Union of Islamic Court in Somalia
Following fifteen years of state collapse, a domesticated endeavour of state resuscitation began to take shape in 2006 with promising outcome led by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Within six months the UIC got ride Mogadishu of the warlords, removed roadblocks, opened the airport and port of Mogadishu, established security (Samatar, 2013, Muller. 2013, de Waal 2015: 122). A semblance of state structures was put in place. Unfortunately, the Islamic profile of the UIC attracted negative attention from neighbouring countries and the US who were allied with the warlords. The demise of the “Somali Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, which was funded by the Central Intelligence Agency” (Samatar, 2013: 170) under the onslaught of the UIC sparked Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006. The success of UIC was seen from the prism of GWT. Apparently, the rapid expansion of UIC alarmed the allies of the warlords. The warlords presented themselves as a force combating terrorism and Islamic radicalism embodies in the UIC. This self-presentation of the warlords as agents combating terrorism allied them with the USA on its fight against global terrorism which it (USA)thought Somalia had become a save heaven for terrorists following the terrorist bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (Hansen, 2013: 24). Consequently, the UIC were designated as pariah that induced the Ethiopians with the tacit support of the US to invaded Somalia in December 2006 (Menkhaus, 2013: 98, Abdullahi 2015:.390-1). Somalia under the UIC was suspected of being a save heaven for international Islamic terrorist groups.
The UIC were defeated and dispersed that further plunged Somalia into more chaos and carnage. The UIC was split into different factions (Mengisteab, 2013). The Ethiopian occupation of Somalia had opposite outcome than its pronounced objective, it generated an extremist radical group, Al Shebab, who fought the Ethiopians until they were forced to leave the country in 2009. Al Shebab introduced harsh Islamic Sharia law in all area they controlled. They were designated terrorists allied to international terrorism by the US administration which pushed them to declare allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012 (Hansen, 2013: 118). The counter-terrorism policies adopted by regional governments (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) and interventions in Somalia propelled radicalisation and religious tensions particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia. Demonstrations in Ethiopia by the Moslem communities; radicalisation of Moslem communities in Mombasa and Nairobi and repressive counter-terrorism measures by police and security forces indicate how the GWT sparks social disruption in those countries.
Moreover, the vanquishing and labelling of the UIC engendered another unfortunate consequence to the resuscitating of the Somali state. There were clear indications that the UIC were trying to resuscitate the state through its endeavour of restoring state functions and services. It was reported that “When the UIC evicted warlords from their bases, they also removed all the checkpoints in the areas warlords controlled. They opened Mogadishu’s international airport and sea port – an accomplishment that had proved elusive for several transitional governments” (Elmi, 2010: 83). The rise of the state is a pre-requisite for combating terrorism, radicalism, extremism, peace and stability. As long as the state remains fragile and dysfunctional all these evils will persist.