Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems Revisited
John Lawrence
10.31124/advance.8559356.v1
https://advance.sagepub.com/articles/preprint/Arrow_s_and_Gibbard-Satterthwaite_s_Impossibility_Theorems_Revisited/8559356
A voting system is demonstrated which meets Arrow's 5 conditions and also satisfies the Gibbard-Satterthwaite demand for strategyproofness. The strategy is contained in the voting procedure itself so voters are incentivized to vote sincerely. This procedure allows for the circumventing of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
2019-08-02 18:31:30
Utilitarian Voting
Approval Voting
Social Choice
Range Voting
Score Voting
Optimal Threshold Voting
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem