Eritrea emerged as independent state de facto (1991) and de jure (1993), following a successful conclusion of thirty years of bloody war of independence. Eritreans held the West responsible for all their sufferings, which have veritable implication for future diplomatic relations. The country’s diplomatic relations commenced with its de jure independence. Except for few years its relationship with the West was fraught with devastating problems. Eritrea had a good relationship with the West, particularly with the US, until the second war (1998-2000) with Ethiopia broke out. Indeed, the Eritrean leader, in cohort with other African leaders, was praised as a new breed of African leaders by the Clinton Administration (Connell, 2009: 136). In addition, as mentioned earlier, it was a member of the coalition of Frontline States targeting Sudan. Following the outbreak of the war however Eritrea fell out of favour of the US administration. Ethiopia and Eritrea now at odds with each other vying for USA favouritism. The choice was self-evident for geo-strategic reasons. The US chose the powerhouse of the region, Ethiopia (Connell, 2009, Reid, 2009). Ethiopia was perceived as a strategic ally of the US in GWT (Klosowicz, 2015). Therefore, Ethiopia was, for instance, permitted to systematically breach the Court of Arbitration final and binding verdict on the border issue of the two countries with tacit US support. Indeed, White House officials pushed for renegotiation on the final and binding border verdict (Bolton 2007). This annoyed Eritrea a great deal leading to it’s drifting away from the US which in turn induced it’s isolation and ended up under sanctions.

The war and the subsequent no war no peace situation adversely affected Eritrea’s domestic as well as international relations. It also brought a dire consequence to the region where the countries engaged in proxy wars (Lyon, 2009). In the internality dimension political, economic, security situations rapidly deteriorated. They were driven by domestic political factors, regional relations and international factors. The final and binding Algiers Agreement that ended the war was rejected by Ethiopia (Muller, 2016, ICG, 2010: 21). A trusted ally of the USA in the GWT, Ethiopia was emboldened by the former’s support in it’s rejection of the implementation of the International Court of Arbitration demarcation verdict. Eritrea accused the United States of not honouring its commitment and pressuring Ethiopia to implement the verdict, conversely the US pushed for negotiated settlement of the border issue that will be acceptable to Ethiopia (Woldemariam and Yohannes, 2007). The then Assistant Secretary of State, Jandyi Frazer, openly declared that the residents of Badme should be consulted thereby rendering the Court of Arbitration verdict virtually null and void. This further angered Eritrea, leading to the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Eritrea ended up in the camp of “pariah states”. A testimony to the unjustness of the politics of the creation of pariah states is that while Ethiopia who reject international Court of Arbitration verdict; invaded Somalia; armed, trained, gave sanctuary to armed Eritrean groups striving to depose the government in Asmara could avoid sanctions, Eritrea was put under sanctions for alleged support of Al Shebab and disturbing security of the region. Supporting Al Shebab was construed as aiding and abetting terrorism thus undermining the fight on GWT.

The GWT driven isolation, sanctions and demonisation pushed Eritrea to the brink of explosion. An economy already dilapidated by thirty-year war of independence immensely suffered under the sanctions regime. The sanctions discouraged external investment as well as engagement with WB and IMF became impossible. The economic hardship couple with political and security challenges induced mass youth migration. The 1998-2000 war engendered division with the leadership of the country many ending in prison. The political crisis had devasting effect on domestic media where many journalists were imprisoned, private newspapers were closed. The legislation was suspended. The national service that was indefinitely extended became the main lifeline of the country; at the same time, it became the mainstay for the youth to flee the country. In short undeclared state of emergency reigned. The no war no peace status quo between Eritrea and Ethiopia that lasted for twenty years (1998-2018) had a devastating effect to the two countries but much more to Eritrea and the region as whole.

The rapprochement between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia signed in 2018 was supposed to harbinger a new epoch in the region. The rapprochement ended the no-peace no-war situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea and Somalia renewed diplomatic relations. The three leaders also expressed the ambition of revitalising IGAD. A new climate of diplomacy began to reign in the region. This new initiative of regional integration did not fall on favourable eyes of the West. The West opposed the new rapprochement because it would antagonise their geostrategic interest in the region. The West waged concerted campaign against the three leaders. Consequently, the president of Somalia lost power, Ethiopia was plunged into civil war sparked by the TPLF, an ally of the West. Expectedly, the tripartite rapprochement lost momentum. In addition, the PM of Ethiopia, in October 2023, declared that Ethiopia should own a port either through peaceful means, or if necessary, by force. The PM claimed ownership of port is life and death for Ethiopia. This sent a shockwave throughout the region. Eventually, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the breakaway Somaliland to lease a port where Ethiopia will have a commercial port and naval base in return for recognition of the independence of Somaliland. This generated strong reaction from the federal government in Mogadishu accusing Ethiopia of violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integration. This added new element to the already precarious situation of the region. Therefore, the region continues to march on its usual road of insecurity and instability.

Yet another consequence of GWT is the proliferation of proxy wars. Next to the division into friendly and non-friendly of the states comes the utilisation of proxy wars. The phenomenon of proxy wars assumes two dimensions. One dimension concerns involvement of big powers who employ client state in their geostrategic ambition for domination. For instance, when the US and Soviet Union converted the HOA into ideological and geostrategic playground (Lefebvre, 1987, Cliffe1999, Woodward, 2006, Yordanov, 2016) they used Ethiopia and Somalia. By the end of the Cold War, it was estimated about 600, 000 people were killed in the HOAR (Rogers, 2014). The superpowers not only produced client states but also very easily shifted alliance, evidence of the opportunistic nature of proxy wars. By mid-1970 the US abandoned Ethiopia and allied with Somalia and Sudan, while the Soviet Union abandoned Somalia and moved to Ethiopia. The Consequences of the opportunistic moves to the region were enormous. The region was converted into dumping ground for sophisticated weapons the two big powers produced (Yordanov 2016).

Consequently, the region is sustaining longest and devastating wars. The GWT and piracy that generated another form of proxy war and militarisation replaced Cold War. Moreover, GWT and piracy brought international naval forces and military forces to the HOA for the second time (Sun and Zoubir, 2016) producing new proxy clients. The proliferation of proxy wars has the tendency of manufacturing new agents. In recent history of the region, we witnessed three types of proxy war agents. We can categorise them in a three-tier structure. These are the big powers of the Cold War, the post-Cold War middle powers and emerging low rank proxy war agents. The sources of power of these proxy war agents varies, from sheer military, to mix of military and economic, and sole economy. The Gulf-States, for instance, could constitute the last form. In the last case economic power is translated into political, diplomatic and possibly military power.

The new dimension of military proxies also generated reconfiguration of regional and international patron-client relations. Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti as clients of the new system of conglomeration of GWT readily intervened in Somalia (Volman and Keeman, 2010). Djibouti was virtually transformed into a “vassal” state through its hosting of various military bases. Drones based in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, regularly survey and attack targets in Somalia and Yemen. Djibouti was therefore playing the role of Trojan Horse in the service of GWT proxy regime.

The second dimension of proxy war relates to regional states. Regional states are increasingly engaged in employing opposition groups of other state(s) to promote their own regional and national interest or undermine other state(s) (Abbink, 2003, Lyon, 2009). The regional states, in an imitation of big powers, attempt to create their own clients. After its invasion of Somalia, Kenya rushed in crafting the Jubaland state (Skeppeström and Nordlund, 2014: 18, Hammond, 2013: 188). This state is intended to serve as a buffer zone for Kenya from attacks by Somali groups. This autonomous state in southern Somalia, bordering Kenya, is perceived by many Somalis as created to be client of Kenya. Ethiopia also crafted out the Transitional Federal Government comprising warlords. Indeed, many Somalis argue that the introduction of federal governmental system is an imposition from the neighbouring states to balkanise Somalia, “The Current Addis Ababa regime, therefore, wants to create several mini-states that are hostile to each other and have good relations with Ethiopia” (Elmi, 2010: 23). Another element played out in the GWT proxy regime is the arbitrary designation of political opponents (individuals as well as groups) as terrorists.

The EPRDF government, for instance, was frequently accused of designating opponents, politicians, human rights activists, journalists, ethnic political organisations such as the Oromo Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Gambella movements as terrorists. The government proclaimed anti-terrorism law (FDRE, 2009), under which many were put in jail and many others were banned. Ethiopia faced harsh criticism from humanitarian organisations for the use of Proclamation No. 652/2009 sweepingly. Critics argued that it is used to prosecute opposition parties, individuals and private media (Griffith, 2013, HRW, 2008, Kassa, 2013). Museveni of Uganda, another friendly state was also abusing terrorist laws (Fesher, 2012).

The rampant conflicts and chronic intra-state and inter-state wars would rationalise the logic of peace mediations in the region. How mediation is conducted has significance not only to the settlement of the wars but also to the credibility and integrity of the international peace mediation system. It also indicates to the morality and legality of instruments of international mediation and enforcement of peace. Many have appealed for a holistic, regional, even-handed and balanced approach to peace mediation (Young, 2012, Bereketeab, 2013). Three important elements in mediation process are: (i) identify and define root causes; (ii) identify and ensure equal and genuine participation/representation of stakeholders; (iii) domestic ownership of process and outcome (Call and Wyeth, 2008). The GWT seems to have distorted the international peace mediation system. Neo-liberal peacebuilding and peace mediation focuses on quick fixes and formal procedures. It therefore avoids dealing with root causes, quite often defines the problem and stakeholders narrowly. For instance, in identifying and defining stakeholders, it focuses only on warring parts. The imperatives of GWT necessitates treating cases and countries differently that would not promote an overall peace and security in the region. To illustrate the different treatment let’s examine (i) CPA: Sudan, (ii) TFG-UIC: Somalia, (iii) Ethiopia-Eritrea.

Let’s begin with the CPA. Unlike its name, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the ruling NCP and the rebel SPLM was all but comprehensive (Young, 2012). What began as all-encompassing peace negotiations, it was progressively reduced to bilateral to suite the GWT agenda. Sudan was accused of aiding and abetting terrorism therefore the secession of South Sudan was seen as the right thing and would boost the fight against terrorism. The mediators narrowly focused on north-south, a uni-dimensional approach to multifaceted conflicts, the final of which became the CPA. This abridgement of the peace mediation led to exclusion and marginalisation of important movements and actors; only the NCP and SPLM were taken on board. The incomprehensiveness and flaws of the peace mediation was reflected in the explosion of conflicts in Darfur (Medani, 2012: 290), Blue Nile, South Kordofan and South Sudan (Young, 2012).

The peace mediation in Somalia was also characterised by serious flaws. In the internecine war between the US supported TFG and the UIC, the mediators stood on the side of the TFG, although the latter lacked popular legitimacy. This failed to settle the conflict and plunged Somalia into more brutal internecine war (Samatar, 2013, Muller, 2013). The nature of the conflict in Somalia was defined by external actors such as Ethiopia, IGAD and the USA and was presented as conflict between international terrorism and the Somali people. This external definition of the nature of the conflict and actors involved deprived the Somalis the opportunity of defining, characterising and finding settlement to their problems.

The 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was ended through the Algiers Agreement. The Agreement contained a number of provisions, the most significant of which was the final and binding border delineation and demarcation article. The UN, AU, EU and USA assumed the role of witness and guarantor in which they are empowered to enforce the agreement (Algiers Agreement, 12 December 2000). The Algiers Agreement authorised the guarantors to invoke Chapter Seven of the UN Charter against anyone of the signatories who renege from its commitment (Algiers Agreement, 18 June). When EEBC (Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission) issued its verdict in April 2002, Ethiopia reneged its commitment and rejected the Verdict because it rewarded the flashpoint of the war (Badme) to Eritrea. The guarantors, instead of exercising their responsibility and putting pressure on Ethiopia chose to engage in acts of appeasement. Ethiopia got away with rejection of international Court of Arbitration verdict while Eritrea faced sanctions.

Peace mediations in the HOAR require different methodological approaches, which are appropriate to the history and context of the region. A holistic, regional by orientation and comprehensive by nature methodology is required. The piecemeal, one at time, approach employed by peace mediators has so far failed to bring peace, stability and security to the region. This approach which for instance drove the mediators to ultimately focus on the south-north conflict of Sudan indeed sparked the outbreak of conflicts in other parts of the country. Another flaw in the peace mediation approach is the unbalanced, biased and double standard practices. Cases as well as countries are treated differently. The most flagrant example of this double standard is the treatment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. Although the conflict has been classified by many scholars and observers as the epicentre of conflicts in the HOAR (ICG, 2003, Healy and Plaut, 2007, Reid 2009), mediators particular Western powers ignored it. This constricted approach to mediation undermined the GWT by generating resentment and bitterness among ignored groups. Unless peace mediation is extricated from the imperatives of GWT and geo-strategic interests, there will not be lasting peace in the region.

The consequences detailed above further influence other three dimensions, notably regional integration, development and legitimacy. Development and legitimacy have the tendency of promoting healthy and sustainable regional integration. Functional regional integration in turn enhances development and legitimacy. What does legitimacy in the context of regional integration mean? Legitimacy has two dimensions, internal and external (Schaar, 1981). In its internality dimension legitimacy would represent a situation where there prevails an amicable relation between citizens, on one hand, and states and regional organisation on the other. In other words, citizens understand the latter as representing their interest and wellbeing so that they confer on it legitimacy. Regional integration is also perceived as a tool of promoting development.

The GWT has a dire consequence to regional integration, socio-economic development and state legitimacy. Regional integration is very sensitive therefore presupposes harmonious relationships among states and peoples that enter into regional patrimony (Mengisteab and Bereketeab, 2012). Conflicts and divisions often tend to foster suspicion, mistrust, hate and antagonisms. These are features that would not bode well for regional integration to succeed and by extension development. All elements of conflict and suspicion need therefore to be managed before genuine regional integration could be entertained. External self-interest driven intervention that aggravate conflicts and suspicion have to be prevented in order for regional integration to succeed.

Socio-economic development by its very nature is also highly sensitive to peace, stability and security. Wars and conflicts destroy not only human life but also socio-economic infrastructures and life sustaining material foundations (Bereketeab, 2013). It is not secrete that the rampant conflicts in the HOAR have created environmental degradation, desertification, soil erosion, draughts that adversely affect agriculture and agricultural production, pastoralism and pastoral production, economic growth, income per capita that in turn affect social activities such as health, education, literacy, level of poverty, nutrition, living standard, child mortality, life expectancy, etc (Mengisteab 2013).

Our third variable, legitimacy, is also negatively affected by GWT intervention. Legitimacy is contingent on functional and harmonious state-society relation. This relation presupposes that the state undertakes some basic provision highly valued by society, in turn society acknowledges and confers sovereignty on the state (Callaghy, 1984, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Tilly, 1978, Young, 1994). This harmonious state-society relation could however easily be disrupted by external intervention, particularly when that external intervention sow division and conflict among them. What the GWT does is that it dislocates the state from the harmonious state-society relation and locates its loyalty somewhere else. Those friendly states in HOAR show their loyalty and accountability to their patrons in the GWT regime that may detach them from their society. The state then becomes alien, indeed an enemy of and a hazard to society (Keenan, 2008). This loss of legitimacy has become the main source of the perpetual conflict, instability and insecurity in the HOAR.

Regional integration, development and legitimacy, ultimately presupposes harmonious and functional relation between citizens, national states and regional organisation. The modern state is autonomous of society, while ultimate power rests on society. Regionalism and regionalisation, an expression of regional integration, manifests collective endeavour for collective problem resolutions. A social contract between citizens, state and regional organisation undergirds modern regionalisation.

This article set out to critically analyse manifestations and implications of GWT in the HOAR. Many perceive the rhetoric of GWT as advocated by the USA is rather embedded in the politics of domination. The politics of domination in this context relates to economic, cultural, political and ideological. In the process of exercising this politics of domination, targeted societies are systematically and mischievously deprived of agency to define, design, plan and execute their problems, realities and future. This further leads to division, marginalization of social groups often with concomitant social evils: conflicts, wars, poverty, abuse of human rights, lack of democracy. In this context the misguided GWT, in lieu of preventing terrorism contributes to its creation. The expansion of terrorism, extremism and radicalism is to a major degree a consequence of the GWT.

The GWT driven intervention through its division of the states into friendly and non-friendly (pariah) states has undermined the unity of the region. Further regional integration, socio-economic development and state legitimacy have become victims of the misguided GWT policy. Militarism and military solution to fundamentally socio-economic and political problems will not lead to settling the festering pathologies in the region. The region will fare better if given the chance to sort out its problems. Cold War, GWT, war against piracy, and scramble for resources have no good record in the region.

In addition, GWT has aggravated the fundamental problem the people of the region face, notably societal construction. At the root of the wars running today in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan lay the incomplete and distorted process of nation and state formation. The GWT, incontrovertibly, contributed to the incompleteness and distortion of the process. Nation and state formation is by its very nature domestic, political and long-term that should be left for internal actors.

The interventionist neoliberal agenda that underpinned the emergence of the GWT rests upon two Western philosophical assumptions. The first is the belief that we live in post-nation state era therefore sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state is anachronistic. The second is globalisation has overtaken localisation. The two assumptions would permit big powers to intervene whenever they deem it necessary to do so. Security is defined from a global dimension. The USA would invoke a security interest globally that allows it to intervene beyond its borders. The GWT was therefore concocted to allow the USA to intervene everywhere with devastating effect to subject people. The consequences of GWT still reverberates in the HOAR, even after, at least formally, the references to it have receded.