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Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems Revisited
preprintposted on 02.08.2019, 18:31 by John Lawrence
A voting system is demonstrated which meets Arrow's 5 conditions and also satisfies the Gibbard-Satterthwaite demand for strategyproofness. The strategy is contained in the voting procedure itself so voters are incentivized to vote sincerely. This procedure allows for the circumventing of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
Declaration of conflicts of interestNone
Corresponding author firstname.lastname@example.org
Lead author countryUnited States
Lead author job roleIndependent researcher
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