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\begin{document}

\title{Ancient Social Motive Simulation Hypothesis of Dreaming}



\author[1]{Frederick Thomas}%
\affil[1]{Coker University}%


\vspace{-1em}



  
  \date{June 14, 2024}


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\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{abstract}
Natural selection shaped motivational systems to produce behaviors that
increase survival and reproductive fitness during waking life. A dream
production mechanism that reflects these motives and simulate them
repeatedly in a variety of scenarios during sleep would have increased
the probability of survival and reproductive success. A thematic
analysis of 900 dream reports suggest that dreaming is a simulation of
ancient social motives to rehearse functional behavior aimed at
satisfying these motives, and thus provide support to the social motive
simulation hypothesis of the function of dreaming.%
\end{abstract}%



\sloppy


\par\null

Abstract

Social living in the ancestral environment presented recurrent
challenges to survival and reproductive fitness. Natural selection
shaped motivational systems to produce behaviors that increase survival
and reproductive fitness during waking life. A dream production
mechanism that reflects these motives and simulate them repeatedly in a
variety of scenarios during sleep would have increased the probability
of survival and reproductive success. An analysis of 969 archived dream
reports suggest that dreaming is a simulation of ancient social motives
to rehearse functional behavior aimed at satisfying these motives, and
thus provide support to the social motive simulation hypothesis of the
function of dreaming.

\emph{Keywords:} Dreaming, evolution, motivation, regulatory focus,
social cognition

\subsection*{Introduction}

{\label{introduction}}

Dreaming is a universal experience that often simulates certain waking
events (Domhoff, 1996, 2003). There is a consensus, among most relevant
prior works, that dreaming is a simulation of a hypothetical scenario to
explore potential outcomes (e.g., Domhoff, 2018; Revonsuo, 2000;
Tuominen et al., 2019). Moreover, the idea that dreaming involve
settings, characters, interactions, and behaviors that parallel waking
social life is also widely accepted. Social life is filled with several
recurrent challenges to reproductive fitness. For decades, researchers
have published writings about the biological function of dreaming (e.g.,
Franklin \& Zyphur, 2005; Zadra \& Stickgold, 2021), suggesting that
hordes of people are searching for meaning in dreams. The subjective
nature of dreaming makes the proposition of the function of dreaming
problematic. The challenges with studying the functioning of dreaming
forced several researchers to claim dreaming is free roaming neural
activity (Hobson \& McCarley, 1977). Other conjectures suggest an
adaptive function of dreaming (e.g., Brereton, 2000). If postulations
regarding the adaptive function of dreaming are true, then it becomes
necessary to construct a comprehensive theory of the functional role of
dreaming that goes beyond prior evolutionary analysis. The goal of this
current work is to extend previous theories by commenting on the role of
dreaming regarding the simulation of evolved goal-driven cognition and
functional behavior.

\section*{Review of the Literature}

{\label{review-of-the-literature}}

\section*{Cognitive Theories of
Dreaming}

{\label{cognitive-theories-of-dreaming}}

One of the leading cognitive theories that address the qualities of
dreaming uses the concept of random activity initiated by the brainstem
(Hobson \& McCarley, 1977). According to the activation synthesis
hypothesis, random activity or noise originating from the pons passes
through sensory relay stations as environmental information and
generates a virtual reality during sleep. The bizarre nature of dreaming
is attributed to the waking brain engaging with the environment and,
during sleep, generating a virtual story out of random information.
Considering the difficulty in remembering and reporting dreams upon
waking, the activation synthesis hypothesis is plausible. If true, it
becomes challenging to propose that dreaming is an adaptive function.
Neuropsychological evidence suggest that the activation-synthesis theory
is limited because it assumed that dreaming is a byproduct of brain
activity. Activation-synthesis theory and other neurocognitive theories
(e.g., Folkes, 1999; Solms, 2000) for that matter, failed to explain the
narrative content of dreams and why the brain generates dream.

Another widely accepted theory that address the quality of dreaming uses
the concept of congruity or continuity between waking life and dreaming
life (Bell \& Hall, 1971; Calkins, 1983). The continuity hypothesis
argued that dreaming is an embodied simulation that dramatize meaningful
experiences and personal concerns of waking life. The frequency in which
characters, social interactions, or behavior appear in a person's dreams
reflects their degree of concern. The continuity hypothesis does make
natural sense and there is some evidence that concern-related topics
have led to dream incorporation (e.g., Nikles et al., 1998). However,
the current continuity hypothesis failed to explain why people dream
about animals, monsters, falling, and the goals of social life such as
occupational, family, relationships, etc. Thus, the simulation of
personal concerns provides little if any adaptive value. The evolution
of higher-order cognition strongly influence a dream production
mechanism (Hobson et al., 2014). Considering the many challenges
afforded by social living, cognitive systems, and dream content,
dreaming is not restricted to personal concerns. Evolutionary theories
provide the most parsimonious explanation of the simulation of dreaming.

\textbf{Evolutionary Theories of Dreaming}

Prior relevant research that considers some of the challenges afforded
by social living, cognitive systems, and the content of dreams suggest
dreaming was selected for as an adaptation to enhance reproductive
success. The social mapping hypothesis by Brereton (2000) claimed
dreaming is a virtual scenario to enhance social traits. He suggested
that environmental threats forced human ancestors to live in groups,
therefore making internal and external social competition the norm. The
author claimed dreaming contributed to the growth of human
consciousness; dreaming and consciousness share the same features;
dreaming is a pre-existing human function relevant to people's success
in powerfully social environment; and dreaming is related to mental
mapping (i.e., skilled in self-imaging and location). Like
consciousness, dreaming is scenario building which can connect the self
to physical and social environment and assign that scenario to others.
Thus, dreaming is an emotionally salient virtual scenario of familiar or
unfamiliar bodies that allow people to locate themselves within a
virtual social environment to manipulate it safely and successfully. It
is a low-cost practice for complex real cost social events. Dreaming
contributes to the development of greater social manipulation skills
relevant to the individual's success in intensely social environment.
The author claimed the adaptive function of dreaming rest in the
mechanisms of the brain and not in the dream content.

The social mapping hypothesis offered some relevant concepts including
the simulation of emotionally salient scenarios and the continuity
between dream life and waking life. However, the hypothesis is limited
and too broad because it failed to identify specific scenarios (i.e.,
finding a mate, caring for offspring, making and keeping friends,
winning respect in social groups, etc.) that are assigned to the social
environment, specific behaviors that are relevant to fitness as well as
explain why simulations are emotionally salient.

Threat simulation theory (TST) is a prominent dream theory among
evolutionary researchers. According to Revonsuo (2000) the biological
function of dreaming is simulating threatening events to rehearse threat
avoidance skills. The threat simulation theory (TST) argues that dream
content showed a significant bias toward representing negative
interactions (80\% of dream content involved negative emotions,
aggressions, misfortunes, and failures) reflecting threats rather than
positive interactions (20\% of dream content involved positive emotions,
good fortunes, success, and friendliness). TST emphasized that only
certain adaptively important situations with certain environmentally
valid cues activate the simulation of threatening events to rehearse
threat perception and the appropriate threat avoidance skills. In other
words, not every single dream of every single individual should realize
this function.

While threat simulation theory (TST) is plausible, it is incomplete. TST
provides a narrow description of the function of dreaming. Social
threats are challenges to reproductive success. TST does not account for
dreaming regarding other challenges to social living such as finding and
keeping a mate, caring for offspring, and so on. Zadra et al. (2006)
claimed that less than 15\% of the thematic content of adult recurrent
dreams showed a direct relation to the threat simulation theory.

In more recent evolutionary literature regarding the biological function
of dreaming, social simulation theory (SST) by Tuominen et al (2019)
considered the function of dreaming to be the simulation of social
events to rehearse social perception and the appropriate social skills.
SST holds that dream content is biased toward simulating social
interactions. Per Tuominen et al. (2019), positive interactions
represented 20\% of all interactions, while 10\% of all interactions
were negative interactions. More importantly, most interactions were
categorized as neutral. Although the overall numbers of positive and
negative interactions in the data were rather low, the simulation of
threat avoidance and social interactions may only be a part of the
biological function of dreaming.

Social simulation theory (SST) is consistent with evolutionary
perspective, but it is incomplete. SST is too broad. While dreams often
revolve around social relationships (Hartmann, 2000; Calkins 1983; \&
Hofmann, 2003), SST does account for dreaming concerning specific
challenges faced by social interactions in waking-life such as finding a
mate, caring for offspring, making and keeping friends, winning respect
in social groups, etc.

Other authors proposed frameworks to understand possible function(s) of
dreaming (e.g., Franklin \& Zyphur, 2005; Stickgold \& Zadra, 2021).
Yet, these theories are vague and incomplete. They failed to identify
the mechanism that underly dreaming as well as the mental rehearsal that
contribute to reproductive success. Moreover, the authors failed to
identify other recurrent challenges afforded by social living including
making and keeping friends, winning or maintaining respect in social
groups, acquiring mates, keeping mates, and successfully caring for
their offspring and other relatives. While previous work regarding
dreaming is plausible, they have not placed dreaming into the complete
context (i.e., the ancestral human environment) in which it belongs.
This current work goes beyond prior limited views of dreaming by
addressing the functions that manifested in that context.

\section*{Method}

{\label{method}}

\subsection*{Materials, Methods, and
Analysis}

{\label{materials-methods-and-analysis}}

This study employed a qualitative grounded theory approach (Charmaz,
2011). Coker University Institutional Review Board determined this study
to be exempt from IRB review according to federal regulations. Archived
dream reports were collected from a public database. The dream reports
are from a large database containing over 22,000 dream reports from all
over the world. The archived reports were derived from Hall and Van de
Castle normative studies. A priori power analysis was not conducted
because the sample size was preset by Domhoff (1996), who claimed a
sample size of 100 reports were required to reach the normative
estimates of dream reports. The full data set used in the present study
involved 969 (486 from females and 483 from males) archived dream
reports ranging from the 1940s to 2020. Constant comparison and thematic
analysis of data was used to identify any motivational and behavioral
indicators reflected in the dream reports.

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Inclusion criteria included querying the database for dream reports for
the following demographics: (1) reports between 50 -300 words; (2)
reports from adults aged 18 - 65; (3) reports from single, married,
divorced, widowed, and college students; and (4) reports with realism
(i.e., comparable to real life). Exclusion criteria involved: (1)
reports shorter than 50 words; (2) greater than 300 words; (3) reports
from children under age 18; and (4) bizarre reports (i.e., mystical
creatures, aliens, etc.). The inclusion and exclusion criteria were
based on dream reports between 50 and 300 words in length because such
reports are best suitable to establish the normative frequencies
(Domhoff, 1999). Bizarre reports are not suitable for establishing
normative frequencies because they often require case histories and/or
symbolic interpretations.

\section*{Results}

{\label{results}}

\subsection*{Beyond a Limited View of
Dreaming}

{\label{beyond-a-limited-view-of-dreaming}}

Although prior relevant theories contain a limited view of dreaming, the
noted theories provided key insights that underlie the current work.
Ancestral social life was filled with recurrent challenges including
protecting themselves from physical attacks, making and keeping friends,
winning respect in their social groups, acquiring mates, keeping mates,
and successfully caring for their offspring and other relatives (Kenrick
et al., 2010). Considering research regarding the neural mechanisms
underlying social cognition (Hobson et al. 2014), the environmental
conditions of selection (e.g., Cosmides \& Tooby, 1995; Tooby \&
Cosmides, 1995) and functional behavior (e.g., Brereton, 2000; Franklin
\& Zyphur, 2005; Revonsuo, 2000), a new hypothesis regarding the
function of dreaming is presented. This current work propose that
dreaming was selected to simulate evolved goal-directed cognition to
rehearse functional behavior aimed at satisfying these goals in waking
life.

Continuity Between Dream Life, Waking Life, and Functional Behavior

Dreaming is considered offline social cognition (Perogamvros et al.,
2013) and is associated with online (waking) social cognition as well as
functional behavioral outcomes (e.g., Jeagher et al., 2010; Yalom,
1980). Dream life is organized along the same lines as waking life. All
sensory systems are involved in dream life and nearly with a rate
equivalent to waking life (e.g., Foulkes 1985; Strauch \& Meier 1996;
Zadra et al. 1998).

In waking life, ancient social motives drive online social cognition to
enhance functional behavior that increase fitness (Kenrick et al.,
2010). When activated by conscious, unconscious, or incidental triggers,
these inner motivational states (self-protection, disease avoidance,
mate seeking, mate keeping, affiliation, status, and kin care motives)
recognize relevant environmental threats or opportunities; mobilize
relevant resources; analyze trade-offs inherent in various dominant
responses; and respond to threats or opportunities presented by the
environmental inputs to satisfy these motives (e.g., Maner et al.,
2012). In essence, these ancient motives are sets of subprograms for
dealing with general categories of adaptive problems afforded by social
living. Each motivational state is linked to a different set of threats
and opportunities. For example, the behaviors, feelings, and decision
rules for keeping a mate are different from those involved in shielding
against unfaithfulness and those involved in making friends are
different from those involved in determining the truth of a statement
(e.g., Street et al., 2015).

Considering ancient social motives drive waking (online) social
cognition and behavior and dreaming (offline social cognition) is nearly
equal to waking (online) social cognition; the offline simulation of
ancient motives might drive functional behaviors aimed at satisfying
these motives in waking life (Perogamvros et al., 2013). In view of the
continuity among dream life, waking life, and functional behavior;
ancient social motives might undergird all three constructs.

Dream Production and Ancient Motive Simulation

If the function of dreaming is the simulation of ancient social motives
(i.e., self-protection, disease avoidance, mate seeking, mate keeping,
affiliation, status, and kin care) to rehearse functional behavior aimed
at satisfying these motives, a dream production mechanism (e.g., Hobson,
2014; Yu, 2016) that tends to select active adaptive goals and simulate
them repeatedly in a variety of scenarios would have increased the
likelihood of successful reproduction.

The construction of a comprehensive perspective on the biological
function of dreaming requires clarification of the following question:
What was the biological context in which social a dream production
mechanism evolved? Here is a brief answer to the question. The primary
evolutionary context for considering the possible adaptive function for
dreaming is ancestral (Pleistocene) environment in which human cognitive
systems were functionally shaped to manage the major costs and benefits
of social life. Humans have a variety of separate fitness systems, as
opposed to an all-purpose system, that attunes social cognition,
emotion, and downstream behavior in particular areas that parallel
recurrent challenges and opportunities from the ancestral past (Cosmides
\& Tooby, 1995; Kenrick et al., 2010; Neuberg et al., 2010; Tooby \&
Cosmides, 1995). Ancient motives including self-protection, disease
avoidance, mate seeking, mate keeping, affiliation, status, and kin care
manage the complex challenges of social living. When these ancient
motives are activated, people show enhanced attention, memory, and
functional behaviors to satisfy these motives.

If dreaming was selected for because of its adaptive function (e.g.,
Brereton, 2000; Franklin \& Syphur, 2005; Revonsuo, 2000; Tuominen,
2019), the general content of dreams should certainly reflect these
ancient motives and consist of situations that allow the rehearsal of
negative and positive scenarios that ultimately lead toward increased
fitness. The idea that dreaming simulates ancient motives to rehearse
functional behaviors is consistent with previous work in cognitive
neuroscience and philosophy of mind by Franklin and Zyphur (2005) who
argued that the evolution of higher-order cognitive faculties strongly
influence a dream production mechanism that is not limited to a single
simulation and rehearsal.

\subsubsection*{The Biological Function of
Dreaming}

{\label{the-biological-function-of-dreaming}}

Social cognition is a dynamic system with content-rich subprograms
(e.g., De Jaegher et al., 2010; Hobson et al., 2014; Maner et al., 2012;
Thelen \& Smith, 2007) that are efficient at solving specific kinds of
adaptive problems such as self-protection, mate seeking, etc. (e.g.,
visual attention monitors angry outgroup members, others select sexually
attractive people for further processing; perceptual systems recognize
faces; and inference systems for inferring mental states and learning
which organisms are dangerous). Although this dynamic system has an
enormous range of patterns, it actually only demonstrates a set of
subprograms, linked to the behavior of elements to deal with general
categories of adaptive problems. The system prefers or settles into only
certain modes of behavior associated with the problem.

Animals tend to learn certain associations with only one or few pairings
due to the survival value of the learning. Biological preparedness makes
acquisition of favorable social interaction strategies specific to the
social domain (Cummins \& Cummins, 1999). Adaptive problems afforded by
social living such as self-protection, disease avoidance, mate seeking,
mate keeping, affiliation, status, and kin care can influence the
acquisition of functional behaviors that are specific for each problem.
Considering ancient social motives attunes attitudes and behaviors in
waking life (Scott \& Cohen, 2020), a simulation of ancient motives in
dream life may prepare people for favorable behavioral strategies in
waking life. The acquisition of favorable behavioral strategies depends
on several factors.

An Adaptationist Approach to Dreaming

From an adaptationist perspective, functional behavior progresses toward
adaptive goals (Kenrick \& Krems, 2018). Once ancestral humans made
progress toward an important goal, such as caring for offspring/family
(i.e., catching fish, building a hut, etc.) rehearsing functional
behaviors toward other goals, such as finding a mate or threats to a
romantic relationship, would have made sense for survival and
reproductive fitness. As such, critical features of social cognition are
affect and regulatory focus. Regulatory focus involves people's
perceptions in the decision-making process, the motivation of a person,
and the way in which they go about achieving their goal (Higgins, 1998).
A complex interaction of ancient social motives, affect, and regulatory
focus results in the acquisition of favorable behavioral strategies to
insure certain outcomes and to insure against certain others.

Ancient Social Motive Simulation and Emotions

Some researchers argue that dreaming does not have an adaptive function
because it appears that dream function failed due to the negative
elements in dreams (i.e., danger, pain, and fear). Additionally, some
may argue that the discomfort experienced in negative dreams is not
conducive to developing functional behavior. Natural selection cares
only about fitness, not comfort (Nesse \& Williams 1997). If dreaming is
a biological adaptation, it may not care about comfort either.
Functional behavior is systematically calibrated to one's social motive
(Kenrick \& Krems, 2018). That is, people generally experience success
when satisfying their goal rather than when they experience discomfort
in dreaming. From this evolutionary perspective, dreams are likely a
simulation of ancient social motives (i.e., self-protection, disease
avoidance, mate seeking, mate keeping, affiliation, status, and kin
care) to rehearse functional behaviors aimed at satisfying these
motives. Because negativity (unhappiness, failure, misfortune, etc.)
serves purposes equally as important as those served by positivity
(happiness, success, good fortune, etc.), it is vital to understand the
functional side of negativity. Natural selection shaped each emotion to
solve problems that arose in a specific domain (Sznycer et al., 2017).
That is, Emotions are secondary systems that evolved to solve subsystem
organization problems.

Ancient Motive Simulation, Affect, and Regulatory Focus

An emotion is a secondary system that regulate self-states into
behavioral strategies that promote the desired end-state or prevent the
undesired end-state (Crowe \& Higgins, 1997). More generally, these
self-regulatory states involve two types of regulatory focus. The
regulatory focus is one of promotion (i.e., the motive to move toward
desired end-states) or prevention (i.e., the motive to move away from
undesired end-states). Sznycer et al. (2017) argued that there is a
strong relationship between the activation of emotions, regulatory focus
(i.e., promotion or prevention focus), and adaptive problems. In other
words, positive or negative feelings can induce either a promotion
focus, or a prevention focus on future behaviors.

Positive and negative feelings that evoke a regulatory focus are linked
to one's particular life history features such as relationship status,
ecology and culture (Kenrick \& Krems, 2018). One's currently salient
social motive may produce different regulatory focus that evoke
functional behavior. Subsequently, regulatory focus that evoke promotion
or prevention behaviors might be different based on the ecological
features of the environment. For example, self-protection or disease
avoidance may be a frequent priority in an environment characterized by
high income inequality or infectious disease. Self-protection motive
might be more strongly linked to promotion behaviors for people living
in the violent environment, whereas a disease avoidant motive might be
more strongly linked to prevention behaviors for people living in the
high-pathogen environment.

Ancient motives might favor a regulatory focus which fosters behavioral
strategies relevant for that motive. Some motives are framed as
preventing harm (e.g., disease avoidance), whereas others are framed as
promoting gains (e.g., mate acquisition). Individual are driven by
dreams that encourage strategies that fit their regulatory focus
(Lockwood et al., 2002). Promotion-focused dreams, that favor a strategy
of pursuing desirable outcomes, might be driven by positive interactions
that highlight strategies for achieving success (e.g., Brereton, 2000;
Tuominen et al., 2019). Prevention-focused dreams, that favor a strategy
of avoiding undesirable outcomes, might be driven by negative
interactions that highlight strategies for avoiding failure (e.g.,
Revonsuo, 2000). From this view, a regulatory focus is an attractor
because positivity (success) or negativity (failure), under certain
conditions, has a kinship for that focus (Thelen \& Smith, 2007). This
is not to say that dreaming is designed to desire failure rather than
success (or vice versa). However, one would argue that negativity
(failure) serve purposes equally as important as those served by
positivity (success). Without those negative affective states, ancestors
would not have survived, or, more importantly from the perspective of
their descendants (i.e., modern-day people), reproduced. Not every
person will respond to the same positive or negative dream in the exact
same way.

Dreaming, Regulatory Focus and Cost/Benefit

A regulatory focus may represent the cost/benefit associated with a
situation. In other words, the subjective feeling of the cost or benefit
that the given action would yield matters. Judgments concerning the
cost/benefit can affect future actions. Consider a person dreaming about
asking another individual out on a date, the potential unhappiness from
rejection might prevent the individual from acting (prevention focus) in
a way that would cost more in terms of social exclusion than the
benefits the action would otherwise yield. Similarly, the potential
happiness from acceptance might promote the individual to act (promotion
focus) in a way that would benefit more in terms of social inclusion
than the cost the action would otherwise yield.

Several other social scientists bridged positivity, negativity, and
functional behaviors (e.g., Buss, 2000; Neese, 2004; Scheier et al.,
2008; Steger et al., 2008). These authors posits that positivity
(happiness, success, good fortune, etc.), and promotion focus occurs
when people face situations that potentially enhance fitness in the
ancestral past. There is support for the heuristic value of the
simulation of ancient motive and functional behavior in an evolutionary
life history perspective. Prior work by Krems et al. (2017) show an
association between people's thoughts of promoting or preventing a
social motive and fitness. Since dreaming often involve negative dream
content (Revonsuo, 2000), negativity such as unhappiness, failure,
misfortunes, etc., also has the potential to drive a prevention of
situations that would lower fitness in ancestral past (Neese, 2004).
Scott and Cohen (2020) went a step further, arguing that positivity and
negativity connect ancient motives with functional behaviors without
requiring people to connect their regulatory focus and underlying
ancient motive. The authors found that when people were asked to connect
their own motive to their regulatory focus or to their idea of promotion
or prevention strategies, the association was much weaker. People are
able to associate motives but are unlikely to connect those motives to
their regulatory focus or to their behavioral strategies. Bearing this
in mind, positive (happiness, success, good fortune, etc.) and negative
(unhappiness, failure, misfortune, etc.) dreams may attract a regulatory
focus that evoke promotion or prevention behaviors aimed at satisfying
these ancient motives.

\subsection*{Conclusion}

{\label{conclusion}}

In the evolutionary sense, a cognitive system is functional if it
promotes the organism's functional behavior to manage the major cost and
benefits of social life (Tooby \& Cosmides, 1992). Reflecting on the
adaptive challenges afforded by social living, a cognitive system that
tends to select adaptive goals, which attune functional behaviors, and
simulate them repeatedly during sleep and in a variety of scenarios
would have increased the likelihood of successful reproduction. The
experience accumulated from dreaming are sure to influence goal-driven
behaviors and overall fitness. The ancient social motives hypothesis
suggests that dreaming is a simulation of self-protection, disease
avoidance, affiliation, status, mate seeking, mate keeping, and kin care
motives to rehearse promotion or prevention behaviors aimed at
satisfying these motives in waking life. However, this argument does
have weaknesses.

One weakness to this hypothesis involves dream amnesia (Hobson \&
McCarley, 1977). One may suggest that poor recall of dreams hinders the
functional role of dreaming. Consider the trigger effect, where subtle
and preconscious influence behavior when there is no awareness at any
level. For example, certain birds migrate in response to daylight
savings time to obtain better food sources and nesting supplies. Those
birds needs do not make any correlation between the migratory triggers
and the purpose for traveling to enhance survival and reproduction.
Similarly, human motives respond to cues even when the individual is not
consciously aware (e.g., Neuberg \& Schaller, 2016; Zilioli et al.,
2016). In addition to nonconscious triggers, motivated behavior may also
have incidental effects (e.g., Boyer, 2003). In short, the noted
evidence show that people regularly make decisions based on information
they cannot consciously access. Although poor recall of dreams is
common, cues in the environment can trigger functional behavior.

Prior studies have made several propositions regarding the function of
dreaming. Neurocognitive and cognitive views suggest dreaming is random
mental activity that is congruent with waking life but with no adaptive
value (e.g., Foulkes, 1990; Hartmann, 2000; Hobson \& McCartley, 1977).
Prior evolutionary theorists proposed a view that did not capture all
the challenges afforded by social living (Brereton, 2000; Franklin \&
Zyphur, 2005; Revonsuo, 2000; Tuominen et al., 2019). The evidence
presented here suggests that social living in ancestral past afforded
several adaptive problems. Natural selection shaped human cognitive
systems to manage the major costs and benefits of evolved social motives
during waking life. A dream production mechanism that attunes active
motives and simulate them repeatedly in a variety of scenarios during
sleep was selected to increase the probability of reproductive success.
Specifically, the hypothesis presented in this current work states
dreaming is a simulation of ancient social motives to rehearse
functional behaviors aimed at satisfying these motives. Researchers may
better understand the role of dreaming as an evolutionary adaptation
through the empirical validation of the hypothesis proposed in this
current work.

.

\subsection*{Acknowledgements}

{\label{acknowledgements}}

\subsection*{Declaration of Conflict
Interests}

{\label{declaration-of-conflict-interests}}

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

\subsection*{Funding}

{\label{funding}}

The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

\subsection*{Data Availability}

{\label{data-availability}}

The data that support the findings of this work are available from the
corresponding author upon reasonable request. All data were gathered
from publicly available databases.

\subsection*{References}

{\label{references}}

Bell, A., \& Hall, C. (1971). The Personality of a Child Molester: An
Analysis of Dreams. Chicago: Aldine Books

Brereton, D. P. (2000). Dreaming, adaptation, and consciousness: The
social mapping hypothesis. \emph{Ethos, 28} (3), 379-409.
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