%0 DATA
%A John, Lawrence
%D 2019
%T Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems Revisited
%U https://advance.sagepub.com/articles/preprint/Arrow_s_and_Gibbard-Satterthwaite_s_Impossibility_Theorems_Revisited/8559356
%R 10.31124/advance.8559356.v1
%2 https://advance.sagepub.com/ndownloader/files/16266755
%K Utilitarian Voting
%K Approval Voting
%K Social Choice
%K Range Voting
%K Score Voting
%K Optimal Threshold Voting
%K Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
%K Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
%X A voting system is demonstrated which meets Arrow's 5 conditions and also satisfies the Gibbard-Satterthwaite demand for strategyproofness. The strategy is contained in the voting procedure itself so voters are incentivized to vote sincerely. This procedure allows for the circumventing of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.