2000) with Ethiopia broke out. Indeed, the Eritrean leader, in cohort with other African leaders, was praised as a new breed of African leaders by the Clinton Administration (Connell, 2009: 136). In addition, as mentioned earlier, it was a member of the coalition of Frontline States targeting Sudan. Following the outbreak of the war however Eritrea fell out of favour of the US administration. Ethiopia and Eritrea now at odds with each other vying for USA favouritism. The choice was self-evident for geo-strategic reasons. The US chose the powerhouse of the region, Ethiopia (Connell, 2009, Reid, 2009). Ethiopia was perceived as a strategic ally of the US in GWT (Klosowicz, 2015). Therefore, Ethiopia was, for instance, permitted to systematically breach the Court of Arbitration final and binding verdict on the border issue of the two countries with tacit US support. Indeed, White House officials pushed for renegotiation on the final and binding border verdict (Bolton 2007). This annoyed Eritrea a great deal leading to it's drifting away from the US which in turn induced it's isolation and ended up under sanctions.

The war and the subsequent no war no peace situation adversely affected Eritrea's domestic as well as international relations. It also brought a dire consequence to the region where the countries engaged in proxy wars (Lyon, 2009). In the internality dimension political, economic, security situations rapidly deteriorated. They were driven by domestic political factors, regional relations and international factors. The final and binding Algiers Agreement that ended the war was rejected by Ethiopia (Muller, 2016, ICG, 2010: 21). A trusted ally of the USA in the GWT, Ethiopia was emboldened by the former's support in it's rejection of the implementation of the International Court of Arbitration demarcation verdict. Eritrea accused the United States of not honouring its commitment and pressuring Ethiopia to implement the verdict, conversely the US pushed for negotiated settlement of the border issue that will be acceptable to Ethiopia (Woldemariam and Yohannes, 2007). The then Assistant Secretary of State, Jandyi Frazer, openly declared that the residents of Badme should be consulted thereby rendering the Court of Arbitration verdict virtually null and void. This further angered Eritrea, leading to the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Eritrea ended up in the camp of "pariah states". A testimony to the unjustness of the politics of the creation of pariah states is that while Ethiopia who reject international Court of Arbitration verdict; invaded Somalia; armed, trained, gave sanctuary to armed Eritrean groups striving to depose the government in Asmara could avoid sanctions, Eritrea was put under sanctions for alleged support of Al Shebab and disturbing security of the region. Supporting Al Shebab was construed as aiding and abetting terrorism thus undermining the fight on GWT.

The GWT driven isolation, sanctions and demonisation pushed Eritrea to the brink of explosion. An economy already dilapidated by thirty-year war of independence immensely suffered under the sanctions regime. The sanctions discouraged external investment as well as engagement with WB and IMF became impossible.

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The economic hardship couple with political and security challenges induced mass youth migration. The 1998-2000 war engendered division with the leadership of the country many ending in prison. The political crisis had devasting effect on domestic media where many journalists were imprisoned, private newspapers were closed. The legislation was suspended. The national service that was indefinitely extended became the main lifeline of the country; at the same time, it became the mainstay for the youth to flee the country. In short undeclared state of emergency reigned. The no war no peace status quo between Eritrea and Ethiopia that lasted for twenty years (1998-2018) had a devastating effect to the two countries but much more to Eritrea and the region as whole.

The rapprochement between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia signed in 2018 was supposed to harbinger a new epoch in the region. The rapprochement ended the no-peace no-war situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea and Somalia renewed diplomatic relations. The three leaders also expressed the ambition of revitalising IGAD. A new climate of diplomacy began to reign in the region. This new initiative of regional integration did not fall on favourable eyes of the West. The West opposed the new rapprochement because it would antagonise their geostrategic interest in the region. The West waged concerted campaign against the three leaders. Consequently, the president of Somalia lost power, Ethiopia was plunged into civil war sparked by the TPLF, an ally of the West. Expectedly, the tripartite rapprochement lost momentum. In addition, the PM of Ethiopia, in October 2023, declared that Ethiopia should own a port either through peaceful means, or if necessary, by force. The PM claimed ownership of port is life and death for Ethiopia. This sent a shockwave throughout the region. Eventually, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the breakaway Somaliland to lease a port where Ethiopia will have a commercial port and naval base in return for recognition of the independence of Somaliland. This generated strong reaction from the federal government in Mogadishu accusing Ethiopia of violation of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integration. This added new element to the already precarious situation of the region. Therefore, the region continues to march on its usual road of insecurity and instability.

**Proxy Wars**

Yet another consequence of GWT is the proliferation of proxy wars. Next to the division into friendly and non-friendly of the states comes the utilisation of proxy wars. The phenomenon of proxy wars assumes two dimensions. One dimension concerns involvement of big powers who employ client state in their geostrategic ambition for domination. For instance, when the US and Soviet Union converted the HOA into ideological and geostrategic playground (Lefebvre, 1987, Cliffe1999, Woodward, 2006, Yordanov, 2016) they used Ethiopia and Somalia. By the end of the Cold War, it was estimated about 600, 000 people were killed in the HOAR (Rogers, 2014). The superpowers not only produced client states but also very easily shifted alliance, evidence of the opportunistic nature of proxy wars. By mid-1970 the US abandoned Ethiopia and allied with Somalia and Sudan, while the Soviet Union abandoned Somalia and moved to Ethiopia. The Consequences of the opportunistic moves to the region were enormous. The region was converted into dumping ground for sophisticated weapons the two big powers produced (Yordanov 2016).

Consequently, the region is sustaining longest and devastating wars. The GWT and piracy that generated another form of proxy war and militarisation replaced Cold War. Moreover, GWT and piracy brought international naval forces and military forces to the HOA for the second time (Sun and Zoubir, 2016) producing new proxy clients. The proliferation of proxy wars has the tendency of manufacturing new agents. In recent history of the region, we witnessed three types of proxy war agents. We can categorise them in a three-tier structure. These are the big powers of the Cold War, the post-Cold War middle powers and emerging low rank proxy war agents. The sources of power of these proxy war agents varies, from sheer military, to mix of military and economic, and sole economy. The Gulf-States, for instance, could constitute the last form. In the last case economic power is translated into political, diplomatic and possibly military power.

The new dimension of military proxies also generated reconfiguration of regional and international patron-client relations. Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti as clients of the new system of conglomeration of GWT readily intervened in Somalia (Volman and Keeman, 2010). Djibouti was virtually transformed into

a "vassal" state through its hosting of various military bases. Drones based in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, regularly survey and attack targets in Somalia and Yemen. Djibouti was therefore playing the role of Trojan Horse in the service of GWT proxy regime.

The second dimension of proxy war relates to regional states. Regional states are increasingly engaged in employing opposition groups of other state(s) to promote their own regional and national interest or undermine other state(s) (Abbink, 2003, Lyon, 2009). The regional states, in an imitation of big powers, attempt to create their own clients. After its invasion of Somalia, Kenya rushed in crafting the Jubaland state (Skeppeström and Nordlund, 2014: 18, Hammond, 2013: 188). This state is intended to serve as a buffer zone for Kenya from attacks by Somali groups. This autonomous state in southern Somalia, bordering Kenya, is perceived by many Somalis as created to be client of Kenya. Ethiopia also crafted out the Transitional Federal Government comprising warlords. Indeed, many Somalis argue that the introduction of federal governmental system is an imposition from the neighbouring states to balkanise Somalia, "The Current Addis Ababa regime, therefore, wants to create several mini-states that are hostile to each other and have good relations with Ethiopia" (Elmi, 2010: 23). Another element played out in the GWT proxy regime is the arbitrary designation of political opponents (individuals as well as groups) as terrorists.

The EPRDF government, for instance, was frequently accused of designating opponents, politicians, human rights activists, journalists, ethnic political organisations such as the Oromo Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Gambella movements as terrorists. The government proclaimed anti-terrorism law (FDRE, 2009), under which many were put in jail and many others were banned. Ethiopia faced harsh criticism from humanitarian organisations for the use of Proclamation No. 652/2009 sweepingly. Critics argued that it is used to prosecute opposition parties, individuals and private media (Griffith, 2013, HRW, 2008, Kassa, 2013). Museveni of Uganda, another friendly state was also abusing terrorist laws (Fesher, 2012).

**International Peace Mediation and GWT**

The rampant conflicts and chronic intra-state and inter-state wars would rationalise the logic of peace mediations in the region. How mediation is conducted has significance not only to the settlement of the wars but also to the credibility and integrity of the international peace mediation system. It also indicates to the morality and legality of instruments of international mediation and enforcement of peace. Many have appealed for a holistic, regional, even-handed and balanced approach to peace mediation (Young, 2012, Bereketeab, 2013). Three important elements in mediation process are: (i) identify and define root causes; (ii) identify and ensure equal and genuine participation/representation of stakeholders; (iii) domestic ownership of process and outcome (Call and Wyeth, 2008). The GWT seems to have distorted the international peace mediation system. Neo-liberal peacebuilding and peace mediation focuses on quick fixes and formal procedures. It therefore avoids dealing with root causes, quite often defines the problem and stakeholders narrowly. For instance, in identifying and defining stakeholders, it focuses only on warring parts. The imperatives of GWT necessitates treating cases and countries differently that would not promote an overall peace and security in the region. To illustrate the different treatment let's examine (i) CPA: Sudan, (ii) TFG-UIC: Somalia, (iii) Ethiopia-Eritrea.

Let's begin with the CPA. Unlike its name, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the ruling NCP and the rebel SPLM was all but comprehensive (Young, 2012). What began as all-encompassing peace negotiations, it was progressively reduced to bilateral to suite the GWT agenda. Sudan was accused of aiding and abetting terrorism therefore the secession of South Sudan was seen as the right thing and would boost the fight against terrorism. The mediators narrowly focused on north-south, a uni-dimensional approach to multifaceted conflicts, the final of which became the CPA. This abridgement of the peace mediation led to exclusion and marginalisation of important movements and actors; only the NCP and SPLM were taken on board. The incomprehensiveness and flaws of the peace mediation was reflected in the explosion of conflicts in Darfur (Medani, 2012: 290), Blue Nile, South Kordofan and South Sudan (Young, 2012).

The peace mediation in Somalia was also characterised by serious flaws. In the internecine war between the US supported TFG and the UIC, the mediators stood on the side of the TFG, although the latter lacked

popular legitimacy. This failed to settle the conflict and plunged Somalia into more brutal internecine war (Samatar, 2013, Muller, 2013). The nature of the conflict in Somalia was defined by external actors such as Ethiopia, IGAD and the USA and was presented as conflict between international terrorism and the Somali people. This external definition of the nature of the conflict and actors involved deprived the Somalis the opportunity of defining, characterising and finding settlement to their problems.

The 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was ended through the Algiers Agreement. The Agreement contained a number of provisions, the most significant of which was the final and binding border delineation and demarcation article. The UN, AU, EU and USA assumed the role of witness and guarantor in which they are empowered to enforce the agreement (Algiers Agreement, 12 December 2000). The Algiers Agreement authorised the guarantors to invoke Chapter Seven of the UN Charter against anyone of the signatories who renege from its commitment (Algiers Agreement, 18 June). When EEBC (Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission) issued its verdict in April 2002, Ethiopia reneged its commitment and rejected the Verdict because it rewarded the flashpoint of the war (Badme) to Eritrea. The guarantors, instead of exercising their responsibility and putting pressure on Ethiopia chose to engage in acts of appeasement. Ethiopia got away with rejection of international Court of Arbitration verdict while Eritrea faced sanctions.

Peace mediations in the HOAR require different methodological approaches, which are appropriate to the history and context of the region. A holistic, regional by orientation and comprehensive by nature methodology is required. The piecemeal, one at time, approach employed by peace mediators has so far failed to bring peace, stability and security to the region. This approach which for instance drove the mediators to ultimately focus on the south-north conflict of Sudan indeed sparked the outbreak of conflicts in other parts of the country. Another flaw in the peace mediation approach is the unbalanced, biased and double standard practices. Cases as well as countries are treated differently. The most flagrant example of this double standard is the treatment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. Although the conflict has been classified by many scholars and observers as the epicentre of conflicts in the HOAR (ICG, 2003, Healy and Plaut, 2007, Reid 2009), mediators particular Western powers ignored it. This constricted approach to mediation undermined the GWT by generating resentment and bitterness among ignored groups. Unless peace mediation is extricated from the imperatives of GWT and geo-strategic interests, there will not be lasting peace in the region.

**Regional Integration, Development and Legitimacy under the GWT Regime**

The consequences detailed above further influence other three dimensions, notably regional integration, development and legitimacy. Development and legitimacy have the tendency of promoting healthy and sustainable regional integration. Functional regional integration in turn enhances development and legitimacy. What does legitimacy in the context of regional integration mean? Legitimacy has two dimensions, internal and external (Schaar, 1981). In its internality dimension legitimacy would represent a situation where there prevails an amicable relation between citizens, on one hand, and states and regional organisation on the other. In other words, citizens understand the latter as representing their interest and wellbeing so that they confer on it legitimacy. Regional integration is also perceived as a tool of promoting development.

The GWT has a dire consequence to regional integration, socio-economic development and state legitimacy. Regional integration is very sensitive therefore presupposes harmonious relationships among states and peoples that enter into regional patrimony (Mengisteab and Bereketeab, 2012). Conflicts and divisions often tend to foster suspicion, mistrust, hate and antagonisms. These are features that would not bode well for regional integration to succeed and by extension development. All elements of conflict and suspicion need therefore to be managed before genuine regional integration could be entertained. External self-interest driven intervention that aggravate conflicts and suspicion have to be prevented in order for regional integration to succeed.

Socio-economic development by its very nature is also highly sensitive to peace, stability and security. Wars and conflicts destroy not only human life but also socio-economic infrastructures and life sustaining material foundations (Bereketeab, 2013). It is not secrete that the rampant conflicts in the HOAR have created environmental degradation, desertification, soil erosion, draughts that adversely affect agriculture

and agricultural production, pastoralism and pastoral production, economic growth, income per capita that in turn affect social activities such as health, education, literacy, level of poverty, nutrition, living standard, child mortality, life expectancy, etc (Mengisteab 2013).

Our third variable, legitimacy, is also negatively affected by GWT intervention. Legitimacy is contingent on functional and harmonious state-society relation. This relation presupposes that the state undertakes some basic provision highly valued by society, in turn society acknowledges and confers sovereignty on the state (Callaghy, 1984, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Tilly, 1978, Young, 1994). This harmonious state-society relation could however easily be disrupted by external intervention, particularly when that external intervention sow division and conflict among them. What the GWT does is that it dislocates the state from the harmonious state-society relation and locates its loyalty somewhere else. Those friendly states in HOAR show their loyalty and accountability to their patrons in the GWT regime that may detach them from their society. The state then becomes alien, indeed an enemy of and a hazard to society (Keenan, 2008). This loss of legitimacy has become the main source of the perpetual conflict, instability and insecurity in the HOAR.

Regional integration, development and legitimacy, ultimately presupposes harmonious and functional relation between citizens, national states and regional organisation. The modern state is autonomous of society, while ultimate power rests on society. Regionalism and regionalisation, an expression of regional integration, manifests collective endeavour for collective problem resolutions. A social contract between citizens, state and regional organisation undergirds modern regionalisation.

## Conclusion

This article set out to critically analyse manifestations and implications of GWT in the HOAR. Many perceive the rhetoric of GWT as advocated by the USA is rather embedded in the politics of domination. The politics of domination in this context relates to economic, cultural, political and ideological. In the process of exercising this politics of domination, targeted societies are systematically and mischievously deprived of agency to define, design, plan and execute their problems, realities and future. This further leads to division, marginalization of social groups often with concomitant social evils: conflicts, wars, poverty, abuse of human rights, lack of democracy. In this context the misguided GWT, in lieu of preventing terrorism contributes to its creation. The expansion of terrorism, extremism and radicalism is to a major degree a consequence of the GWT.

The GWT driven intervention through its division of the states into friendly and non-friendly (pariah) states has undermined the unity of the region. Further regional integration, socio-economic development and state legitimacy have become victims of the misguided GWT policy. Militarism and military solution to fundamentally socio-economic and political problems will not lead to settling the festering pathologies in the region. The region will fare better if given the chance to sort out its problems. Cold War, GWT, war against piracy, and scramble for resources have no good record in the region.

In addition, GWT has aggravated the fundamental problem the people of the region face, notably societal construction. At the root of the wars running today in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan lay the incomplete and distorted process of nation and state formation. The GWT, incontrovertibly, contributed to the incompleteness and distortion of the process. Nation and state formation is by its very nature domestic, political and long-term that should be left for internal actors.

The interventionist neoliberal agenda that underpinned the emergence of the GWT rests upon two Western philosophical assumptions. The first is the belief that we live in post-nation state era therefore sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state is anachronistic. The second is globalisation has overtaken localisation. The two assumptions would permit big powers to intervene whenever they deem it necessary to do so. Security is defined from a global dimension. The USA would invoke a security interest globally that allows it to intervene beyond its borders. The GWT was therefore concocted to allow the USA to intervene everywhere with devastating effect to subject people. The consequences of GWT still reverberates in the HOAR, even after, at least formally, the references to it have receded.

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