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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Revisited.pdf (93.9 kB)
Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems Revisited
A voting system is demonstrated which meets Arrow's 5 conditions and also satisfies the Gibbard-Satterthwaite demand for strategyproofness. The strategy is contained in the voting procedure itself so voters are incentivized to vote sincerely. This procedure allows for the circumventing of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
History
Declaration of conflicts of interest
NoneCorresponding author email
j.c.lawrence@cox.netLead author country
- United States
Lead author job role
- Independent researcher
Human Participants
- No
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