Eritrea
Eritrea emerged as independent state de facto (1991) and de
jure (1993), following a successful conclusion of thirty years of
bloody war of independence. Eritreans held the West responsible for all
their sufferings, which have veritable implication for future diplomatic
relations. The country’s diplomatic relations commenced with its de jure
independence. Except for few years its relationship with the West was
fraught with devastating problems. Eritrea had a good relationship with
the West, particularly with the US, until the second war (1998-2000)
with Ethiopia broke out. Indeed, the Eritrean leader, in cohort with
other African leaders, was praised as a new breed of African leaders by
the Clinton Administration (Connell, 2009: 136). In addition, as
mentioned earlier, it was a member of the coalition of Frontline States
targeting Sudan. Following the outbreak of the war however Eritrea fell
out of favour of the US administration. Ethiopia and Eritrea now at odds
with each other vying for USA favouritism. The choice was self-evident
for geo-strategic reasons. The US chose the powerhouse of the region,
Ethiopia (Connell, 2009, Reid, 2009). Ethiopia was perceived as a
strategic ally of the US in GWT (Klosowicz, 2015). Therefore, Ethiopia
was, for instance, permitted to systematically breach the Court of
Arbitration final and binding verdict on the border issue of the two
countries with tacit US support. Indeed, White House officials pushed
for renegotiation on the final and binding border verdict (Bolton 2007).
This annoyed Eritrea a great deal leading to it’s drifting away from the
US which in turn induced it’s isolation and ended up under sanctions.
The war and the subsequent no war no peace situation adversely affected
Eritrea’s domestic as well as international relations. It also brought a
dire consequence to the region where the countries engaged in proxy wars
(Lyon, 2009). In the internality dimension political, economic, security
situations rapidly deteriorated. They were driven by domestic political
factors, regional relations and international factors. The final and
binding Algiers Agreement that ended the war was rejected by Ethiopia
(Muller, 2016, ICG, 2010: 21). A trusted ally of the USA in the GWT,
Ethiopia was emboldened by the former’s support in it’s rejection of the
implementation of the International Court of Arbitration demarcation
verdict. Eritrea accused the United States of not honouring its
commitment and pressuring Ethiopia to implement the verdict, conversely
the US pushed for negotiated settlement of the border issue that will be
acceptable to Ethiopia (Woldemariam and Yohannes, 2007). The then
Assistant Secretary of State, Jandyi Frazer, openly declared that the
residents of Badme should be consulted thereby rendering the Court of
Arbitration verdict virtually null and void. This further angered
Eritrea, leading to the deterioration of relations between the two
countries. Eritrea ended up in the camp of “pariah states”. A
testimony to the unjustness of the politics of the creation of pariah
states is that while Ethiopia who reject international Court of
Arbitration verdict; invaded Somalia; armed, trained, gave sanctuary to
armed Eritrean groups striving to depose the government in Asmara could
avoid sanctions, Eritrea was put under sanctions for alleged support of
Al Shebab and disturbing security of the region. Supporting Al Shebab
was construed as aiding and abetting terrorism thus undermining the
fight on GWT.
The GWT driven isolation, sanctions and demonisation pushed Eritrea to
the brink of explosion. An economy already dilapidated by thirty-year
war of independence immensely suffered under the sanctions regime. The
sanctions discouraged external investment as well as engagement with WB
and IMF became impossible. The economic hardship couple with political
and security challenges induced mass youth migration. The 1998-2000 war
engendered division with the leadership of the country many ending in
prison. The political crisis had devasting effect on domestic media
where many journalists were imprisoned, private newspapers were closed.
The legislation was suspended. The national service that was
indefinitely extended became the main lifeline of the country; at the
same time, it became the mainstay for the youth to flee the country. In
short undeclared state of emergency reigned. The no war no peace status
quo between Eritrea and Ethiopia that lasted for twenty years
(1998-2018) had a devastating effect to the two countries but much more
to Eritrea and the region as whole.
The rapprochement between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia signed in 2018
was supposed to harbinger a new epoch in the region. The rapprochement
ended the no-peace no-war situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Eritrea and Somalia renewed diplomatic relations. The three leaders also
expressed the ambition of revitalising IGAD. A new climate of diplomacy
began to reign in the region. This new initiative of regional
integration did not fall on favourable eyes of the West. The West
opposed the new rapprochement because it would antagonise their
geostrategic interest in the region. The West waged concerted campaign
against the three leaders. Consequently, the president of Somalia lost
power, Ethiopia was plunged into civil war sparked by the TPLF, an ally
of the West. Expectedly, the tripartite rapprochement lost momentum. In
addition, the PM of Ethiopia, in October 2023, declared that Ethiopia
should own a port either through peaceful means, or if necessary, by
force. The PM claimed ownership of port is life and death for Ethiopia.
This sent a shockwave throughout the region. Eventually, Ethiopia signed
a memorandum of understanding with the breakaway Somaliland to lease a
port where Ethiopia will have a commercial port and naval base in return
for recognition of the independence of Somaliland. This generated strong
reaction from the federal government in Mogadishu accusing Ethiopia of
violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integration. This
added new element to the already precarious situation of the region.
Therefore, the region continues to march on its usual road of insecurity
and instability.
Proxy Wars
Yet another consequence of GWT is the proliferation of proxy wars. Next
to the division into friendly and non-friendly of the states comes the
utilisation of proxy wars. The phenomenon of proxy wars assumes two
dimensions. One dimension concerns involvement of big powers who employ
client state in their geostrategic ambition for domination. For
instance, when the US and Soviet Union converted the HOA into
ideological and geostrategic playground (Lefebvre, 1987, Cliffe1999,
Woodward, 2006, Yordanov, 2016) they used Ethiopia and Somalia. By the
end of the Cold War, it was estimated about 600, 000 people were killed
in the HOAR (Rogers, 2014). The superpowers not only produced client
states but also very easily shifted alliance, evidence of the
opportunistic nature of proxy wars. By mid-1970 the US abandoned
Ethiopia and allied with Somalia and Sudan, while the Soviet Union
abandoned Somalia and moved to Ethiopia. The Consequences of the
opportunistic moves to the region were enormous. The region was
converted into dumping ground for sophisticated weapons the two big
powers produced (Yordanov 2016).
Consequently, the region is sustaining longest and devastating wars. The
GWT and piracy that generated another form of proxy war and
militarisation replaced Cold War. Moreover, GWT and piracy brought
international naval forces and military forces to the HOA for the second
time (Sun and Zoubir, 2016) producing new proxy clients. The
proliferation of proxy wars has the tendency of manufacturing new
agents. In recent history of the region, we witnessed three types of
proxy war agents. We can categorise them in a three-tier structure.
These are the big powers of the Cold War, the post-Cold War middle
powers and emerging low rank proxy war agents. The sources of power of
these proxy war agents varies, from sheer military, to mix of military
and economic, and sole economy. The Gulf-States, for instance, could
constitute the last form. In the last case economic power is translated
into political, diplomatic and possibly military power.
The new dimension of military proxies also generated reconfiguration of
regional and international patron-client relations. Uganda, Kenya,
Ethiopia and Djibouti as clients of the new system of conglomeration of
GWT readily intervened in Somalia (Volman and Keeman, 2010). Djibouti
was virtually transformed into a “vassal” state through its hosting of
various military bases. Drones based in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti,
regularly survey and attack targets in Somalia and Yemen. Djibouti was
therefore playing the role of Trojan Horse in the service of GWT proxy
regime.
The second dimension of proxy war relates to regional states. Regional
states are increasingly engaged in employing opposition groups of other
state(s) to promote their own regional and national interest or
undermine other state(s) (Abbink, 2003, Lyon, 2009). The regional
states, in an imitation of big powers, attempt to create their own
clients. After its invasion of Somalia, Kenya rushed in crafting the
Jubaland state (Skeppeström and Nordlund, 2014: 18, Hammond, 2013: 188).
This state is intended to serve as a buffer zone for Kenya from attacks
by Somali groups. This autonomous state in southern Somalia, bordering
Kenya, is perceived by many Somalis as created to be client of Kenya.
Ethiopia also crafted out the Transitional Federal Government comprising
warlords. Indeed, many Somalis argue that the introduction of federal
governmental system is an imposition from the neighbouring states to
balkanise Somalia, “The Current Addis Ababa regime, therefore, wants to
create several mini-states that are hostile to each other and have good
relations with Ethiopia” (Elmi, 2010: 23). Another element played out
in the GWT proxy regime is the arbitrary designation of political
opponents (individuals as well as groups) as terrorists.
The EPRDF government, for instance, was frequently accused of
designating opponents, politicians, human rights activists, journalists,
ethnic political organisations such as the Oromo Liberation Front,
Ogaden National Liberation Front, Gambella movements as terrorists. The
government proclaimed anti-terrorism law (FDRE, 2009), under which many
were put in jail and many others were banned. Ethiopia faced harsh
criticism from humanitarian organisations for the use of Proclamation
No. 652/2009 sweepingly. Critics argued that it is used to prosecute
opposition parties, individuals and private media (Griffith, 2013, HRW,
2008, Kassa, 2013). Museveni of Uganda, another friendly state was also
abusing terrorist laws (Fesher, 2012).
International Peace Mediation and GWT
The rampant conflicts and chronic intra-state and inter-state wars would
rationalise the logic of peace mediations in the region. How mediation
is conducted has significance not only to the settlement of the wars but
also to the credibility and integrity of the international peace
mediation system. It also indicates to the morality and legality of
instruments of international mediation and enforcement of peace. Many
have appealed for a holistic, regional, even-handed and balanced
approach to peace mediation (Young, 2012, Bereketeab, 2013). Three
important elements in mediation process are: (i) identify and define
root causes; (ii) identify and ensure equal and genuine
participation/representation of stakeholders; (iii) domestic ownership
of process and outcome (Call and Wyeth, 2008). The GWT seems to have
distorted the international peace mediation system. Neo-liberal
peacebuilding and peace mediation focuses on quick fixes and formal
procedures. It therefore avoids dealing with root causes, quite often
defines the problem and stakeholders narrowly. For instance, in
identifying and defining stakeholders, it focuses only on warring parts.
The imperatives of GWT necessitates treating cases and countries
differently that would not promote an overall peace and security in the
region. To illustrate the different treatment let’s examine (i) CPA:
Sudan, (ii) TFG-UIC: Somalia, (iii) Ethiopia-Eritrea.
Let’s begin with the CPA. Unlike its name, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), signed between the ruling NCP and the rebel SPLM was
all but comprehensive (Young, 2012). What began as all-encompassing
peace negotiations, it was progressively reduced to bilateral to suite
the GWT agenda. Sudan was accused of aiding and abetting terrorism
therefore the secession of South Sudan was seen as the right thing and
would boost the fight against terrorism. The mediators narrowly focused
on north-south, a uni-dimensional approach to multifaceted conflicts,
the final of which became the CPA. This abridgement of the peace
mediation led to exclusion and marginalisation of important movements
and actors; only the NCP and SPLM were taken on board. The
incomprehensiveness and flaws of the peace mediation was reflected in
the explosion of conflicts in Darfur (Medani, 2012: 290), Blue Nile,
South Kordofan and South Sudan (Young, 2012).
The peace mediation in Somalia was also characterised by serious flaws.
In the internecine war between the US supported TFG and the UIC, the
mediators stood on the side of the TFG, although the latter lacked
popular legitimacy. This failed to settle the conflict and plunged
Somalia into more brutal internecine war (Samatar, 2013, Muller, 2013).
The nature of the conflict in Somalia was defined by external actors
such as Ethiopia, IGAD and the USA and was presented as conflict between
international terrorism and the Somali people. This external definition
of the nature of the conflict and actors involved deprived the Somalis
the opportunity of defining, characterising and finding settlement to
their problems.
The 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was ended through the
Algiers Agreement. The Agreement contained a number of provisions, the
most significant of which was the final and binding border delineation
and demarcation article. The UN, AU, EU and USA assumed the role of
witness and guarantor in which they are empowered to enforce the
agreement (Algiers Agreement, 12 December 2000). The Algiers Agreement
authorised the guarantors to invoke Chapter Seven of the UN Charter
against anyone of the signatories who renege from its commitment
(Algiers Agreement, 18 June). When EEBC (Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary
Commission) issued its verdict in April 2002, Ethiopia reneged its
commitment and rejected the Verdict because it rewarded the flashpoint
of the war (Badme) to Eritrea. The guarantors, instead of exercising
their responsibility and putting pressure on Ethiopia chose to engage in
acts of appeasement. Ethiopia got away with rejection of international
Court of Arbitration verdict while Eritrea faced sanctions.
Peace mediations in the HOAR require different methodological
approaches, which are appropriate to the history and context of the
region. A holistic, regional by orientation and comprehensive by nature
methodology is required. The piecemeal, one at time, approach employed
by peace mediators has so far failed to bring peace, stability and
security to the region. This approach which for instance drove the
mediators to ultimately focus on the south-north conflict of Sudan
indeed sparked the outbreak of conflicts in other parts of the country.
Another flaw in the peace mediation approach is the unbalanced, biased
and double standard practices. Cases as well as countries are treated
differently. The most flagrant example of this double standard is the
treatment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. Although the conflict has
been classified by many scholars and observers as the epicentre of
conflicts in the HOAR (ICG, 2003, Healy and Plaut, 2007, Reid 2009),
mediators particular Western powers ignored it. This constricted
approach to mediation undermined the GWT by generating resentment and
bitterness among ignored groups. Unless peace mediation is extricated
from the imperatives of GWT and geo-strategic interests, there will not
be lasting peace in the region.
Regional Integration, Development and Legitimacy under the GWT
Regime
The consequences detailed above further influence other three
dimensions, notably regional integration, development and legitimacy.
Development and legitimacy have the tendency of promoting healthy and
sustainable regional integration. Functional regional integration in
turn enhances development and legitimacy. What does legitimacy in the
context of regional integration mean? Legitimacy has two dimensions,
internal and external (Schaar, 1981). In its internality dimension
legitimacy would represent a situation where there prevails an amicable
relation between citizens, on one hand, and states and regional
organisation on the other. In other words, citizens understand the
latter as representing their interest and wellbeing so that they confer
on it legitimacy. Regional integration is also perceived as a tool of
promoting development.
The GWT has a dire consequence to regional integration, socio-economic
development and state legitimacy. Regional integration is very sensitive
therefore presupposes harmonious relationships among states and peoples
that enter into regional patrimony (Mengisteab and Bereketeab, 2012).
Conflicts and divisions often tend to foster suspicion, mistrust, hate
and antagonisms. These are features that would not bode well for
regional integration to succeed and by extension development. All
elements of conflict and suspicion need therefore to be managed before
genuine regional integration could be entertained. External
self-interest driven intervention that aggravate conflicts and suspicion
have to be prevented in order for regional integration to succeed.
Socio-economic development by its very nature is also highly sensitive
to peace, stability and security. Wars and conflicts destroy not only
human life but also socio-economic infrastructures and life sustaining
material foundations (Bereketeab, 2013). It is not secrete that the
rampant conflicts in the HOAR have created environmental degradation,
desertification, soil erosion, draughts that adversely affect
agriculture and agricultural production, pastoralism and pastoral
production, economic growth, income per capita that in turn affect
social activities such as health, education, literacy, level of poverty,
nutrition, living standard, child mortality, life expectancy, etc
(Mengisteab 2013).
Our third variable, legitimacy, is also negatively affected by GWT
intervention. Legitimacy is contingent on functional and harmonious
state-society relation. This relation presupposes that the state
undertakes some basic provision highly valued by society, in turn
society acknowledges and confers sovereignty on the state (Callaghy,
1984, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Tilly, 1978, Young, 1994). This harmonious
state-society relation could however easily be disrupted by external
intervention, particularly when that external intervention sow division
and conflict among them. What the GWT does is that it dislocates the
state from the harmonious state-society relation and locates its loyalty
somewhere else. Those friendly states in HOAR show their loyalty and
accountability to their patrons in the GWT regime that may detach them
from their society. The state then becomes alien, indeed an enemy of and
a hazard to society (Keenan, 2008). This loss of legitimacy has become
the main source of the perpetual conflict, instability and insecurity in
the HOAR.
Regional integration, development and legitimacy, ultimately presupposes
harmonious and functional relation between citizens, national states and
regional organisation. The modern state is autonomous of society, while
ultimate power rests on society. Regionalism and regionalisation, an
expression of regional integration, manifests collective endeavour for
collective problem resolutions. A social contract between citizens,
state and regional organisation undergirds modern regionalisation.
Conclusion
This article set out to critically analyse manifestations and
implications of GWT in the HOAR. Many perceive the rhetoric of GWT as
advocated by the USA is rather embedded in the politics of domination.
The politics of domination in this context relates to economic,
cultural, political and ideological. In the process of exercising this
politics of domination, targeted societies are systematically and
mischievously deprived of agency to define, design, plan and execute
their problems, realities and future. This further leads to division,
marginalization of social groups often with concomitant social evils:
conflicts, wars, poverty, abuse of human rights, lack of democracy. In
this context the misguided GWT, in lieu of preventing terrorism
contributes to its creation. The expansion of terrorism, extremism and
radicalism is to a major degree a consequence of the GWT.
The GWT driven intervention through its division of the states into
friendly and non-friendly (pariah) states has undermined the unity of
the region. Further regional integration, socio-economic development and
state legitimacy have become victims of the misguided GWT policy.
Militarism and military solution to fundamentally socio-economic and
political problems will not lead to settling the festering pathologies
in the region. The region will fare better if given the chance to sort
out its problems. Cold War, GWT, war against piracy, and scramble for
resources have no good record in the region.
In addition, GWT has aggravated the fundamental problem the people of
the region face, notably societal construction. At the root of the wars
running today in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan lay the
incomplete and distorted process of nation and state formation. The GWT,
incontrovertibly, contributed to the incompleteness and distortion of
the process. Nation and state formation is by its very nature domestic,
political and long-term that should be left for internal actors.
The interventionist neoliberal agenda that underpinned the emergence of
the GWT rests upon two Western philosophical assumptions. The first is
the belief that we live in post-nation state era therefore sovereignty,
territorial integrity and inviolability of the state is anachronistic.
The second is globalisation has overtaken localisation. The two
assumptions would permit big powers to intervene whenever they deem it
necessary to do so. Security is defined from a global dimension. The USA
would invoke a security interest globally that allows it to intervene
beyond its borders. The GWT was therefore concocted to allow the USA to
intervene everywhere with devastating effect to subject people. The
consequences of GWT still reverberates in the HOAR, even after, at least
formally, the references to it have receded.