Union of Islamic Court in Somalia
Following fifteen years of state collapse, a domesticated endeavour of
state resuscitation began to take shape in 2006 with promising outcome
led by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Within six months the UIC got
ride Mogadishu of the warlords, removed roadblocks, opened the airport
and port of Mogadishu, established security (Samatar, 2013, Muller.
2013, de Waal 2015: 122). A semblance of state structures was put in
place. Unfortunately, the Islamic profile of the UIC attracted negative
attention from neighbouring countries and the US who were allied with
the warlords. The demise of the “Somali Alliance for the Restoration of
Peace and Counter-Terrorism, which was funded by the Central
Intelligence Agency” (Samatar, 2013: 170) under the onslaught of the
UIC sparked Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006. The success of UIC
was seen from the prism of GWT. Apparently, the rapid expansion of UIC
alarmed the allies of the warlords. The warlords presented themselves as
a force combating terrorism and Islamic radicalism embodies in the UIC.
This self-presentation of the warlords as agents combating terrorism
allied them with the USA on its fight against global terrorism which it
(USA)thought Somalia had become a save heaven for terrorists following
the terrorist bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998
(Hansen, 2013: 24). Consequently, the UIC were designated as pariah that
induced the Ethiopians with the tacit support of the US to invaded
Somalia in December 2006 (Menkhaus, 2013: 98, Abdullahi 2015:.390-1).
Somalia under the UIC was suspected of being a save heaven for
international Islamic terrorist groups.
The UIC were defeated and dispersed that further plunged Somalia into
more chaos and carnage. The UIC was split into different factions
(Mengisteab, 2013). The Ethiopian occupation of Somalia had opposite
outcome than its pronounced objective, it generated an extremist radical
group, Al Shebab, who fought the Ethiopians until they were forced to
leave the country in 2009. Al Shebab introduced harsh Islamic Sharia law
in all area they controlled. They were designated terrorists allied to
international terrorism by the US administration which pushed them to
declare allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012 (Hansen, 2013: 118). The
counter-terrorism policies adopted by regional governments (Ethiopia,
Kenya and Uganda) and interventions in Somalia propelled radicalisation
and religious tensions particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia.
Demonstrations in Ethiopia by the Moslem communities; radicalisation of
Moslem communities in Mombasa and Nairobi and repressive
counter-terrorism measures by police and security forces indicate how
the GWT sparks social disruption in those countries.
Moreover, the vanquishing and labelling of the UIC engendered another
unfortunate consequence to the resuscitating of the Somali state. There
were clear indications that the UIC were trying to resuscitate the state
through its endeavour of restoring state functions and services. It was
reported that “When the UIC evicted warlords from their bases, they
also removed all the checkpoints in the areas warlords controlled. They
opened Mogadishu’s international airport and sea port – an
accomplishment that had proved elusive for several transitional
governments” (Elmi, 2010: 83). The rise of the state is a pre-requisite
for combating terrorism, radicalism, extremism, peace and stability. As
long as the state remains fragile and dysfunctional all these evils will
persist.