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Federal vs. Central Foreign Policy

German Foreign Policy Structure: An Analysis of Decision-Making Process

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Abstract

This article wants to discuss this question why German foreign policy has an ambivalent character and no grand strategy. To answer this question, I focus on the domestic level to draw up a profile of the German foreign policy making process. For the analysis content analysis is used as a research method in order to examine the legitimate actors who make foreign policy decisions and determine the guidelines of German foreign policy. In summary, German politics is divided between a value-oriented and an interest-based, and federal and central foreign policy, and the Basic Law provides no conclusive regulation on the foreign policy, which has already led to conflicts between the Federal Government and the Federal States, the Federal Government and the Bundestag and coalition parties in the government.

Keywords: German Foreign Policy, Federal vs. Central Foreign Policy, Decision-making Process

Introduction

The geopolitical change in the world of politics in the global system has influenced German foreign policy since reunification and demands that German foreign policy appropriately adjust to the new challenges (Hellmann 2015; Maull 2014; Hacke 2012). At the international level, the government seeks to enforce its own foreign policy interests and to maintain a high degree of influence on the international political system. Due to the polarity and the distribution of power in international politics, many different interests, meet each other and therefore the scope for action of the state is limited. The reduction of the room for maneuver of a state thus depends not only on its own interests and its power of influence in the international system but also on those of its governing interaction actors. While the international system is anarchically organized, at the hierarchical-national levels, it is above all the achievement of political support from the executive, the legislature and society. At the same time, the foreign policy of the political parties in Germany is in trouble, their foreign policy programs are controversial and in accordance with these developments in world politics they have very different views (Fard 2018). The purpose of this article is to analyze the German foreign policy structure by referring to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and the basic programs of the parties involved in the government. In this article, the domestic actors or the governmental dimension, which have a determining influence on German foreign policy, will be discussed. In the following,

the legitimated actors in creating foreign policy are investigated, who make foreign policy decisions and determine the guidelines of German foreign policy. Content analysis is used as a research method in order to classify the divergent opinions on the internal power relations that articulate themselves in the antagonistic discourses, an analytical examination of the structure of the German community as well as its structures in the Federal Republic of Germany is carried out, which makes clear which constitutional possibilities are available to a German federal government stands to pursue their foreign policy. In particular, the Basic Law is used as the substantive basis for shaping German foreign policy as well as official original documents of the German government and statements.

The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and German Foreign Policy

The state system of the Federal Republic of Germany is organized as “a federal state” (Article 20 paragraph (1) Basic Law) that is a link between the federal government and the federal states. The basis of this federal order arose after the Second World War from a parliamentary council in cooperation with the occupying powers (Laufer and Münch 1998). The state system of the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with Article 20 paragraph (2) of the Basic Law stipulates that “all state authority is derived from the people”. The Basic Law is the legitimate basis for the shaping of German foreign policy (Wolfrum 2007: 157) and determines the rules and requirements for which state organs are responsible for foreign relations and which national actors formulate foreign policy objectives and decisions in international relations to meet (ibid.). The Basic Law recognizes the separation of powers, which is distributed among various state organs - the executive, legislative and judiciary - (Hellmann et al., 2014: 43f.). In the parliamentary-democratic system of the Federal Republic of Germany plays the German parliament, which is elected by the people, a central role. In contrast to other parliamentary democracies, the Federal Chancellor is directly elected by the Parliament in accordance with Article 63 paragraph (1) Basic Law (Article 63 paragraph (1) Basic Law). That is why the Chancellor or his government is dependent on the parliamentary majority (Ismayr 2007). The opposition faction in parliament is required to control and criticize the government and its majority and to offer political alternatives to the government (ibid.). The Bundestag’s decision-making process is characterized by political parties that compete within a multi-party system in order to fill political decision-making positions and contribute to political decision-making. In this context, the German Parliament plays an important role in German foreign policy (ibid.: 175).

The formulation and implementation of foreign policy are a matter for the Federal Government. Their leadership role vis-à-vis the federal states and the parliament is enshrined in the Basic Law. Thus, in 1984, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that foreign policy was a central area of executive power. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court can also act as a limiter of foreign policy scope for action, as it is the decisive point maker of the internal framework conditions and the distribution of competences between the levels. In the past, however, it has become apparent that the verdicts are usually in favor of the executives.

Division of Competences: Conflict between the Executive and the Legislature

Although the Federal President is the highest representative of the Federal Republic, he has no formal power. The following tasks in the field of foreign policy belong to the office of the Federal President: He “represents the Federation for the purposes of international law”, “concludes treaties with foreign states on behalf of the Federation” and “accredited and receive envoys” (Article 59 paragraph (1) Basic Law). The Federal President is informed by the Federal Government about foreign policy. Since Article 58 of the Basic Law stipulates that all presidential orders require the countersignature of the Federal Chancellor or competent Federal Minister, one can assume that his activities are generally restricted in the field of foreign policy and have no effect on government decisions (Jochum 2007: 169).

The Federal Chancellor is a central player in German foreign policy. In doing so, he determines the guidelines of politics and bears the responsibility for them (Article 65 paragraph (1) Basic Law). The German Chancellor plays a leading role in German foreign policy. He formulates the objectives and strategies of German foreign policy. Furthermore, the Chancellor also forms the Government by determining the number and areas of responsibility of the ministries and filling their posts. Starting from the bureaucratic theoretical approach,

the Federal Chancellor is the most important person for German foreign policy, since the influence of an actor on the national decision-making process depends on his bureaucratic position. The chancellor principle and its leading role in foreign policy are limited by the coordination functions of the departmental principle, the cabinet principle, and the coalition principle (Korte 2007: 204). In this context, the Federal Foreign Minister and the Federal Minister of Defense have an important role to play in the foreign policy decision-making processes due to their emphasized position, which was laid down in the Basic Law pursuant to Article. 65 (1) and Article 65a (1) of the Basic Law. According to Article 65 (1) of the Basic Law, “conducts the affairs of his department independently and on his own responsibility” (Article 65 paragraph (1) Basic Law).

In this context, the Federal Foreign Minister in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany has the field of foreign policy at his disposal for his own profiling. Due to his position with the Foreign Minister, it was not always easy for the Chancellor to push back his Foreign Minister, which is why many Chancellors took an inexperienced foreign minister by their side so that they themselves could set clear and stronger foreign policy accents (Hellmann et al. : 47). In critical foreign policy decision-making situations, however, there may also be open conflicts between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. For example, one can refer to the so-called “*Zehn-Punkte-Plan*” of the Helmut Kohl government in November 1989, the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan in 2001, or the sanctions against Russia in the Ukraine crisis of 2014. In addition, the chancellor principle in German foreign policy also depends on the cabinet principle, which, in addition to the departmental principle, has an effect on the foreign policy decisions of the Federal Chancellor (Hellmann et al. 2006b: 46; Korte 2007). As a rule, the Federal Cabinet consists of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers. The head of the Chancellery will be presenting foreign affairs matters for discussion and decision-making at the Cabinet meeting, which will be concluded by a majority.

Although the Federal Chancellor plays a central role in foreign affairs and has a strong position, his power position is limited by the Cabinet and the departmental principle, as these form counterweights against the power position of the Federal Chancellor. Although the Chancellor has primacy in German foreign policy, the Federal Foreign Minister takes over responsibility for the German foreign relations. A glance at the development of federal government periods shows that the Foreign Ministry is often taken over by the smaller coalition partners, thus reducing the room for maneuver of the Federal Chancellor and opposing positions between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister can lead to conflicts and deviations over foreign policy issues (Hellmann et al.: 48f.). Although the basis of each coalition is set out in the coalition agreement and coalition parties are to agree on the foreign policy principles, such political agreements are abandoned in the course of legislative periods, as the world policy is constantly changing and as a result, new challenges for the shaping of German foreign policy, to which the coalition parties cannot agree. These deviations in the tension between coalition parties lead to a conflict of objectives and limit the character of German foreign policy or its scope for action (ibid.).

Based on the constitutional basis of the Federal Constitutional Court, that the Federal Government occupies a primary position in the structuring of foreign relations, and according to BVerfGE 68 (1) the care of foreign affairs is part of the task of the Federal Government, the question can be asked which role the German parliament plays in German foreign policy. The German parliament consists of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, which play a subordinate and restricted or indirect role in foreign policy issues (Hellmann et al., 2006b: 53). The Basic Law has laid down various forms for the control of the Federal Government and Parliament’s rights of participation in shaping German foreign policy. In addition, it should be noted that the Bundestag can enforce its participation rights and parliamentary-political control directly through the ratifications and the decision annual budget law, more actively involved in foreign policy decisions resulting from the federal budget, and can block some foreign policy decisions of the federal government. In this context, the classic dualism between parliament and the federal government changed into a new dualism between the government and both the majority and the opposition factions in the Bundestag (Ismayr 2007). In principle, the legislature has the right to participate in shaping German foreign policy, which is enshrined in the Basic Law: In the development and integration of the European Union (Article 23 paragraph (1) Basic Law), in the transfer of sovereign rights to international organizations (Article 24 paragraph (1) Basic Law), and at the conclusion of international treaties (Article 59 paragraph (2) Basic Law). In addition, the Basic Law

has limited the competence of the Federal Government, thereby providing for concrete but the controversial involvement of the legislature in the implementation of foreign missions. According to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 1994, the Bundestag must approve, in addition to international treaties, the Bundeswehr's foreign missions decided by the Federal Government. Added to this are the determination of the case of defense (Article 115a Basic Law) and the conclusion of peace treaties (Article 115-1 paragraph (3) Basic Law).

Distribution of Competences: Conflict between the Federal Government and the Federal States

The Federal Republic of Germany is a federal state and is organized on two levels, namely the federal government and the federal states. Although the influence on the organization of the federal system in the Federal Republic of Germany is weighted in favor of the federal states in accordance with Article 30 of the Basic Law (see Hellmann 2006b, p.43), the distribution of competences in the field of foreign policy is clearly defined in Article 32 paragraph (1) of the Basic Law: "*Relations with foreign states shall be conducted by the Federation*" (Article 32 paragraph (1) Basic Law). On one side the Basic Law lays down Art.73 Paragraph 1, 2 of the Basic Law states that the federal government has "exclusive legislation on foreign affairs and defense" (Article 73 paragraph (1, 2) Basic Law). On the other hand, the Basic Law grants the federal states a right to be heard that "before the conclusion of a treaty that affects the particular circumstances of a state, [...] the federal state shall be consulted in a timely fashion" (Article 32 paragraph (2) Basic Law). In addition, under this article, the federal states can "have the power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with foreign states with the consent of the Federal Government" (Article 32 paragraph (3) Basic Law).

Due to the increasing intertwining of German foreign policy within the EU, the foreign policy options of the Länder have widened, according to the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court according to Article 70 paragraph (1) of the Basic Law. The Basic Law extended the participation rights of the federal states in EU matters in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law, so that the Federal Government is obliged under Art 23 paragraphs (2) of the Basic Law to inform the Bundestag and the Bundesrat comprehensively and at the earliest possible date in all EU matters (Article 23 paragraph (2) Basic Law).

The Basic Law strengthens the participation rights of the Länder in cases in which the interests of the federal states are affected (Article 23 paragraph (5) Basic Law). Another right of cooperation of the federal states was taken into account in accordance with Article 24 paragraph (1) of the Basic Law and stipulates that the Federation may be a law transfer sovereign powers to international organizations (Article 24 paragraph (1) Basic Law).

All the above-mentioned rules and rights in favor of the federal states refer to a limitation of competence of the Federal Government in the area of foreign policy activities. The shift in the allocation of competences between the federal government and the states is controversial and triggered a heated controversy in German foreign policy in EU matters between the federal government and state governments. Although the distribution of competences between the federal government and the states has been determined by the new regulation and supplementation, there are no explicit regulations for shaping German foreign policy within the EU.

In summary, although the Basic Law provides explicit rules on the German foreign policy of the Federal Government, there was no conclusive and uniform regulation on the distribution of competences, which has already led to conflicts between the Federation and the federal states, the Federal Government and the Bundestag and coalition parties in the government to have. Such conflicts over external relations in the Basic Law could arise because of the lack of an explicit delineation of the distribution of competences between the Bundestag and the Federal Government and raise problems in German foreign policy (Wolfrum 2007: 158, Hellmann et al. 2006b, and 2014). The Basic Law also emphasized its transitory character and also provided for the possibility of reform: "This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect" (Article 146 Basic Law).

Foreign Policy Pendulum of the German Political Parties between Values and Interests

Characteristic of the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany is its party statehood (Oppelland, 2007: 269). The political parties “participate in the formation of the political will of the people” (Article 21 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), bind together the interests of society and represent their opinions in the political processes (Bartsch, 1998). On the other hand, the parties represented in the Bundestag influence their political factions on German foreign policy, thereby conveying foreign policy decisions to the public (Oppermann and Höse 2011: 67). Although the foreign policy is shaped by the federal government, but the foundations of the policy are influenced by parties involved in the government, they, therefore, represent the principles and values of their parties (Paterson, 1981). A look at the historical development and shaping of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany shows that all foreign policy strategies and orientations have been determined in party-political conflicts (Oppelland 2007). In addition, the Chancellor determines German foreign policy by his authority competence (Article 65 paragraph (1) of the Basic Law), nevertheless, he cannot reject the basic values of his own party in foreign policy, since he depends on the support and loyalty of his party and the faction majority (Oppelland 2007). Although the party political conflicts have an effect on the shaping of foreign policy, the scope of their decisions is limited in view of the requirements of the international system (Ismayr 2007).

The governing parties are in a bilateral relationship between the fundamental values of their own party, which should be guided by them, as well as the opposition parties and the structure of international geopolitics that must be established (Oppermann and Hose 2011). This interrelation between governing parties or opposition parties and German foreign policy leads German foreign policy in a potentially conflictual situation in which ruling parties, as central actors, either formulate their foreign policy according to the basic values of their own parties and do not adapt to the requirements of the international environment have to accept their loss of influence or have to adjust to the reality of the international system and give up some basic beliefs of the party (Oppelland 2007). In this perspective, German foreign policy not only leads to inner-party and domestic conflicts, but also to wavering. Against this background, each federal government continues to work with the foreign policy strategies of its predecessor, without correcting or revising them, even though, as an opposition party, they did not agree with the respective foreign policy and sharply criticized foreign policy decisions (Hellmann et al. 2006). A look at the foreign policy of the red-green federal government with regard to NATO, the enlargement of the EU and Bundeswehr operations, the foreign policy of the Union parties or Social-liberal government coalition in relation to the Eastern policy - especially the Russia and Central Eastern Europe policy - show how the federal governments continue to pursue the foreign policy of its respective predecessor government and adapt to the new challenges and demands of global politics (Fard 2018). Therefore, the question can be asked to what extent the government-forming parties after German reunification has an effect on the design and development of German foreign policy. After the geopolitical shifts in world politics and the End of the East-West Conflict, the political parties of the Federal Republic of Germany have reacted to the new situation and prepared or adopted their basic programs (Oppelland 2007: 269). The SPD, The Social Democratic Party of Germany, adopted the “Berlin Program” in 1989 and decided again in 2007 to implement the “Hamburg Program” through an adaptation process. The Greens also wrote in Berlin in 2002 after the violent internal party disputes, a new policy program. The basic program of the CDU, The Christian Democratic Union of Germany, was renewed in 1994 in Hamburg and expressly formulated again in 2007 in Hanover. In addition, the basic program FDP, The Free Democratic Party, 1997 in Wiesbaden and 2012 in Karlsruhe was decided again (ibid.). The adjustment processes within the German parties led to a party-political consensus to a certain extent with regard to the German foreign policy orientation, which is expressly reflected in the basic programs of the parties (Fard 2018). This will be discussed in the following section.

Party Political Consensus and Parties Conflicts over German Foreign Policy

After the German reunification, the political parties involved in government all proceed from a value-led foreign policy based on values such as peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, solidarity and a more fairness foreign policy action in world politics. Although these values have been emphasized by all parties in the basic program, they are not interpreted in the same sense and parties have different priorities in enforcing their values (Oppelland 2007: 271). At first sight, the formulated values in the policies of all parties look

similar, but they show their fundamental differences in concretizing these values in reality (ibid.). Citing the assumption of more responsibility of German foreign policy in world politics, the new fundamental program of all parties legitimized the use of force and military operations of the Bundeswehr under international and constitutional conditions if human rights violations occur and lead to fatal consequences for those concerned. Although the SPD and the Greens are theoretically committed to their basic programs for conflict prevention and resolution, they have admitted to Bundeswehr missions in Kosovo conflict and Afghanistan.

One point in which all parties agree is the European Union or the enlargement of the EU. It is true that there was a far-reaching consensus among the parties, with all political parties in the party-political arguments about German European politics, and the decisive foreign policy decisions about the EU were approved overwhelmingly by all parties represented in the Bundestag. However, the parties fought hard in cases such as the introduction of the euro, the European Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the enlargement of the EU and the euro crisis. These disputes led German foreign policy to intra-party conflicts both from the right-wing of the CDU / CSU and from the left-wing of the Greens and the SPD (ibid.). Although all parties are in favor of the European Union, there is no consensus between parties on both a basic principle of European policy and the objectives and directions of German foreign policy for the design and development of the European Union.

It has been noted in the Basic programs of all parties that they plead for multilateral German foreign policy, express peace and freedom within the framework of the United Nations, and advocate a world community and friendship with neighbors and other states in international relations. They also commit themselves that German foreign policy should improve the situation in both underdeveloped and emerging countries through development cooperation. They are working for a reform of the world economic order. Although the CDU / CSU and the FDP want to achieve this goal in the existing world order, the SPD and the Greens are aiming for a radical approach to a more fair and equitable world order. On the one hand, the SPD and the Greens under the red-green government pursued a foreign policy that was directed against the US and sought counter-formation against the US through their European policy and rapprochement with Russia and China. On the other hand, the Union parties plead for the support of the American leadership and cooperative cooperation within NATO and are positioned against a European counter-power policy and oppose any form of alienation of the transatlantic relations.

Looking for a Federal or Central Foreign Policy Making Process

Although the primacy of the Federal Government in foreign policy was pointed out in the Basic Law, and moreover, the Federal Constitutional Court emphasized the primacy of the Federal Government in shaping foreign policy relations, the hierarchy does not stipulate that the Federal Chancellor should have complete and final control over German foreign policy has. The German interests are not static in the international system, because of the geopolitical conditions and world political shifts are not static as a factor. Therefore, they were completely ignored by the judiciary and the legislature.

The Parliament and the Federal Constitutional Court would be more willing to pay the value of centralization in foreign affairs if the international environment was multipolar, and there were a multitude of threats to Germany's influence and goals. In this case, the federal government should be able to project its power more effectively and assert its interests (Abebe and Huq 2013: 724ff.). Among the advocates of decentralized federalism in shaping geopolitical codes in German foreign policy are those observers who are in favor of decentralization of regulation in German foreign policy (Laufer and Munch 1998). They argue that countries can better meet the diverse preferences of the national population for foreign affairs than a single national policy. They see decentralized federalism as a catalyst for governmental reactions to diverging interests and preferences of the federal states and assume that a national policy should inevitably be characterized by heterogeneous preferences and interests of the countries, and a decentralized federalism eliminates a single-handedly federal government in the foreign affairs, Thus, countries interests are seen as more important in identifying efficient national policies, as they have an incentive to compete for votes among the population (Hinsch 2002). In addition, it emphasizes that countries are more motivated than the Federal Government to tie together with the opinion of the population and their interests in the field of foreign policy and to

contribute to the political process. Finally, it is argued that decentralization is necessary to protect individual freedoms and thus better control the federal government in its decisions.

Compared to decentralized federalism in the development of geopolitical codes of German foreign policy, there are advocates who oppose such an emphasis on decentralization and the resulting consequences for German foreign policy (Puttner 2000). They assume that the interest of the national government in foreign policy control with changing geopolitical conditions varies over time. While both the federal states and the federal government, as well as the executive and legislative branches are interested in regulating foreign policy conflicts over federalism, the polarity of international geopolitics generally determines German foreign policy. Therefore, in international relations, the interest of the Federal Government in the foreground, if the federal government is in a unipolar global environment, therefore, of the countries and the legislature in particular, the Federal Constitutional Court should be the most respected. In this context, due to the lack of centralization of the German state apparatus, the Federal Government is clearly limited in shaping an overall strategy in German foreign policy. From this perspective, it is argued that the Federal Constitutional Court did not take the international system as a starting point for the granting of co-decision and co-decision rights of the Lander and the German Parliament in EU affairs, as well as for the parliamentary reservation on foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr in its analysis of the constitutional basis. In addition, proponents of centralized federalism in relation to German foreign policy point to the problem of collective action in a decentralized organizational structure. They emphasize that both military security and economic perspective, competition policy could best be achieved through a nationally centralized foreign policy and not sub-national interventions (Weichelein 2012).

Proponents of centralized federalism are currently criticizing the absence of a concerted German voice in international politics as a major weakness of German federalism (Sargentich 1993). Although the Basic Law and the Federal Constitutional Court accordingly, limit the competence of the federal states to sign international agreements and treaties (they can only conclude contracts with foreign states with the agreement of the Federal Government) or to participate in military operations of the Bundeswehr, the centralization of the Foreign policy argues that the speed of foreign policy decisions was limited by the participation and co-decision rights of the Lander and the German Parliament in the deployment of the Bundeswehr and the conclusion of international treaties. That is why they support the centralization of diplomatic, military and German foreign policy by a single institutional actor. They further argue that preserving and enhancing the competitiveness of the German economy in international politics and the federal government's leadership and assertiveness for geographic, demographic and technological reasons require nationally centralized geopolitical coding in German foreign policy in order to increase social welfare could, because in a decentralized system many obligations of the federal government at country level lead to competing interests in the areas of conflict of free trade, tariffs, taxes, and trade-related subsidies and limit the scope for action and effectiveness of the federal government. However, German foreign policy lacks a framework for taking account of international political factors in its decisions. This deficiency leads to a kind of foreign policy of ad hoc decisions (Sandschneider 2005: 62). In this context, it is noted that the legislative and judicial branches lack the competence to analyze and integrate the international political environment. As a result of their co-decision rights in foreign affairs, these participation rights are unhelpful or even counterproductive because they have no capacity to identify and account for foreign affairs in terms of international geopolitics.

To summarize, the crucial point here is the structure of the international system. Since Germany is in a uni-multipolar system, the situation in which German foreign policy operates in order to achieve its goals has become more difficult and more complex. In this order, the interests of other major powers to limit the ability of the federal government and compete with Germany in the pursuit of its goals. That is why every country has its own foreign policy goals. On the other hand, everyone lacks the opportunity to act unilaterally. The complexity of international politics in a unipolar world poses a serious challenge to German interests. In this context, it becomes clear that multipolarity directly influences any assessment of the foreign affairs of the federal system. Indeed, in developing its geopolitical codes in the international system, Germany must choose between a centralized and a decentralized foreign policy. In this situation, it can be stated that a centralized foreign policy could have many advantages for the Federal Republic of Germany if the Federal

Government could also bundle the interests of the countries in the foreign policy environment and determine them a suitable policy.

Conclusion

Although the Basic Law issued explicit rules on German foreign policy, this did not result in any conclusive and uniform rules on the distribution of competences, which had already led to conflicts between the federal government and the federal states, the federal government and the Bundestag, as well as the coalition parties in the government. Such conflicts over external relations in the Basic Law could arise because of the lack of an explicit delineation of the distribution of powers between the Bundestag and the Federal Government and raise problems in German foreign policy. Another point of conflict arises in the context of the Europeanization and Transatlanticisation of German foreign policy in the age of globalization, which intensifies the tension between the Federal Government and the Bundestag, because the German Bundestag wants to exert more influence on the foreign policy decisions of the Federal Government through this increasing interconnectedness. In the federal system of the Federal Republic, foreign policy competence is divided in the context of the constitutional separation of powers in favor of the Federal Government. The participation rights of the German parliament in European politics, as well as in Bundeswehr operations, which are extensive in contrast to the other western democracies, are regarded by geopolitics as a disadvantage for German foreign policy. Hellmann assesses the distribution of powers between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag by stating that the conflicting field of German foreign policy is in the need for reform in view of the effectiveness and effectiveness of the decision-making processes in the age of globalization.

A look at the development of German foreign policy after reunification shows that the federal structures of the Federal Republic, which are not intended by the constitution, have changed due to the changing global political conditions. In order to meet foreign policy requirements, the German state system is constantly adapting to the new global political challenges. Although the Basic Law emphasizes that the maintenance of German foreign policy is the task of the Federal Government, it assigned the greater part of the legislative powers to the Lander. For this reason, since reunification, the German federal system has needed a unified Unitarian regulation for the shaping of German foreign policy. The German constitution and the resulting German federalism are characterized by two aspects. The figure of German federalism originated after the Second World War when the occupying powers prevented a strong German central state in favor of the German federal states. This German model of federalism is about the decentralization of the federal structures of the Federal Republic, which in the course of time developed in the direction of centralism, because of the federal decision-making structures and the complex distribution of powers between the Federal Government and the Bundestag and Bundesrat as well as the various levels of federal and state governments due to the competing legislative responsibilities, have not cooperated more effectively, have led to alienation between the federal government and the states and the state and the population as well as fluctuating attitude of the federal government.

The German constitution and German federalism still exist in the form that determined the Western Allies and no longer corresponds to the new framework conditions of the Federal Republic of Germany after reunification. With regard to German foreign policy, not only a reform of the Basic Law but also a reform of federalism is necessary if Germany formulates its foreign policy role strategically and consistently and does not want to fall behind in the international competition. This is intended to reduce the participation rights of the federal states and the legislature in the foreign policy environment and to clearly and clearly classify their distribution of competences. The crucial point here is the structure of the international system. Since Germany is in a uni-multipolar system, the situation in which German foreign policy operates in order to achieve its goals has become more difficult and more complex. In this order, the interests of other major powers limit the ability of the federal government and compete with Germany in the pursuit of its goals. That is why every country has its own foreign policy goals. On the other hand, everyone lacks the opportunity to act unilaterally. The complexity of international politics in a unipolar world poses a serious challenge to German interests. In this context, it becomes clear that multipolarity directly influences any assessment of the foreign affairs of the federal system. In fact, Germany must decide between a centralized

and decentralized foreign policy. In this situation, one can state that a centralized foreign policy could have many advantages for the Federal Republic of Germany if the federal government could also bundle the interests of the countries in the foreign policy environment and determine in a suitable policy.

The German political parties do not formulate their foreign policy in world political consciousness. The German parties do not pursue any power politics in their foreign policy formulations, which is explicit in the foreground in the foreign policy discourse of other major powers. Likewise, national interests are still in the shadow of the German past. For both reasons, this political understanding of the German parties does not correspond to events and politics at the international level. That is why their basic programs for German foreign policy, such as the German Basic Law, have been determined on normative and value-oriented foundations. The German party-political conflict is about the orientation of German foreign policy and the role of Germany or Europe in world politics. Rather, it is about the controversial foreign policy positions of German foreign policy and its decision-making directions. Although the parties hardly diverge in their basic programs with the orientation of German foreign policy and come to an agreement in the coalition negotiations, this problem still exists in the German parties and led to the crisis in German foreign policy and as a result to dissatisfaction with the political parties in the parliamentary system.

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