10.31124/advance.8559356.v1
John Lawrence
Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems Revisited
2019
Advance
Utilitarian Voting
Approval Voting
Social Choice
Range Voting
Score Voting
Optimal Threshold Voting
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
2019-08-02 18:31:30
article
https://advance.sagepub.com/articles/preprint/Arrow_s_and_Gibbard-Satterthwaite_s_Impossibility_Theorems_Revisited/8559356
A voting system is demonstrated which meets Arrow's 5 conditions and also satisfies the Gibbard-Satterthwaite demand for strategyproofness. The strategy is contained in the voting procedure itself so voters are incentivized to vote sincerely. This procedure allows for the circumventing of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.