The Scenario of a Pandemic Spread of the Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 is Based on a Statistical Fallacy

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Abstract

In view of the rapidly increasing numbers of reported new coronavirus infections, many speak of an upcoming pandemic. However, since the number of conducted coronavirus tests has rapidly increased over time as well, the apparent increase in infections may actually reflect increased testing, rather than a rapid spread of the coronavirus. To examine this issue, data from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and USA were analyzed. In all countries, the rapid increase in reported new infections was largely attributable to the rapid increase in conducted tests. Statistically controlling for the increased amount of testing revealed that the increases in reported infections dramatically overestimate the true increases in every country. According to the estimated true courses of new infections, the increases were initially much smaller, and the courses of new infections have already flattened or are even decreasing since the beginning of calendar week 13 (March 23) in almost all countries. The courses of reported new infections reflect effects of increase almost simultaneously in every country, which further confirms that the increases in reported new infections reflect effects of increased testing. These results indicate that the scenario of a coronavirus pandemic is based on a statistical fallacy.

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
Introduction


For weeks, people around the world have been looking at the apparently rapid spread of the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. In view of the increasing numbers of daily new infections reported from many countries, experts, politicians, and the media speak of an upcoming pandemic with millions of infected people worldwide. In response to such horror scenarios, extreme fear is experienced at the individual level and draconian countermeasures have been adopted in many countries.


29 In the face of such dynamics, a fundamentally important question arises: Do the observed 30 increases in the reported numbers of new infections really reflect what they seem to reflect at 31 first glance – a true increase in the number of new infections? If looking more closely at the 32 reported increasing numbers of new infections from a methodological perspective, one will 33 notice that one important problem regarding the interpretation of such data has so far been 34 neglected: that the number of tests carried out for the coronavirus has rapidly increased as well. 35 The fundamental problem is that if there are many infected people that are not detected 36 because too few tests are conducted (i.e., unreported infections), which is assumed to be the case for coronavirus infections¹, the number of reported new infections depends on the number of 37 38 conducted tests: when the number of tests is increased, the number of detected new infections 39 will automatically increase as well because more hitherto unreported infections are detected. 40 This introduces a potential statistical fallacy: An observed rapid increase in detected new 41 infections may give the impression that there might be a rapid spread of a virus. However, the 42 observed rapid increase actually may reflect the rapid increase in testing, and tell nothing about 43 the true course of new infections, which may actually be much less steep or even decreasing. 44 The statistical fallacy can be illustrated by a simple example: Imagine there is a garden

45 where ten Easter eggs are hidden every day (i.e., the true number of new infections). On the first day, the children are allowed to search for one minute and they find one egg; on the second day, 46 47 they are allowed to search for two minutes and they find two eggs; and on the third day, they are 48 allowed to search for four minutes and they find four eggs (i.e., the number of reported new 49 infections). The children could get the misleading impression that exponentially more Easter 50 eggs are hidden in the garden every day because they find exponentially more eggs every day. 51 But of course, this is a problematic interpretation because in reality there were always the same number of eggs hidden in the garden, and the increased number of eggs found is only due to the 52 53 increased number of search attempts (i.e., the increase in the number of tests). As illustrated in Fig. 1 based on data from Italy and the USA²⁻⁴, regarding the reported numbers of new 54 55 coronavirus infections, such problem indeed exists.









59 reported new coronavirus infections. The course of the number of conducted coronavirus tests

- 60 (height of the blue bars) and the course of reported new coronavirus (height of the red bars) in
- 61 Italy and the USA in calendar weeks 10-13 is shown (from March 2 to March 29).
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
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As can be seen in Fig. 1, the number of reported new infections increases simultaneously

64 with the number of conducted tests. However, as illustrated by the Easter egg example, if there are unreported cases (in the Easter egg example: the hidden eggs that are not found due to too 65 few search attempts), one will automatically find at least as many new infections as the number 66 67 of tests has been increased (unless the true number of new infections is in reality decreasing). For 68 example, if one runs twice as many tests, one will also find at least twice as many new 69 infections. Consequently, if there were a true increase in new infections, one would have to find 70 a larger increase in detected new infections than is caused solely by the increase in the number of 71 tests. For instance, if the number of tests were doubled, one would have to find more than twice 72 as many new infections if there were a true increase in new infections.

73 Thus, based on an analysis of the relationship between the increase in the number of tests 74 and the concurrent increase in reported new infections, the question of whether the increase in 75 reported new infections is prone to such a statistical fallacy can be examined: if the number of new infections is in reality increasing, the factor by which the reported new infections increase 76 77 should be larger than the factor by which the number of tests is increased. If the number of new 78 infections does in reality not change, the factor by which the reported new infections increase 79 should mirror the factor by which the number of tests is increased. If the number of new 80 infections is in reality decreasing, the factor by which the reported new infections increase 81 should be smaller than the factor by which the number of tests is increased. The basic principle 82 of the statistical fallacy is illustrated in Fig. 1a.





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86 Fig. 2: Illustration of the statistical fallacy and the method of correction. As illustrated in the 87 upper panel of (a), if there are many unreported infections (green bars), the number of reported 88 new infections (red bars) is determined by the number of tests carried out (blue bars). If the 89 number of tests increases over time, more new infections will be observed, although the true 90 number of new infections may in reality be much less increasing (from week 1 to 2), not change 91 (from week 2 to 3), or even decrease (from week 3 to 4). As shown in the lower panel of (a), 92 whether an observed increase in reported new infections reflects a true increase beyond the test-93 number induced increase can be determined by a comparison of the factors by which the number 94 of tests (blue bars) and the reported new infections (red bars) increase from week to week. As an 95 example with real data, (b) shows the relationship between the number of conducted coronavirus 96 tests (blue bars) and the number of reported new coronavirus infections (red bars) for Germany 97 in calendar weeks 10 to 14 (upper panel), and the respective factors by which the numbers of 98 conducted tests (blue bars) and reported new infections (red bars) increased from week to week 99 (lower panel). (c) shows for the data from Germany the test-number biased course of reported 100 new infections (red bars), and the course of new infections when statistically controlling for the 101 increased amounts of testing (green bars). Note that for the purpose of visual comparison, the 102 growth curves in (c) are scaled to the number of reported infections in calendar week 10. In 103 reality, the true number of new infections is higher than the reported number of new infections 104 due to the existence of unreported cases (see Fig. 1A).

106 As an example with real data, Fig. 1b shows the relationship between the number of 107 conducted coronavirus tests and the number of reported new coronavirus infections for Germany^{5,6} in calendar weeks 10 to 14 (upper panel), and the respective factors by which the 108 109 numbers of conducted tests and reported new infections increased from week to week (lower 110 panel). As can be seen, the number of tests increased rapidly with time, indicating that large parts 111 of the observed increase in reported new infections is attributable to increased testing. Examining 112 the factors by which reported new infections and tests increased from week to week indicates 113 that the number of new infections increased stronger than the number of conducted tests from 114 calendar weeks 10 to 12, indicating that the number of new infections initially truly increased, 115 albeit smaller than suggested by the reported number of new infections. However, from calendar 116 week 12 on, the number of tests and the number of reported new infections increased 117 simultaneously, indicating that the observed increases in reported new infections are fully 118 attributable to increased testing, and tell nothing about the true course of the spreading of the 119 virus.

120 In a situation where an increase in reported new infections does not necessarily tell 121 something about the true course of new infections due to the fact that the number of tests has 122 simultaneously increased as well, there is a simple statistical technique that can be used to 123 estimate the true course of new infections: the observed numbers of reported new infections can 124 be statistically controlled for the increase in conducted tests. The basic principle can be described 125 as follows: how many new infections would have been observed if the number of tests would not 126 have been increased across weeks? This can easily be estimated by dividing the weekly number 127 of reported new infections by the factor by which the number of tests has been increased per 128 week. Fig. 1c illustrates this for the data from Germany. As can be seen, the test-number biased

course of reported new infections dramatically overestimates the true course of new infections,
as revealed by statistical control for the increase in test numbers. Contrary to what is suggested
by the observed rapid increase in reported new infections, the number of new infections initially


132 increased much less, and is actually decreasing since the beginning of calendar week 13.


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Results

134 To examine whether the increases in reported new infections in other countries are prone 135 to the same statistical fallacy as well, data from Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and USA on the numbers of conducted coronavirus tests^{3-5,7-9} and reported new coronavirus 136 infections^{2,6} in calendar weeks 10 to 14 (March 2 to April 5) were analyzed. To account for 137 138 potential temporal variability in the timeline running up to a test being reported, both in terms of 139 the time it takes for a symptomatic person to receive a test, and in the time for that test to get 140 reported, and because for Germany and France only data on the number of conducted tests per 141 week is available, data were aggregated by week.

142 Fig. 3 shows for each of the countries the relationship between the numbers of conducted 143 tests and reported new infections (left panels), and the test-number biased courses of reported 144 new coronavirus infections and the estimated true courses based on statistical control for the 145 increased amount of testing (right panel). In all countries, the rapid increase in the number of 146 new infections per week was largely attributable to the rapid increase in the number of conducted 147 tests per week. Statistically controlling for the increased amount of testing consistently revealed 148 that the observed rapid increases in reported new infections dramatically overestimate the true 149 increases in every country. According to the estimated true course, the initial increases in new 150 infections were much smaller, and in almost every country, the course of new infections has 151 already flattened or is decreasing since about calendar week 13.





Calendar Week

Number of Conducted Tests

153 Fig. 3. Statistical fallacy in the countries Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and 154 USA. The left panels show the relationships between the number of conducted coronavirus tests 155 and the number of reported new coronavirus infections in every country for calendar weeks 10 to 156 14 (March 2 to April 5). The right panels show for every country the test-number biased course 157 of reported new infections, and the estimated true course based on statistical control for the 158 increased amount of testing. Note that for the purpose of visual comparison, the growth curves 159 are scaled to the number of reported infections in calendar week 10. In reality, the true number of 160 new infections is higher than the reported number of new infections due to the existence of 161 unreported cases (see Fig. 1A).

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163 The previous analyses indicate that the observed rapid increases in new infections largely 164 reflect the fact that the number of tests has been rapidly increased over time. To further examine 165 this issue, the courses of reported new infections and reported deaths were compared for the six 166 countries. To account for the much longer reporting lag for deaths (about up to two weeks in many countries, e.g.¹⁰), only data until March 28 were examined. Fig. 4 shows the courses of the 167 168 daily increases in reported new infections and deaths. To enable a visual comparison, the values 169 for new infections were scaled to the level of the number of deaths, based on the respective death 170 rates in each country. Intriguingly, in every country, the numbers of reported new infections and 171 deaths started to increase almost simultaneously. Correlation analyses revealed that the growth 172 curves were highly related (Austria: r = .83, p < .001; Belgium: r = .88, p < .001; France: r = .94, p < .001; Germany: r = .95, p < .001; Italy: r = .96, p < .001; USA: r = .95, p < .001). 173






Fig. 4. Course of reported daily new coronavirus infections and deaths. The courses of the reported daily new coronavirus infections (blue lines) and deaths (yellow lines), and the theoretically expected course of the number of deaths based on an estimated temporal delay of 10 days between diagnosis and death (red lines), are shown for the countries Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and USA. Note that for the purpose of visual comparison, the values for new infections are scaled to the level of the number of deaths based on the respective death rates in each of the countries.

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Discussion

The present findings indicate that the observed increases in reported new infections dramatically overestimate the true spreading of the coronavirus in all of the examined countries. Statistically controlling for the concurrent increases in the number of tests suggest that the true increases in new infections were relatively small in every of the examined countries, and that the course of new infections has already flattened or is even decreasing in almost every country since the beginning of calendar week 13 (March 23).

192 The fact that the courses of reported new infections and deaths started to increase almost 193 simultaneously in every country provides further evidence that the increases in reported new 194 infections reflect effects of increased testing. From a biological perspective, the absence of a 195 temporal lag between the increases in new infections and deaths is surprising since there should 196 be a substantial temporal lag between diagnosis and death. According to findings from China, the 197 time span between the onset of symptoms and death is about 18 days¹¹. Thus, even when 198 conservatively assuming that individuals are tested four days after symptom onset, there should 199 be a temporal lag between increases in new infections and deaths of 14 days. The only 200 reasonable explanation for the absence of a temporal lag between the increases in new infections 201 and deaths may be that that many of the deceased people were tested on the coronavirus shortly 202 before or after death. However, if so, this implies that one of two possibilities must be true. The 203 first possibility is that the deceased people have really did of the coronavirus. However, this 204 would mean that if the increased testing had been started already 14 day earlier, one would have 205 found a comparable increase in new infections. The second possibility is that the deceased 206 people only have become infected with the virus shortly before death, but actually have died of 207 another disease. However, this would mean that the growth curves for new infections and deaths 208 actually depict the same thing: the increases in the number of new infection that is brought about

209 by the increased number of tests.

210 One issue that may be finally discussed is the question of how the estimated smaller 211 increases in new infections fit with reports from several countries that intensive care units are 212 crowded, or with pictures as the ones from Italy where coffins of died people are accumulated in 213 churches, which has even experts led to assume that such scenarios may take place in many 214 country if no countermeasures against the transmission of the coronavirus are taken¹². However, 215 there is one aspect that is often overlooked. In almost any country, only a relatively small part of 216 people tested on the coronavirus receives a positive test result. For instance, in Germany, only 217 around seven to eight percent receive a positive coronavirus diagnosis¹³, and even in Italy where 218 it is assumed that only people with more severe respiratory symptoms are tested for the coronavirus, only around 20 percent receive a positive coronavirus diagnosis¹⁴. Since mainly 219 220 people with acute respiratory symptoms are tested, people receiving a negative test result are not 221 healthy but suffer from other diseases, suggesting that other respiratory diseases are currently 222 circulating that are masked by the current strong focus on the coronavirus. Thus, reports from 223 crowded intensive care units and pictures with many coffins of died people may be partly 224 misleading in that a relatively large part of these people may actually have suffered from other 225 diseases, and not from the coronavirus. Indeed, this is empirically supported by data from the National Center of Health Statistics of the USA¹⁰. From the 6,427 people that have died in the 226 227 USA of the coronavirus according to diagnosis in between March 22 and April 11, only 2,925 228 (42.2%) died of pneumonia. Within the same three weeks, however, even when excluding 229 pneumonia deaths involving influenza, overall 10,006 people have died of pneumonia in the 230 USA. Thus, at least in the USA, only a relatively small part of the deaths involving pneumonia 231 were actually caused by the coronavirus.

232 In conclusion, the present findings indicate that the coronavirus crisis appears to be based 233 on a statistical fallacy: at some point in time, a new virus test is developed, accompanied by a big 234 echo in the media, leading to a rapid increase in the application of the new virus test, and thus a 235 rapid increase in reported new virus infections and deaths, which gives the impression that we 236 are facing a pandemic with millions of infections and deaths – although in reality the increase in 237 new infections has been only relatively small, and the number of new infections has relatively 238 quickly started to decrease. Becoming aware of this statistical fallacy seems to be extremely 239 important in order to counteract the extreme fear that is induced by the fallacy-prone horror 240 scenario that there may be soon millions of coronavirus infections and deaths.

241

Methods

242 **Data**. Data on the numbers of daily new coronavirus infections and deaths for the 243 countries Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and the USA were retrieved from the European Center 244 for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), which publishes a daily updated data file on the 245 coronavirus disease². For Germany, these data were retrieved from the NPGEO Corona Hub 246 2020 (Robert Koch Institute)⁹. Official data on the number of conducted coronavirus tests for 247 Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy are provided by the respective national Institutes for Health³⁻ 248 ⁶. For Germany, official data on the mean daily test capacities in Germany in calendar weeks 10-249 14 is provided in the daily situation report of the Robert Koch Institute on the coronavirus disease from April 8; the number of tests per week was determined by multiplying the mean 250 251 daily test capacities by 5 (5-day working week)⁷. Data on the daily number of tests in the USA is 252 provided by the CODID Tracking Project which provides data based on an aggregation of data released by individual states⁸. The raw data on which the present analyses are based can be 253 254 downloaded at https://osf.io/hkaru/?view_only=830bfd6cbea14744811423308e851827.

255 References 256 1. Li, R., Pei, S., Chen, B., Song, Y., Zhang, T., Yang, W., Shaman, J. Substantial 257 undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel coronavirus (SARS-258 CoV2). Science Epub ahead of print (16 Mar 2020). 259 2. Data on the numbers of daily new infections and deaths for the countries Austria, Belgium, 260 France, Italy, and the USA were retrieved from the European Center for Disease Prevention 261 and Control (ECDC), which publishes a daily updated data file on the coronavirus disease: 262 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases (data retrieved on 263 April 13, 2020, 10:00 a.m. CET). 264 3. Official data on the number of conducted tests in Italy is provided by the Ministry of Health 265 and compiled by the Department of Civil Protection on Github: https://github.com/pcm-266 dpc/COVID-19. The data is collected and made available by the webpage 267 ourworldindata.org: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-testing (data retrieved on April 13, 268 2020, 10:00 a.m. CET). 269 4. Data on the mean daily test capacities in the USA in calendar weeks is provided by the 270 CODID Tracking Project which provides data based on an aggregation of data released by 271 individual states: https://covidtracking.com/ (data retrieved on April 13, 2020, 10:00 a.m. 272 CET). 273 5. Official data on the mean daily test capacities in Germany in calendar weeks 10-14 is 274 provided in the daily situation report of the Robert Koch Institute on the coronavirus disease 275 from April 8, 2020; the number of tests per week was determined by multiplying the mean 276 daily test capacities by 5 (5-day working week):

278 04-08-de.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (Accessed 14 April 2020).

279 6. Data for Germany on the numbers of infections and deaths were retrieved from the NPGEO
280 Corona Hub 2020 (Robert Koch Institute): https://npgeo-corona-npgeo-

281 de.hub.arcgis.com/datasets/dd4580c810204019a7b8eb3e0b329dd6_0 (data retrieved on April

282 13, 2020, 10:00 a.m. CET).

7. Official data on the number of conducted tests in Austria is provided by Austria Ministry for
Health who publishes daily updates on the number of tests conducted per day:

285 https://www.sozialministerium.at/Informationen-zum-Coronavirus/Neuartiges-Coronavirus-

286 (2019-nCov). The data is collected and made available by the webpage ourworldindata.org:

287 https://ourworldindata.org/covid-testing (data retrieved on April 13, 2020, 10:00 a.m. CET).

8. Official data on the number of conducted tests in Belgium is provided by the Belgian

289 Institute for Health who publishes the number of tests conducted per day: https://epistat.wiv-

isp.be/covid/. The data is collected and made available by the webpage ourworldindata.org:

291 https://ourworldindata.org/covid-testing (data retrieved on April 13, 2020, 10:00 a.m. CET).

9. Official data on the number of conducted tests in France is provided by the Agence Nationale

de Santé Publique who has published the number of conducted tests per day until March 8,

- and per week starting from March 9:
- 295 https://www.santepubliquefrance.fr/recherche/#search=COVID-

296 19%20:%20point%20epidemiologique&sort=date. The data is collected and made available

by the webpage ourworldindata.org: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-testing (data retrieved

298 on April 13, 2020, 10:00 a.m. CET).

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- 311 20200404.pdf (data retrieved via GitHub on April 13 2020, 10:00 p. m. CET).