Abstract
This article seeks to examine the consequences of the global war on
terror (GWT) in the Horn of Africa. The focus is on the various
implications to individual countries and the region as a whole. It
therefore, critically interrogates what the consequences are and how
they manifested. The interplay between internal and external factors
compounding the consequences are critically analysed. Militarisation in
the service of geo-strategic and geopolitical interests through creation
of division of states into friendly and non-friendly and construction of
unholy alliances hinders cooperation and regional integration. The
politics of creation of pariah states, related to the GWT, engenders
fragility, internal instability, and failed states. This in turn exposes
societies to all sorts of pathologies, distorting the process of state
and nation formation. The paper interrogates these intertwined
variables. The paper contends that the GWT aggravated the precarious
state of peace and stability in the Horn region causing far-reaching
structural, political, social, economic, security, inter-state relation,
integration and diplomatic damages still reverberating even after the
GWT has been jettisoned. The study of the consequences of the GWT still
remains scanty. The paper hopes to contribute to the dearth of knowledge
on the consequence of GWT.
Key words : global war on terror, Horn region, militarisation,
proxy wars
Introduction
After decades of Cold War interventions that transformed the Horn of
Africa region (HOAR) into a theatre of war for superpower rivalry
(Yordanov, 2016), it got respite in 1990 in tandem with the demise of
the Soviet Bloc that heralded the end of the Cold War. The end of Cold
War and collapse of state socialism spurred triumphalist hasty
statements such as end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), prophesy of clashes
of civilisations (Huntington, 1996). This respite, however, did not last
long. A new era of external intervention, in the form of global war on
terror (GWT), commenced. The GWT coupled with the war against piracy has
attracted various international forces to the HOAR. The last form in a
litany of external interventions pertain to what goes commonly under the
designation of scramble for resources. Today, although terrorism and
piracy has subsided, several dozens of naval forces from West, East,
North and South of the glob are still active in the region. Following
the Gaza war sparked by the Hamas action on October 7, 2023, and
subsequent Houthi retaliatory attacks on ships destined to or connected
with Israel passing through Bal El Mandab, disrupting trade have
heightened further the insecurity of the region. What is the underlying
rational behind the huge military presence in the HOAR? What are the
implications of GWT driven interventions? Is there any mitigation to the
interventions? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions.
More specifically, it argues that the GWT has caused irreparable damages
in the region in terms of structure, socio-economic development,
inter-state relation, democratisation, regional integration, nation and
state formation.
Temporality wise the GWT succeeded the Cold War. Nevertheless, there is
similarity between the two. If not in form in content, the Cold War and
GWT are identical. Both engage in the creation of friends and
non-friends and militarisation of the HOAR. They also entrench proxy
wars. The international interventions do cause conflicts, instability
and mistrust within states as well as among states of the region
perpetrating the cycle of conflicts. There is growing suspicion that the
international involvement in the region has less to do with terror and
piracy but rather is driven by scramble for resources and strategic
positioning (Keenan, 2008, Volman and Jeremy, 2010, Aning at al, 2008).
One of the contentions behind this suspicion is that in spite of the
huge presence of international military forces, with all the
accompanying modern sophisticated technology of warfare, it has not been
possible to resolve one of the raison d’etre for its presence,
defeating the rag-tag militias of Al Shebab completely.
This led to some to argue that the prevalence of terrorist acts and
piracy is somehow tolerated because they legitimise the continuous
presence of these international actors (Keenan, 2008). The proponents of
such argument opine that the less commitment and dedication by
international actors to rout out the malice ravaging Somalia is an
illustration of the tolerance. Many therefore contend that the
superpower rivalry for geo-strategic influence during the Cold War era
is now replaced by West-East rivalry for the scramble for natural
resources (Abrahamsen, 2013, Schmidt, 2013). The recent discovery of
huge biofuel and other mineral resources in the region coupled with the
new phenomenon of land grabbing thus lends further currency to the
apprehension that it creates a kind of Eldorado where states,
transnational corporations and extractive companies are vying for those
precious untapped resources. The war in Gaza and the Houthi’s
retaliatory measure in the Bal El Mandab chock point is a new addition
to the misery of the region.
This article seeks to examine the multiple implications of GWT driven,
geo-strategic calculations of interventions and geopolitics in the HOAR.
Therefore, it critically interrogates what the consequences are, how
they are manifested and the mechanisms involved. It has two primary
objectives. First, it will interrogate the trajectory of the GWT in the
HOAR. Secondly, it seeks to examine the multiple implications caused by
the GWT to the HOAR. The article contends the GWT caused irreparable
political, social, economic, security, integration and diplomatic
damages derailing developmental process in the region.
The article consists of seven sections. Section two analyses
militarisation and conflicts in the region concomitants of GWT. Section
three discusses the politics of producing pariah states. Section four
analyses proxy wars. Section five analyses international peace mediation
and GWT. Section six examines regional integration, development and
legitimacy under the GWT regime. The final section provides concluding
remarks.
Militarisation and Conflicts
Militarisation and conflicts are two concepts that are intimately
connected, albeit not in a unilinearity correlation mode. The
interconnection is not a simple manifestation of military as a source of
conflict, military could also serve as mechanism of conflict mitigation
and deterrence. A circumstance where militarisation would serve as a
function of conflict deterrence is when a considerable symmetry in
military prows prevails. A second condition is when militarisation at
the centre succeeds in pacification of society through taming
centripetal forces (Callaghy, 1984, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Young,
1994). In the case of the latter, it relates to the Weberian notion of
state monopoly of the legitimate means of violence (Weber, 1984).
Societal pacification presupposes a developmental imperative in which
societal groups are not in a position to challenge the state through the
possession of the means of violation. There emerges a pacified and
peaceful society. Conversely, the state submits itself to the societal
control, as ultimate power lies on society. The state represents the
interests of and is owned by all societal groups, emancipation of the
state. Emancipation of state presupposes its standing above all societal
groups. Succinctly, state emancipation entails: (i) autonomy of the
state, (ii) the state stands above societal groups, (iii) establishment
of state harmony over society (Bereketeab, 2011). The pacification of
society and emancipation of state represents peace and peacefulness.
This also indicate to another development, “The development of a modern
state depends above all on the gradual emancipation of established
political structure from society” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 4-5). This
pacification of society and emancipation of state would eventually
produce a condition that render militarisation and violent conflicts
within society unnecessary.
It is common knowledge that, militarisation, because of its very nature
of provision and making available of the very tools of mortality is
anti-peace and peacefulness. Therefore, it is associated with conflicts,
destruction and wars. Militarisation in the sense of widespread
availability of the means of destruction harbours propensities that
easily evolve into conflicts. This is further accentuated when
militarisation takes place as an outcome of geo-strategically driven
external intervention. Militarisation serves as means for economic,
political, cultural and ideological domination. At the end, its primary
contribution could be understood as opposition of state emancipation and
societal pacification.
Noting the institutionalisation mechanism, Volman and Keenan (Keenan,
2008) write, ‘Militarization of Africa is being co-ordinated by
AFRICOM’. Indeed, the region has experienced a great deal of such kinds
of militarisation over several decades with concomitant dire
consequences the most obvious one being the Cold War (Yordanov, 2016).
The US need of African oil necessitated that “the Bush administration
decided to use military structure to secure access to and control over
African oil and opted to use the GWOT as a justification, rather than
acknowledging that US military intervention in Africa was about resource
control” (Keenan, 2008: 635). The GWT as a strategy and justification
for the exploitation of resources rests on militarisation of the region.
This militarisation is not limited only to international big powers but
also to regional states who willingly jump on the bandwagon of the
campaign of GWT to repress their own people. It is not rare that regimes
deploy the politics of GWT to repress opposition. For instance, the
EPRDF government in Ethiopia introduced draconian laws in 2009 that
included anti-terror law, Proclamation No. 652/2009, “that prevented
opposition political parties, the media and Civil Society organizations
working on democratisation from accessing donor funding” (Mulugeta,
2024: 85).
The GWT driven militarisation has at least two dimensions notably arming
of client states and presence of foreign armed forces. In terms of the
former client states are provided with armaments that are utilised
against internal opposition as well as in the inter-state conflicts
(Woodward, 2006, Cliffe, 2004, Schmidt, 2013, Keenan, 2008, Yordanov,
2016). This militarisation through supporting tyrant governments
therefore is serving as obstacle to democratisation, respect of human
rights, peace, security and development in HOAR. Indeed, the ready
availability of the means of warfare is a cause to the rampant wars
ravaging the region. Even pastoralists who often engage in cattle
rustling, equipped with AK-47, instead of traditional bows and arrows,
could inflict immense devastation. The region is hosting several dozens
of military organisations.
The US tendency to arrogate to itself the right to interfere and enforce
its strategic interests and values (Keller, 2006, Geis and Wunderlich,
2014) often coated in the slogan of protecting global interest and
security and their friends is a factor of militarisation in the region.
The following are some of the current external military forces actively
operating or operated in the region.
- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),
- Africa Command (AFRICOM),
- Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-Terrorism (PREACT),
- Drones base at Port Lemonnier (Djibouti) and Arba Minch (Ethiopia,
until January of 2016),
- France, Germany, Japan, Dutch, Mission Atalanta (EU), USA, China (have
military bases in Djibouti),
- Private Military Companies (PMCs) that are not accountable to neither
home governments nor host governments (Keenan, 2008: 642, Aning et al,
2008). Therefore, lack transparency and accountability to host
countries (Aning et al, 2008),
In the hinterland, the tiny state of Djibouti hosts most of the military
forces. Indeed, the constellation of Western military force has led some
to call it “Horn of Africa NATO” (Sun and Zoubir, 2016: 115). This
militarisation of Djibouti may serve well the Ismail Omar Guelleh
government, but it seems that it is inducing increasing internal
divisions and dissatisfaction as expressed in incidents such as the
bombing in July 2014 of a restaurant that is frequently visited by
Westerners, and the August 25, same year, attempt on the life of the
President. It has also contributed to complications of relation between
Djibouti and Eritrea.
The Politics of Producing Pariah States
Two notions with the same meaning are invariably employed to label
certain actors. These are ‘pariah’ and ‘rogue’. The meaning invoked by
the notions is that “states or non-state actors as being outside the
normative structure of international society” (Geis and Wunderlich,
2014: 459). This definition of course begs explanation of its
presumption of existence of consensually agreed upon “international
norms” and “international society”. In addition, “Penguin Dictionary
of International Relations (1998) define Pariah States as international
States/actors which by virtue of their political systems, ideological
postures, leadership or general behaviour suffer from diplomatic
isolation and widespread global moral opprobrium” (Lawal, 2012: 227).
International community, international values and norms are most abused
terminologies. In reality they are used to mean Westerns norms and
Western societies. In practice therefore it means arbitrary imposition
of those norms and values.
The notion of pariah states as academic subject is not well developed in
social sciences. It is rather, purposely employed by big powers,
particularly the USA, to designate states considered none compliant with
its global war on terror policies (Litwak, 2000). As Rotberg, 2007: 7)
notes, “They [pariahs] disregarded Washington’s predominant
military might and followed autarkic rather than collegial, consensual,
or respectful policy trajectories”. This makes it subject to the
politics of arbitrary construction. The politics of construction of
pariahs is usually characterised by an ideology that fosters the need of
a concerted and systematic demonization and dehumanisation campaigns
(Geis and Wunderlich, 2014: 463). Once the label sticks not only it
becomes legitimate to take any measure against the target state but also
becomes hard to remove the designation for a long time to come. This
political ideology is quietly infiltrating academia where academic
discourse is highly influenced by it (Geis and Wunderlich 2014:
459-460). Western mainstream media driven by disseminating Western
values have further promoted the politics of construction of pariahood.
In its ideological underpinning the politics of pariahood is an attempt
of cultivating Western value, particularly US value (Keller, 2006)
thereby denigrating and depreciating the values and norms of targeted
societies (a reminiscence of the civilising mission: civilising the
savages, barbarians, the dark continent). The concept is uncritically
deployed in academic works and by researchers too. Books like ‘Worst of
the Worst’, edited by Robert I. Rotbert (2007), uncritically echo what
White House officials utter. Lawal (2012: 227) notes, ‘big power
alliance structure determines Pariahood, but that they also compensate
or punish States according to their whims and caprice’. What this
indicates is that the categorisation of pariah is rather driven by big
power geo-strategic interests and considerations devoid of any rigorous
scientific interrogation. The US by its sheer power of influence
singlehandedly inserted the doctrine of pariah state at the centre of
academia and policymaking. It has also become fashionable that scholars,
donors, policymakers, Western media, human rights organisations and
activists uncritically mimic the designation.
Recently, the concept of pariah states has been popularised under the
GWT regime. The label of rogue state was rigorously pursued by the
American administration, particularly by G.W. Bush, following the
terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 (Geis and Wunderlich, 2014,
Preble, 2005). The main components of the Bush Doctrine are pre-emption,
democratisation and dominance. Pre-emption alludes to the logic of
attacking before being attacked. While democratisation become euphemism
to regime change, dominance refers to ensuring US global hegemony
(Dresner, 2009). The imperative urge of confronting global terrorism as
defined by the US administration has therefore brought the concept to
centre of policymaking, international relation, diplomacy and to certain
degree academia. The outcome of pervasive utility of the concept in the
HOAR is dividing the states into pariah (non-friendly) and friendly and
has brought serious multidimensional policy implications.
One of the consequences of the GWT driven intervention in the region is
the division of the states into friendly and none-friendly ones. The
division seems to be based on arbitrary and subjective criteria. Big
powers divide at whim states into those who are willing to serve the GWT
and those who are not. The designation has become controversial. If they
fail to fall in line with the US interpretation of GWT, are categorised
as enemies, “either you are with us or with the enemy”.
As will be detailed blow while the non-friendly countries are Sudan,
UIC-Somalia and Eritrea; the friendly countries are Ethiopia, Djibouti,
Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. A critical question is what is the
implication of this division to peace, security, stability and regional
integration? The most obvious upshot of the designation of the friendly
state for incumbents is they can get away with whatever violation
whereas non-friendly states are sanctioned harshly. Big powers seem to
gloss over or even defend actions of their close allies. A case in point
is the Assistant Secretary of State, Jandayi Frazer, in the US
Congressional Hearing, defending the Ethiopian government’s action
against the ethnic Somali Ethiopians that was labelled by many
humanitarian organisations as crime against humanity (HRW, 2008). This
kind of blatant defence of friendly states by White House officials
undermines US advocacy of universal human rights value.
Moreover, friendly states are rewarded economically, politically,
militarily and diplomatically. Ethiopia, for instance, received about
US$ 3.5 billion annually, followed by Kenya with 2.6 billions and
Uganda 1.7 billions from the West. The three countries also received
weapons, particularly from the US as rewards for their involvement in
Somalia, for instance (Burgess, 2013). Non-friendly states on the other
hand are placed under economic, political, military and diplomatic
sanctions. Rebellions to depose the governments are frequently supported
and at times even incited to destabilise them. The Sudan is a good
example of how the US armed opponents of the government (Nmoma, 2006:
55-6). These societies are extremely fragile, suffer of variety of
pathologies. The external interventions therefore further aggravate the
already precarious situation. States are pushed to failed status with
all the accompanying consequences. The division into friendly and
non-friendly states also adversely affects regional integration. A
survival instinct will bring those who are designated “pariahs”
together. This will therefore compartmentalise the states into opposing
groups affecting the long-term sustainable and functional regional
integration. Below, we will examine the case of three cases designated
as pariah.