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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Revisited.pdf (93.9 kB)

Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems Revisited

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posted on 02.08.2019, 18:31 by John Lawrence
A voting system is demonstrated which meets Arrow's 5 conditions and also satisfies the Gibbard-Satterthwaite demand for strategyproofness. The strategy is contained in the voting procedure itself so voters are incentivized to vote sincerely. This procedure allows for the circumventing of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.

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Declaration of conflicts of interest

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Corresponding author email

j.c.lawrence@cox.net

Lead author country

United States

Lead author job role

Independent researcher

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No

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